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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals opinion was entered September 3, 2009. Appellant's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed on October 5, 2009, and was granted on 
December 29, 2009. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-3-10-
2(3)(a) (2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion (Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 
96, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)) by asking Plaintiffs tort reform questions listed in his 
questionnaire in amended form and whether Plaintiff properly preserved this issue by 
simply proposing the jury questionnaire in the first place, but not objecting to the court's 
actions or requesting that the original questions be listed in the final questionnaire. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled plaintiff 
counsel's objection to a harmless closing argument reference to a well-known case to 
counter the use of a per diem damages analysis. 
3. Whether the trial court correctly granted Defendant's Motion in Limine 
dismissing Norrine Boylefs loss of consortium claim. 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11 (2005) 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "injury" or "injured" means a significant permanent injury to a person that 
substantially changes that person's lifestyle and includes the following: 
(i) a partial or complete paralysis of one or more of the extremities; 
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(ii) significant disfigurement; or 
(iii) incapability of the person of performing the types of jobs the person 
performed before the injury; and 
(b) "spouse" means the legal relationship: 
(i) established between a man and a woman as recognized by the laws 
of this state; and 
(ii) existing at the time of the person's injury. 
(2) The spouse of a person injured by a third party on or after May 4, 1997, may 
maintain an action against the third party to recover for loss of consortium. 
(3) A claim for loss of consortium begins on the date of injury to the spouse. The 
statute of limitations applicable to the injured person shall also apply to the 
spouse's claim of loss of consortium. 
(4) A claim for the spouse's loss of consortium shall be: 
(a) made at the time the claim of the injured person is made and joinder of 
actions shall be compulsory; and 
(b) subject to the same defenses, limitations, immunities, and provisions 
applicable to the claims of the injured person. 
(5) The spouse's action for loss of consortium: 
(a) shall be derivative from the cause of action existing in behalf of the injured 
person; and 
(b) may not exist in cases where the injured person would not have a cause of 
action. 
(6) Fault of the spouse of the injured person, as well as fault of the injured person, 
shall be compared with the fault of all other parties, pursuant to Sections 78-27-37 
through 78-27-43, for purposes of reducing or barring any recovery by the spouse 
for loss of consortium. 
(7) Damages awarded for loss of consortium, when combined with any award to the 
injured person for general damages, may not exceed any applicable statutory limit 
on noneconomic damages, including Section 78-14-7.1. 
(8) Damages awarded for loss of consortium which a governmental entity is required 
to pay, when combined with any award to the injured person which a 
governmental entity is required to pay, may not exceed the liability limit for one 
person in any one occurrence under Title 63, Chapter 30d, Governmental 
Immunity Act of Utah. 
Rule 24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order indicated . . . 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the 
standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and . . . 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
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(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court. 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is sufficient that a 
party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the 
court the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the 
court and his grounds therefor; and, if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or 
order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him. 
Rule 47(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to conduct 
the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter 
event, the court shall permit the parties or their attorneys to supplement the examination 
by such further inquiry as is material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective 
jurors such additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper. 
Prior to examining the jurors, the court may make a preliminary statement of the case. 
The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to make a preliminary statement of the 
case, and notify the parties in advance of trial. 
CITATION TO THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The citation to the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is Boyle v. Christensen, 
2009 UT App 241, 219 P.3d 58, 2009 WL 2783006. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises from a relatively minor auto pedestrian accident in which the 
Plaintiff was hit in a low speed collision in a grocery store parking lot. Alleging damages 
arising from the pedestrian's personal injuries, Plaintiffs (the pedestrian and his wife) 
brought suit against the defendant, who was driving the vehicle. 
B. Summary of Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Trial Court. 
After discovery, but prior to trial, Defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff 
spouse's loss of consortium claim. The trial court correctly reasoned the spouse had 
5 
failed to show the requisite facts to sustain a loss of consortium claim under Utah Code 
Ann. §30-2-11 (2005). The case continued to trial on the personal injury claim of the 
pedestrian. 
Immediately preceding the trial, a proposed jury questionnaire was provided to the 
trial court by Plaintiff. Plaintiffs questions were received by the trial court, who 
implemented them into a single set of written questions that was created according to the 
trial court's discretion. Plaintiffs counsel never objected to the proposed voir dire 
questions, passed the jury for cause and eventually approved of the impaneled jury. 
Despite the lack of any objection at trial, Petitioners now complain that the trial court 
abused its discretion by combining the two sets of voir dire questions into one amended 
questionnaire. 
During her closing argument, defease counsel mentioned a well-known case in 
order to counter a per diem analysis presented by Plaintiff during his closing argument. 
The court, in its discretion, overruled Plaintiffs objection as the reference was harmless 
lawyer talk during the closing argument. After deliberation, the jury returned a 
substantial verdict for the plaintiff. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the actions of the trial court in all respects: 
We conclude that Mr. Boyle did not adequately preserve his argument that 
the district court erred in failing to ask requested juror bias and tort reform 
questions on voir dire. We also conclude that no error arose from 
Christensen's counsel's closing argument reference to Liebeck and that the 
district court properly dismissed Mrs. Boyle's loss of consortium claim. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 
Opinion at ^ 24. 
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C. Material Background Facts. 
On July 22, 2004 plaintiff John Boyle was hit by a vehicle which was traveling at 
a very low speed in a Smith's parking lot. Plaintiff described the impact as follows: 
Q. Okay. Tell me what part of his vehicle struck what part of your 
body. 
A. The left front bumper, hood and tire struck me. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And as near as ~ as near as I can figure, he hit me on the left-hand 
side front and then I turned because I was bruised on my left side on 
my arm, my hip, my leg and my shin. So that's all I have to go by. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I was sore other places, but that was where the impact occurred. 
Q. Okay. Were you able to remain upright? 
A. I was. I rode up on his hood and grabbed the bumper and the wheel 
well and stayed upright, otherwise I would have gone down. 
(R. 240, Plaintiff Dep. pp. 23:23-24:14; R244-245, 258-259.) 
Mr. Boyle did not seek out medical attention for allegedly-related injuries until 
five days after the accident, when he sought only chiropractic treatment from Walter 
Wagner for left-sided, lower back and buttock pain on July 26, 2004. (See Wagner 
Records, R. 245 at 267-316.) Mr. Boyle was an existing patient of Dr. Wagner, having 
seen him for similar left lower back, buttock and leg problems several times prior to the 
subject accident. Indeed, Mr. Boyle received treatment from Dr. Wagner for these 
problems as recently as June 2004, which was the month prior to the accident. (Id.) Mr. 
Boyle's medical records and imaging studies demonstrate he had complained of back 
pain for almost 40 years prior to the July 2004 accident. Moreover, imaging studies 
demonstrate that Mr. Boyle was suffering from severe degenerative disc disease at L5-S1 
as far back as January of 1990. (Id) 
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From the date of the accident through May 9, 2005, Mr. Boyle sought chiropractic 
treatment from Dr. Wagner twenty-three times. Twenty-two of these treatments came in 
the ten weeks following the accident. After the twenty-third treatment on May 9, 2005, 
Mr. Boyle did not receive any chiropractic treatment for back pain or injuries for over 
twelve months. (Id.) Then, on May 19, 2006, Mr. Boyle again began receiving 
chiropractic back treatments after a separate and unrelated trip and fall accident at work. 
(Plaintiffs Dep., R. 260-61(pp. 41:24-42:13.)) 
At the time of his deposition, Mr. Boyle worked at O'Currance, an inbound call 
center, and had been employed there since December 12, 2005. He made between $20 to 
$35 an hour (depending upon his sales numbers), worked thirty hours a week, and 
received health insurance benefits. (Id at R. 253-54 (pp. 9-10.)) Mr. Boyle had no plans 
to quit working at O'Currance. (Id.) At the time of the accident, Mr. Boyle was working 
for Mascot Financial where he was doing almost exactly the same type of work that he 
currently does for O'Currance: 
Q. Tell me what some of your job responsibilities are now currently on 
the phone. 
A. I just take incoming phone calls, people who have an interest in 
getting out of debt, and then sell them the product, which is a $350 
product. 
Q. Okay. Now, tell me what you did for Mascot Financial. 
A. You generate your own leads calling people and it's a debt reduction 
plan as well. 
(Id at R. 254-55(pp. 10:8-11, 11:23-25)) 
Mr. Boyle testified that from August 2004 to December 12, 2005, he could not 
work anywhere because of his back pain, and thus, was unemployed. (R. 247(p. 13:1.)) 
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Yet, Mr. Boyle admitted later in his deposition that he is an avid golfer and worked at 
Glenmoor golf course in West Jordan eight to sixteen hours each week between August 
2004 and December 2005. (R. 262-266(pp. 46, 50:10-16.)) Presumably, Mr. Boyle 
slowed down his work at the golf course when he got the job at O'Currance on December 
12, 2005. 
Prior to trial, on May 21, 2008, the trial court granted Defendant's motion in 
limine to dismiss plaintiff Norrine Boyle as she had not met the statutory requirements 
for making a loss of consortium claim. (Motions Transcript, see Addendum; R. 532-34 
attached hereto.) Soon thereafter, this matter was heard at a jury trial June 3-6, 2008. 
Prior to trial, a jury questionnaire was provided to the court by the plaintiff. The trial 
court did not refuse to ask Plaintiffs questions; rather it considered Plaintiffs questions 
and created one set of written questions for the jury to respond to during oral voir dire. 
The written questions were given to counsel before they were asked by the court, (R. 
436-40; 596-600.) 
After receiving the court's written questions, neither party objected to the 
questionnaire that was ultimately presented by the court. (See id.) The court used the 
written questions it fashioned during oral voir dire and asked extensive follow-up 
questions while the jury was responding to the questions; again, there were no objections. 
(R. 693, Jury Selection Transcript at pp. 25-89, see Appellant Addendum, at Ex. 4.) 
After oral voir dire, the trial court met in chambers with counsel for both parties. (Id, at 
90:13-21.) At this time, there was only one challenge for cause by defense counsel, 
which was denied by the court. (Id at 91:4-92:16.) 
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During this meeting in chambers, there were no objections to the questionnaire as 
posed by the trial court and there were no requests to ask additional questions designed to 
reveal possible juror biases regarding tort reform or ask questions regarding tort reform 
issues. Indeed, the only request was by counsel for the defendant, who expressed a desire 
to ask further questions of juror number 8. QA at 92:21.) When the jury pool was 
brought back before the judge, he asked many additional questions of juror number 8. 
(Id. at 93-97.) After his questioning, the court invited counsel for both parties up for a 
bench conference and specifically asked if they any further questions, and both parties 
indicated that they had nothing further. (IcL at 97:10-18.) 
Both parties then passed the jury panel for cause, (Id. at 97:21-98:3) and after the 
preemptory challenges were made, a jury was selected. At this point, both parties clearly 
indicated that the jury that eventually impaneled, was the jury that they had selected. (Id. 
at 99:10-20.) Not one objection was raised during the entire jury selection process. 
Moreover, the only additional questions requested, were the follow-up questions 
requested by counsel for the defendant, which the court promptly asked. 
During closing arguments, counsel for defendant made an innocuous reference to 
another case in order to make a point: 
The third main issue in this case is Mr. Boyle's pain and suffering. What has he 
been like since the accident? What's expected in the future? Ladies and gentlemen, 
they want a lot of money for this. A lot of money. What's been written on the 
board is called a per diem analysis. 
Sometimes people like to use that in — 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I object to this, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Your objection is overruled. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: It's a per diem analysis. How many days has it been 
since the accident? How many days for the rest of his life? And how much per day 
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is that worth? That's what's been done :c. • * • •• i * ac JM.V!> . ^ ;. Me 
McDonald's case with a cup of coffee. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Objection. 
THE COURT: What's the basis of your objection? You are not stating those 
succinctly, the legal basis. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN :; M> objection is it's prejudicial and it's not in 
evidence. 
AHE COURT. Okay. Your objection is noted but overruled. 
(Closing Argument Transcript at R. 695, pp. 48:7-49:5 ) 
A fter ha v ing heard all the e\ idence w Inch inu/luuled extensi\ e medical expert 
testimony, the jury rendered a verdict for $62,500.00, which was substantially more when 
interest "vv as added (R , 669 6 73.) Unhappy with the jury's decision, Plaintiffs' appealed. 
(R. 674-75.J The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial cour Jet. :* "^ v.r-* - -y 
holding 1) Plaintiff failed to adequately preserve for appeal his claim that the district 
, . . " ' i " ^ I K i : h e 
overruled plaintiff counsel's objection to defense's counsel's Liebeck reference, and 3) 
dismissal oi A:. -. iv-\ ,c ,
 sv);,,, wf consortium claim,,, was not error. Opinion, [^24. Again, 
unhappy with the Court of Appeals Opinion , Plaintiffs' filed a Petition for "W rit ::»f 
Certiorari, on October 5, 2009, This Court granted Plaintiffs' Writ of Certiorari on 
De< ;embei 29,2009 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintil I is not ennnej K na\ c .i jury questionnaire presented in the exact form, 
depth, or extent as he claims. Even if Plaintiff is entitle cl„ to ha" - e the exact q;i lestions he 
proposed on his questionnaire asked during voir dire, his attorney failed to preserve the 
i ^ - . . ; < - !*-*! -;•:".••• • - ' - • J - - - ' - : <-. . —: ncii UIL ir;a1 court elected to submit the 
,:i :i 
written questions in amended form. Plaintiffs counsel also did not seek an opportunity 
to ask additional questions when given the opportunity to do so at the end of the trial 
judge's questions, even though defense counsel did request and receive additional 
questioning. (R 693 at p. 97.) An essential component of disagreeing with a court's 
decision is that counsel makes that objection known to the court; Plaintiffs counsel failed 
to do so at any time prior to or during this trial. 
Moreover, the trial court judge properly ruled on plaintiff counsel's objection to 
defense counsel's harmless reference to the "McDonald's Coffee" case. Defense counsel 
used the reference in an effort to cast light on plaintiff counsel's attempt to inflate 
damages by presenting them as part of a per diem analysis. Defense counsel's closing 
argument references were a valid attempt to expose opposing counsel's highly prejudicial 
technique and defend her client against an excessive judgment. Regardless, even if it was 
error, it was harmless. 
Lastly, Plaintiffs wife, Norrine Boyle, was not injured in this case. The 
legislature has set forth very specific rules for a loss of consortium claims; Plaintiffs 
injuries simply do not rise to the level required for his wife, Mrs. Boyle to sustain her 
claim for loss of consortium. Plaintiff Boyle was not incapable of performing the types 
of jobs the person performed before the injury. This was not a summary judgment 
motion, but simply a motion to interpretation of whether Ms. Boyle met the evidentiary 
requirements of Utah Code. Ann. § 30-2-1 l(l)(a)(iii). 
The well-reasoned opinions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly 
interpreted and applied long established Utah law regarding voir dire, preservation of the 
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record foi appeal, and a ti ial coi n it' s disci etion Consequent .; •* \ oon ^HOL o,.! *rm 
the decision by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
Ilir low.Tt outl did iint i oniiinl I'IMI liy allow nwi l!w fnal vjoui I ]iidye discrditm 
to conduct voir dire, allowing counsel to use non-prejudicial "lawyer talk" during closing 
arguments, or dismissing Ms. Bo> le's loss of consortium claim. Plaintiff counsel did not 
preserve the right to appeal regarding tort reform qi lestions becai lse there was no 
objection prior to or during voir dire. Defense counsel is allowed to use lawyer talk 
tlin nig closing titgiinii'iiiLs In tit It/ml IRI tJninl, In citJtiihun, the (rial court, may dismiss a 
claim if a plaintiff is unable to meet an evidentiary standard prescribed by statute. 
I iiii iijicl), I:K- ...iu :N v ^'.r and the District Court and the Utah Court of Appeals properly 
resolved the ^ J O ^ - O ^ I H V >• ,.? - " 
POINT I iFFIRMING A JUDGE'S DISCRETION WHEN CONDUCTING 
VOIR DIRE IS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH PRIOR DECISIONS AND 
IS NOT ERROR WHEN APPEII ANTS FAILED TO PRESERVE 
THE RIGHT TO APPEAI,. 
The trial court fashioned a voir dire questionnaire for potential jurors by 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because the judge is given "considerable discretion" 
jin! '"likiy itseli conduct the examination ..,** i.iii \>ii ,; ;c. our. ••..(•* * Kuic 47(a) 
(2008); see also Ostler v. Albina Transfer ( J I . * ? — * - -" "* 
There is no question that a trial court judge does not need to use the exact questions 
suggested by either pai ty , bi it instead ma) i ise altei nati \ ' e questions. Bee v. Aneheuser-
1 3 
Busch, Inc., 2009 UT App 35, f 16, 204 P.3d 204. In this case, Appellants' Brief simply 
does not contain a citation to the record showing they properly objected to the Trial 
Court's voir dire questionnaire. 
Counsel is always on notice that it is necessary to show the right to appeal has 
been preserved. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require an objection to preserve 
the issue for appeal. Rule 24(a)(5)(A) requires an appellant to include "a citation to the 
record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or a statement of grounds 
for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." Utah R. Appellate P. 
(2008). A "challenging party must show they raised the issue in a timely fashion, 
specifically, and supported by evidence or relevant legal authority." Williams v. Bench, 
2008 UT App. 306, ^ 31 , 193 P.3d 640 (internal quotations omitted). This supports the 
policy that "trial courts ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if 
appropriate, correct it." Id. (internal quotations omitted). If a Plaintiff fails to do this, 
then he or she is "deemed to have waived the issue." Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 
869 P.2d 926, 931 (Utah 1993). Ultimately, "alleged deficiencies in voir dire must be 
brought to the district court's attention in order to be preserved for appeal." Opinion, 
atf7. 
Furthermore, the Utah Court of Appeals has held parties are entitled to ask 
questions specifically designed to elicit "which jurors may have read or heard 
information generally on tort reform." Bee, 2009 UT App. at ^ 16 (citing Barrett v. 
Peterson, 868 P.2d 96 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), which quotes Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 
467 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)) (ellipses omitted). The purpose for allowing this type of 
14 
questioning is speeifie; these questions ate designed to dck' i iuine v\hethci an\ 
prospective juror has been exposed to tort reform propaganda, which can lead to 
subconscious biases. Id.; see also Alcazar, 2008 U T App. at TJ12 (noting "the trial cour t ' s 
questions did not allow the plaintiff an opportunity to know vv hich of the prospecti ;e 
jurors had been exposed to tort reform propaganda.") (emphasis in original). 
I11 Lb.'le! < 'he pliunlil I hmughl a personal injur)' action against w^ .hivei o\ « 
commercial truck for an accident in which the plaintiff was paralyzed from the waist 
down • • . .. c at 446 . One of the issues on appeal by the plaintiff/appellant was that 
tik :u'"" i ;" • did not adeqi Mitel) " i e^ eal bias related to exposui e to "tort • •' 
propaganda. I d at 447 . The judge refused to ask the plaintiffs proposed questions, and 
insicj.i . UNM. • ru iiijr potential jurors would object to providing a large claim 
(exceeding a million dollars), (2) if they believed people should r.ot resort to the courts to 
resolve disputes or recover damages, and (3) whether they "believed they were incapable 
of rendering ,i I'm and inn1 s r u h n based mi iln1 eudc in a M Id i he Uldh I oun mi 
Appeals found the modified "questions [were] substantively responsive to plaintiffs 
concerns and appear[ed] sufficient to reveal ' tort reform' b ias . " Id. Accordingly, the 
court upheld the trial court judge's discretion when condi icting \ • oir dii e 
In the present case, the Boyles have failed to show two things regarding voir dire: 
1
 I i ln , \ eaniia11 , stablish \\\ "i i;il i * HIS I pulae abused In i dis* ul ioi i and \ /") they cannot 
demonstrate they preserved the right to appeal. The Utah Court of Appeals already found 
the district court conducted voir dire using its own... questions without objection from 
either par ty," Opinion, f4 Signifies mtlj ' ' [i L]1 t: t..o ! iiiie [] did N 1 t Bo> le ::; « - er indie at e • 1 : • 
the district court that the court's questions failed to adequately address the concerns 
posed by his own questions." Opinion, at ^[11. The Court of Appeals said: 
Mr. Boyle argues on appeal that his mere submission of specific jury 
questions relating to damages and tort reform preserves for appeal his claim 
that the voir dire questions the district court actually posed were 
inadequate. We disagree . . . Here the district court attempted to reconcile 
the parties' proposed jury questions into a single set of voir dire questions 
that addressed each party's concerns. If Mr. Boyle believed that the district 
court's modification of his questions constituted error on the part of the 
district court, it was his obligation to bring this alleged error to the district 
court's attention. His failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the issue as 
one for appeal. See id.; compare Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) (finding no preservation where a part:/ failed to "call the 
judge's attention to [a] specific question" in a set of voir dire questions that 
had been rejected by the trial court), with Alcazar v. University of Utah 
Hosps. & Clinics, 2008 UT App 222, ^ 5, 188 P.3d 490 (addressing 
substantive issue where appellant had "repeatedly attempted to persuade the 
trial court to give the requested voir dire questions, including briefing the 
rather direct authority from this court on the issue, [but] the court declined 
and offered its own unique philosophical approach to voir dire in medical 
malpractice cases."). 
Opinion, at [^12 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs' cite to Alcazar v. U. of U. Hosp., 188 P.3d 490 (UT. App. 2008) to 
further support that the lower court judgments should be reversed. Alcazar is 
distinguishable. In Alcazar, the underlying claim was for medical malpractice. The 
Plaintiffs' proposed a jury questionnaire that contained questions specific to biases and 
prejudices with regard to medical malpractice claims, yet the judge refused to ask any of 
the proposed med-mal questions. Here, the underlying case deals with an auto/pedestrian 
accident, but the questions Plaintiff argues should have been asked dealt with tort reform 
in general. Plaintiffs proposed questions dealt with general tort reform and the modified 
questions also dealt with tort reform. The Utah Court of Appeals explained: 
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As the trial approached, Mr. Boyle submitted a proposed jury questionnaire 
that included specific questions intended to elicit jurors' views regarding 
damages and tort reform. Christensen also submitted proposed voir dire 
questions, and the district court edited and combined the parties' proposed 
questions into a single set of voir dire questions that did not contain the 
exact questions posed by either party. The district court conducted voir 
dire using its own questions without objection from either party. 
Opinion, at ^|4. 1 Iwo the court asked, "related questions" that adequately garnered 
inloi jiahoii :,,, ^ - J. ; .. : r i,; make apreemptory challenge. Opinion, at |^ 14. 
Plaintiffs' also cite to Bee to support their argument, but they niisehanieten /e the 
holding from that case. The Bee decision did not say plaintiffs were entitled to "elicit 
any information abonl (he nulr, tdtials1 \irws legaidine, personal ni|iii\ lawsuits 01 "oil 
reform" as the Boyles' claim. Instead, the appellate court concluded: 
[The] trial court should have asked the prospective jurors appropriate 
preliminary questions—either those suggested by appellant or alternative 
questions more to its liking—designed to detect, initially, whether any of 
the prospective jurors had been exposed to tort reform propaganda. Had 
the trial court done so, and had any of the jurors responded positively to 
these initial questions, appellant would have been entitled to have more 
specific questions put to the jurors designed to probe those jurors' attitudes 
regarding, and possible bias resulting from, the tort-reform information. 
2009 III App. at 116 (citing Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96 (Utah Ci App. 1993)) 
(ellipses omitted) (emphasis added) 
Before questioning the jury pool, Judge Medley gave counsel a written list of 
questions (haI In intended 10 ask polenliel |iimrs. Later, he asked counsel in chambers 
whether they wanted any further questions asked of the jury pool. In response to a 
request by defense counsel, he further questioned potential juror number eight. Despite 
cleai opportunities to seek f 1 1.1 thei questioning, plaintiff counsel sta> ed silent, I he 
Boyles' had many chances to object or request further questioning prior to and during 
voir dire. Plaintiffs' counsel simply chose not to do so, presumably, because they 
believed the questions asked already asked by Judge Medley were adequate. 
However, even if this Court determines plaintiffs' right to appeal was preserved, 
plaintiff counsel never requested the court to ask whether prospective jurors were 
exposed to tort reform propaganda. The four questions the Boyles claim the court should 
have asked do not seek whether potential jurors "may have read or heard information 
generally on tort reform." Despite this, similar to Ostler, and as required under Bee, the 
trial court asked potential jurors fifteen questions that were sufficient, in their totality and 
context, to reveal any tort reform bias, including: 
13. Do you have any feelings or beliefs that would prevent you 
from being fair and impartial regarding persons who have personal injury 
disputes and who choose to resolve those disputes by going to court? 
14. Do you have any personal religious or other beliefs that 
would prevent you from awarding damages in a large amount, small 
amount, or zero amount, if warranted and justified by the evidence and the 
law given you by the Court? 
(R. 536). Plaintiffs' counsel claims it is "inherently prejudicial" not to ask potential 
jurors about their views on "tort reform issues," but Bee does not state this. Bee only 
uses "prejudice is presumed" language regarding a different issue—if a trial court may 
allow co-defendants separate sets of peremptory challenges—and not regarding tort 
reform voir dire, 2009 UT App. at If 18. 
Plaintiffs' contention that questions 13-14 did not, as ^preliminary matter, address 
their tort reform questions is unfounded. Plaintiffs' counsel argues that these questions 
were insufficient because most prospective jurors responded merely with a "no" answer. 
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Yet under Bee the case Plaintiffs' i ely on, the trial court was only obligated to ask 
follow-up questions "had any of the jurors responded ; o*iu \ c * tr- -
questions." 2009 UT App. at f 16. In addition to these twi - questions, the court asked 
extensive questions of the ji iry dui ing oral v oir dire in :>. :• discover any potential bias 
or prejudice. 
I he trial court is granted substantial discretion during the jury selection process 
and clearly did not abi :i se that discretion in this ti ial It w as nc t pi ejudicial again st the 
Plaintiff to use alternative questions that elicited substantially equivalent information. 
,v
 - • \ •. •) , *, s • i : ficiency of questioning, plaintiff counsel failed to preserve 
this issue for ai* S.H^ U. lithe Court allows counsel to obtain *\ ^ ' ^ . > - i 
a formal, proper objection, then it will be giving parties a free pass loi a new ir.; 
Instead, Ik* ( n mi «ln iM illiiiutlu Itnu'f rouif dHn'mmdlimi1 
POINT II ALLOWING NON-PREJUDICIAL LAWYER TALK DURING 
CLOSING ARGUMENTS IS HARMLESS AND NOT ERROR. 
Thr Iowa* limits, did nnl ''oinmil I'IIDT by permitting counsel to use non-
prejudicial "lawyer talk," and this ruling does not depart from the accepted course of 
judicial proceedings. Judges have "considerable latitude" of discretion over statements 
offered during closing ar<.n.n^ni> "• • •- * p ^ •:>'-• :-h - in-, 
to what may be so prejudicial that a miscarriage of justice could result." Hales v. 
Peterson, 360 F 2d 822, 824 (Utah 1961) Fhus, even if the argument in question is 
improper or has no bearing to the facts of the case, the petitioner must show the statement 
caused prejudice and affected the fundamental fairness of the trial to meet the standard 
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for reversible error. Jones v. Carvell 641 P.2d 105, 112 (Utah 1982); see also Opinion, 
at f 8 (explaining the court's obligation to determine "whether remarks made during 
closing argument improperly influenced the verdict"). 
Any claimed prejudice must be based on more than mere "lawyer talk," which is 
not intended to substitute for evidence, because "the sensible and fair rule" with respect 
to presenting an argument "is to leave the propriety of counsel's use of such argument to 
the sound discretion of the trial court." Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co., 354 P.2d 
575, 576 (Utah 1960). In addition, although plaintiff counsel refers to this case for 
another purpose, Spahr v. Ferber Resorts, LLC also persuasively highlights the Tenth 
Circuit rule regarding closing arguments and lawyer talk: 
[V]acating a jury award and ordering a new trial on the basis of an 
inappropriate closing argument is an extreme remedy only to be granted in 
unusual cases . . . [because] even through an argument may be improper, a 
judgment will not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that the challenged 
remarks influenced the verdict. 
No. 2:08-cv-72, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9571 (D. Utah Feb. 4, 2010). 
In Hales, a young girl was killed in an automobile/pedestrian accident. 360 P.2d 
at 824. During closing arguments, defense counsel stated the driver was not negligent 
because the highway patrol and investigating officers did not issue any citation or arrest 
for wrongdoing. Id. The court held this was not reversible error even though the 
argument was "immaterial" and had "no place in the argument to the jury." Id. 
In Olsen, which is particularly on-point, counsel for the plaintiff used a per diem 
calculation to argue for an award of pain and suffering damages before the jury and 
defense counsel objected. 354 P.2d at 576. The objection was overruled and the 
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defendant appealed, I he defendant correctly asserted the per diem argument was 
prejudicial, but the Supreme Court affirmed and held the argument was simp!) a 
statement or "lawyer talk" that was not meant to be considered as evidence or a substitute 
th.ere.foi e. Id Conseqi lently , e\ en thoi lgh a per diem argument was pi eji idi.ci.al, the court 
did not find reference to it to be an abuse of discretion. Id. 
In Spahr, the defendant claimed the plaintiff made "at least seventeen arguments 
based on matters not in the recc >r< 1 " N < ) 2:08 cv 72, 2010 1 J S. Dist, I EXIS 95 7L i;l 
*25. The court also found that plaintiffs attorney did "refer to matters that were not 
arguably supported b> the i ecord ' ' Id. at :i 29, However, the court found that these 
"arguments made in closing argument. . . were unlikely to have improperly in:j..T v.-
the jury." Id. 
In her cl.osi.ng argument, defense counsel foi Mi Chi istensen was proper!.) 
explaining to the jury that the Boyles were claiming unreasonable damages by relying on 
a prejudicial calculation method VV hile doing this, she made an innocuous statement that 
referencedLiebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants r . : .S..Inc. .MSe 11<> IK10 ? 4^ Y ™(H 0 ? 4 ] Q 
1995 WL 360309 at ' ' > \ M. DIN!. AU;J : S. 109^ ] he Utah Court of Appeals 
explained uMi Hm n- a\iini\n- \y, i uuuu ini/.t vYuiMotseifs nmnsel's comment as one 
that calls to the jury's attention material that the jury would not be justified in considering 
in reaching its verdict, but we reject that characterization." Opinion, at f 15 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). Insfeihl, the apprllijlt eourl Hinracleri/al this reference 
as a harmless statement that allowed counsel to make a point, helped undo the harmful 
^°'
1
* '
 !
. - i b .-.nalysis, and did not prejudice the Boyles. 
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Specifically, the Court of Appeals said, "we see no harm in allowing Christensen to use a 
cultural reference as shorthand to make the point that, in Christensen's opinion, Mr. 
Boyles's damages methodology was likely to render this jury's verdict excessive. Such 
an argument is not inappropriate . . . ." Id. at ]fl7. 
Reference to the McDonald's case is not inherently prejudicial. As noted above, 
the trial court asked sufficient questions regarding the jurors' views on tort reform and 
damages to eliminate potential biases regarding these issues. The sole purpose of defense 
counsel's reference to the McDonald's case was to expose Plaintiffs prejudicial per diem 
damages calculations. In addition, plaintiff counsel also made reference to Liebeck 
before the jurors: 
We note that Mr. Boyle's counsel also made reference to Liebeck in his 
closing argument, albeit in reply to Christensen's counsel's comment: 
"The McDonald's case was mentioned. What was not mentioned is the 
court has a right to, and did, fix that. The bad verdict got all the press. The 
fact that the court reduced it to less than I think ten percent of the original 
amount of course didn't make the press" 
Id., at ]|17, n.2. Therefore plaintiffs counsel brought even greater attention to the 
reference, and also had a chance to correct any possible prejudicial effect. 
Counsel obviously did not mean to offer the case as evidence, or a substitute 
therefore, but simply as a statement offered to appeal to the jury's common sense. 
Although Judge McHugh did differ in her interpretation of State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 
981 (Utah 1998), she nevertheless agreed "that the decision of the trial court should be 
affirmed." Opinion, at ^26. She agreed because, as plaintiff counsel notes, "there was no 
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prejudice to the plaintiff." Opinion, at ffl[26-31; see also Brief of Appellants on 
Certiorari, at 9. 
Regardless, even if the statement was immaterial or had no place in closing 
arguments, it did not affect the fundamental fairness of the trial. Instead, the trial court 
judge clearly instructed the jurors about the relevant issues. The single comment, clearly 
offered as "lawyer talk," was not sufficient to create a miscarriage of justice. 
Consequently, this Court should not take the extreme remedy of disturbing the lower 
court judgment, but should instead affirm the reference as a simple use of cultural 
shorthand to protect against an inappropriate and prejudicial damage calculation. 
POINT III THE COURT OF APPEALS SUFFICIENTLY EXAMINED AND 
RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF DEFINING "INCAPABLE" BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES. 
Plaintiffs' brief could not, and did not identify any factual context that created a 
material issue of fact that is relevant to this motion. The evidence presented simply 
identifies what we already know—that there is a dispute as to the causation and extent of 
Mr. Boyle's lower back injury. However, Plaintiffs did not indicate any facts showing 
Mr. Boyle sustained injuries that would entitle his wife to make a loss of consortium 
claim under Utah Code § 30-2-11 ("The Loss of Consortium Act" or "the Act"). 
Plaintiffs wrongly claim "the existence of a significant permanent injury was thus 
essentially uncontested [by Defendant]." This assertion is completely unfounded given 
that the crux of this issue is whether Mr. Boyle had a "significant permanent injury" as 
defined by statute. The Loss of Consortium Act is very clear; "injured" means a 
significant permanent injury to a person that includes the following: 
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(i) a partial or complete paralysis of one or more of the 
extremities; 
(ii) significant disfigurement; or 
(iii) incapability of the person of performing the types of jobs the 
person performed before the injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(l)(a) (2009). Defense counsel further stressed this at oral 
argument regarding motions in limine on May 19, 2008 when she stated, "[Tjhere has to 
be a significant permanent injury that substantially changed the plaintiffs life, Mr. 
Boyle's life. That I would degree [sic] is in dispute in this case." (R. 691, Motions 
Transcript, at 5:14-18, May 19, 2008.) 
Plaintiffs cite to Spahr v. Ferber Resorts, LLC, No. 2:08-cv-72, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9571 (D. Utah Feb. 4, 2010) in an attempt to broaden the Loss of Consortium 
statute beyond the scope of the significant permanent injury contemplated by the 
legislature. In Spahr, the wife produced evidence of "massive and deep scarring" that 
caused her husband to be "ashamed to be seen" to convince the court the plaintiff 
suffered "extreme scarring." Id., at *12. This met the Act's test of significant permanent 
injury because it represented a significant disfigurement. 
Mr. Boyle's brief indicates a dispute between the parties as to the source, extent, 
and duration of Mr. Boyle's back injury. Mr. Boyle did not seek out medical attention 
for injuries allegedly related to this accident until five days after the incident occurred 
when he only sought chiropractic treatment from Walter Wagner for left-sided, lower 
back and buttock pain on July 26, 2004. (R. 267-316.) Plaintiffs argue that all of the 
experts, including those hired by defendant, agree the impact was sufficient to cause a 
ruptured disc. Plaintiff claims he had bruises on his left arm, left side, left thigh, and left 
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shin, abrasions on his foot, and very distinct pinpointed back pain. Whether the Mr. 
Boyle had a disc herniation in his back because of the subject accident was disputed; yet 
counsel never asserted this injury included a partial or complete paralysis of one or more 
of the extremities or a significant disfigurement. (R. 264-265.) 
Mr. Boyle simply did not suffer any type of permanent paralysis. Although he 
may have some surgical scarring, it is not severe, and he is not disfigured. 
Furthermore, the court expressly noted Spahr is distinguishable from this case: 
The Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Boyle v. Christensen does not 
persuade the court otherwise. In Boyle, the injured party admitted in his 
deposition that he had performed the same jobs after his injury that he had 
performed before his injury, albeit in "significant discomfort." In that 
context, the Boyle court found that the party was capable of doing those 
jobs, noting that "the statute does not speak in terms of impairment, but 
rather, 'incapacity.'" Here, the record supports a conclusion that Mr. Spahr 
is not simply in discomfort doing jobs he had done before, but is incapable 
of kneeling and climbing ladders. Accordingly, Ms. Spahr's claim does not 
hinge on an argument that he is impaired in his gardening and carpentry, 
but on proof that he is altogether precluded from them. 
Id. at * 14-15 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, the individual does not need to 
be "completely incapable of doing a job even in a most limited and extraordinary way" as 
was argued by the defendant in Spahr, but rather he must be clearly unable to complete 
the essential parts of his job after the injury. Mr. Boyle does not meet even this broader 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(l)(a)(iii) as evidenced by his continued and 
substantially similar employment at O'Currence and Glenmoor Golf Course. 
There are no facts to suggest Mr. Boyle could no longer work in the same type of 
employment as before the accident. Plaintiffs claim Mr. Boyle was doing substantially 
different work before the accident even though he admitted in his deposition testimony 
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that he sold a debt reduction plan prior to the accident, just as he sells at O'Currence (Id 
at R. 254-55.) Mr. Boyle also trained employees at O'Currence, just as he previously did 
on occasion at his former job, until he stopped because he could make more money 
selling the product. (Id at R. 253.) Before the accident, Mr. Boyle worked from home 
and only drove when going to his appointments or an occasional trip to the office. (Id at 
R. 257-58.) At his current job, he sells the same type of product over the phone from an 
office. By no stretch of the imagination is this "substantially different" work. 
Furthermore, Mr. Boyle's deposition reads as follows: 
Q. Okay. What about your back, does your back prevent 
you from doing anything at work? 
A. Not at that work [speaking of O'Currence]. I do work 
at the golf course on Saturday mornings from a half hour before daylight 
until 10:00 o'clock. 
* * * 
Q. . . . How long have you worked there on Saturdays? 
A. Three years. Three years plus. 
Q. All right. Prior to this accident — 
A. Excuse me, I should tell you I did some work for them 
after the surgery, but all I was doing then was standing behind a counter 
and checking people in, checking people out. So during that time I was 
unemployed I still worked some hours. It would range from probably eight 
to 16 hours a week. 
(Id at pp. 49:10-14, 50:6-16.) 
Plaintiffs' counsel suggests that Mr. Boyle's spine problems are "disabling," yet 
in his deposition, Mr. Boyle clearly indicated that he could work, and in fact did still 
work. He is working almost forty hours a week at a job outside of the home that is 
substantially similar to his pre-accident employment. Mr. Boyle works at O'Currance, an 
inbound call center, and has since December 12, 2005. He makes between $20 to $35 an 
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hour (depending upon his sales numbers), puts in thirty hours a week, and receives health 
benefits. (R. 253-54.) At the time of his deposition, Mr. Boyle had no plans to quit 
working at O'Currance. (Id.) While it may or may not be true that Plaintiff is 
uncomfortable at work, he simply cannot deny the above-stated facts. Moreover, he is 
still an avid and frequent golfer. 
Mr. Boyle was not incapable, under any definition, of performing the types of jobs 
he performed before the accident. In fact, Mr. Boyle is working in the same type of 
profession he did prior to the accident. Therefore, there was no evidence to support 
Norrine Boyle's claim for loss of consortium, and that is why her case was dismissed by 
the trial court. 
Plaintiffs would have this court believe that the test for whether or not a spouse of 
an injured party can bring a loss of consortium claim is whether the injured party 
sustained "a significant permanent injury that substantially changes that person's 
lifestyle, which also includes significant disfigurement, or the incapability of the injured 
person of performing the types of jobs the person performed before the injury." 
(Appellant Brief at p. 22.) Plaintiffs are incorrect about the applicable test. The correct 
test is whether Mr. Boyle's significant injury "includes" either a partial or complete 
paralysis, a significant disfigurement or renders him incapable of performing the types of 
jobs he performed before the accident. § 30-2-1 l(l)(a). 
The district court "agreed with Christensen that Mr. Boyle's claimed injuries did 
not meet the statutory definition of an injury and dismissed Mrs. Boyle's loss of 
consortium claim." Opinion, ^3. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district finding 
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by holding that "Mrs. Boyle failed to present evidence that would support a loss of 
consortium claim under the parties' mutual interpretation of the governing statute." 
Opinion, Tfl9. Regardless of how Mrs. Boyle personally feels, she was unable to make 
the statutory threshold showing necessary to state a claim for loss of consortium. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing points and authorities, the appellate court's decisions 
and rulings should be affirmed on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 10 day of March, 2010. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By: < ra^ fe«J g^dkssEL 
Kristin A. VanOrman 
Jeremy G. Knight 
Pamela E. Beatse 
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ADDENDUM 
Trial Court Transcript of Jury Selection. 
Trial Court Transcript of Oral Argument on Defendant's Motions in Limine. 
Spahr v. Ferber Resorts, LLC, No. 2:08-cv-72, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9571 (D. 
Utah Feb. 4, 2010). 
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THORNE, Associate Presiding Judge: 
^1 John and Norrine Boyle, husband and wife, appeal from the 
district court's judgment awarding Mr- Boyle damages^ of $62,500 
against Kerry Christensen. We affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
BACKGROUND 
•^ 2 In 20Q4, Christensen struck Mr. Boyle with his vehicle while 
Mr. Boyle was walking in a crosswalk located in a grocery store 
parking lot. As a result, Mr. Boyle suffered back injuries that 
ultimately required back surgery. The surgery was only partially 
successful and left Mr. Boyle with chronic back pain. In 2005, 
the Boyles sued Christensen for negligence and loss of 
consortium. 
f3 In January 2008, Christensen filed a motion to dismiss Mrs. 
.Boyle.1 s loss of consortium claim. Christensen's motion argued 
that loss of consortium as a cause of action is governed by 
statute and requires an "injury" as that term is statutorily 
defined. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11 (Supp. 2008) . The 
district court agreed with Christensen that Mr. Boyle's claimed 
injuries did not meet the statutory definition of an injury and 
dismissed Mrs. Boyle's loss of consortium claim. 
14 Trial on Mr, Boyle's negligence claim tooK place in June 
2008. As trial'approached, Mr. Boyle submitted a proposed jury-
questionnaire that included specific questions intended to elicit 
jurors' views regarding damages and tort reform. Christensen 
also submitted proposed voir dire questions, and the district 
court edited and combined the parties' proposed questions into a 
single set of voir dire questions that did not contain the exact 
questions posed by either party. The district court conducted 
voir dire using its own questions without objection from either 
party. At the close of voir dire, both Mr. Boyle and Christensen 
passed the jury for cause. 
15 Christensen had admitted liability for Mr. Boyle's injuries, 
and trial commenced solely on the issue of damages. After each 
side rested its case, the parties made their closing arguments to 
the jury. During Christensen's closing argument, his counsel 
characterized Mr. Boyle's closing argument relating to pain and 
suffering damages as follows: 
It's a per diem analysis. How many days has 
it been since the accident? How many days 
for the rest of his life? And how much per 
day is that worth? That's what's been done 
here. That's how we get verdicts like in the 
McDonald's case with a cup of coffee. 
Mr. Boyle's counsel*timely objected to the reference to "the 
McDonald's case"--a New Mexico lawsuit docketed as Liebeck v. 
McDonald's Restaurants, case no. D-202-CV-9302419, that resulted 
in a famously large 1994 jury verdict--stating that "it's 
prejudicial and it's not in evidence." The district court 
overruled this objection, and Christensen1s counsel completed her 
closing argument without further reference to Liebeck. 
^6 The jury ultimately rendered: Mr. Boyle a damages verdict of 
$62,500, of which $27,800 was for general pain and suffering. 
The jury's general damages award was significantly less than that 
sought by Mr. Boyle, and he appeals from the resulting judgment. 
Mrs. Boyle also appeals from the dismissal of her loss of 
consortium claim. 
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
%1 Mr. Boyle first argues that the district court erred in 
failing to question potential jurors on the issues of juror bias 
and tort reform. "We review challenges to the trial court's 
management of jury voir dire under an abuse of discretion 
standard." Bee v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 2009 UT App 35, H 8, 204 
P.3d 204 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, alleged 
deficiencies m voir dire must be brought to the district court's 
attention in order to be preserved for appeal. See Doe v. Hafen, 
772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
1)8 Next, Mr. Boyle argues that the district court erred by 
allowing Christensen to reference Liebeck in his closing 
argument. "The determination of whether remarks made during 
closing argument improperly influenced the verdict is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court." Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 
62, K 35, 29 P.3d 638. 
1f9 Finally, Mrs. Boyle argues that the district court erred 
when it granted Christensen's motion to dismiss her loss of 
consortium claim. "We review a trial court's ruling on a motion 
to dismiss for correctness, according no deference to the trial 
court." Code v. Utah Pep't of Health, 2007 UT App 390, f 3, 174 
P.3d 1134; see also Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT, 78, U 9, 99 P.3d 
842. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Voir Dire on Juror Bias and Tort Reform 
HlO Mr. Boyle's first argument on appeal is that the district 
court erred in failing to conduct voir dire questioning on issues 
relating to juror bias and tort reform. In his jury 
questionnaire, Mr. Boyle proposed the following voir dire 
questions:l 
4[.] What are your feelings or opinions 
about people who bring personal injury 
lawsuits? If supported by the evidence, 
could you award a large amount of money to 
the plaintiff in this case? 
1. Mr. Boyle's questionnaire included vanous "yes" or "no" 
check boxes that have been omitted here for ease of quotation. 
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5[.] If you were seriously hurt or injured 
by the negligence of another, would you sue? 
Please explain your answer: 
6[.] If supported by the evidence, could you 
award money damages for 
a. Future physical pain 
b. Mental anguish 
c. The impact on a wife of partially 
disabling injuries to her husband? 
d. Future medical bills 
If you answered NO to any of the above, 
please explain: 
7[.] Do you believe the law should impose 
limits on money that can'be awarded for pain 
and suffering[?] If YES, what do you believe 
these limitations should be? 
The district court did not ask the potential jurors these 
questions but, rather, conducted voir dire using a set of 
questions that it had drafted itself. 
^11 The district court's voir dire asked potential jurors the 
following questions relating to juror attitudes about personal 
injury claims and damages: 
13. Do you have any feelings or beliefs that 
would prevent you from being fair and 
impartial regarding persons who have personal 
injury disputes and who choose to resolve 
those disputes by going to court? 
14. Do you have any personal, religious or 
other beliefs that would prevent you from 
awarding damages in a large amount, small 
amount, or zero amount, if warranted and 
justified by the evidence and the law criven 
you by the Court? 
15. Given all considerations and everything 
you know about this case so far, can you be a 
fair, impartial, neutral, judge of the facts 
and follow the law as given to you by the 
Court ? 
At no time, however, did Mr. Boyle ever indicate to the district 
court that the court's questions failed to adequately address the 
concerns posed by his own questions, and Mr. Boyle ultimately 
passed the jury for cause. 
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^12 Mr. Boyle argues on appeal that his mere submission of 
specific jury questions relating to damages and tort reform 
preserves for appeal his claim that the voir dire .questions the 
district court actually posed were inadequate. We disagree. 
11
 [I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal!,] the issue must be 
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court 
has an opportunity to rule on that issue," 438 Main St. v. Easy 
Heat, Inc.. 2004 UT 72, fl 51, 99. P.3d 801 (alterations in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district 
court attempted to reconcile the parties' proposed jury questions 
into a single set of voir dire questions that addressed each 
party's concerns. If Mr. Boyle believed that the district 
court's modification of his questions constituted error on the 
part of the district court, it was his obligation to bring this 
alleged error to the district court's attention. His failure to 
do so constitutes a waiver of the issue as one for appeal. See 
id. ; compare Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(finding no preservation where a party failed to "call the 
judge's attention to [a] specific question" in a set of voir dire 
questions that had been rejected by the trial court), with 
Alcazar v. University of Utah Hosps, & Clinics, 2 008 UT App 222, 
% 5, 188 P.3d 490 (addressing substantive issue where appellant 
had "repeatedly attempted to persuade the trial court to give the 
requested voir dire questions, including briefing the rather 
direct authority from this court on the issue, [but] the court 
declined and offered its own unique philosophical approach to 
voir dire in medical malpractice cases"). 
Ul3 Mr. Boyle argues for the first time in his reply brief that 
the district court's failure to question the jury on the 
requested issues constitutes plain error and is thus an exception 
to the preservation requirements. See generally Nielsen v. 
Spencer, 2008 UT App 375, 1 14, 196 P.3d 6L6 (discussing plain 
error), cert, denied, 207 P.3d 432 (Utah 2009). In the past, we 
have refused to consider arguments of plain error raised for the 
first time in an appellant's reply brief, even if the plain error 
argument is in response to a dispute over preservation raised for 
the first time in the appellee's brief. See, e.g., Moore v. 
Smith, 2007 UT App 101, j 24, 158 P.3d 5-62, cert, denied, 182 
P.3d 910 (Utah 2007) . Accordingly, we do not conduct a plain 
error analysis here. 
Kl4 We conclude that Mr. Boyle failed to adequately preserve for 
appeal his claim that the district court's voir dire questioning 
was inadequate. Although the district court did not ask the 
exact questions submitted by Mr. Boyle, it did ask related 
questions. Thereafter, Mr. Boyle passed the jury for cause 
without objection and without explaining the alleged harm 
resulting from the fact that his proposed questions had not been 
asked. Under these circumstances, Mr. BoyLe failed to preserve 
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any claim of error arising from the district court's failure to 
ask his submitted questions. Accordingly, we decline to address 
that issue. 
II. Closing Arguments 
fl5 Mr. Boyle next argues that he is entitled to a new trial 
because of ChristensenTs counsel's reference to Liebeck--the 
McDonald's coffee case--in her closing argument. Closing 
arguments represent the final opportunity for parties to 
summarize their cases and attempt to influence the jury, and 
parties are allowed substantial leeway in doing so. See State v. 
Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 615 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), aff'd, 973 P.2d 
975 (Utah 1998) . 
Counsel for both sides have considerable 
latitude in their closing arguments. They 
have the right to fully discuss from their 
perspectives the evidence and all inferences 
and deductions it supports. However, counsel 
exceeds the bounds of this discretion and 
commits error if he or she calls to the 
jury's attention material that the jury would 
not be justified in considering in reaching 
its verdict. 
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Boyle 
attempts to characterize Christensen1s counsel's comment as one 
that "calls to the jury's attention material that the jury would 
not be justified in considering in reaching its verdict," see 
id., but we reject that characterization. 
Hl6 Mr. Boyle argues that there had been no evidence presented 
about the Liebeck case and that the reference was therefore 
improper as "unrelated commentary . . . that is not supported by 
the evidence." Mr. Boyle cites State" v, Alonzo, 932 P.2d 60 6 
(Utah Ct, App, 1997), aff'd, 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 1998), in support 
of his argument. In Alonzo, the defendants were charged with 
assaulting a police officer following a physical altercation 
between the defendants and police. See id. at 608-09, During 
closing arguments, the defendants referred to "'those Rodney King 
cops that are doing time in the Federal penr" in an attempt to 
illustrate that police officers who use excessive force could 
lose their jobs and go to jail. See id. at 614-15. The district 
court disallowed this use of the Rodney King matter but did 
clarify "that the jury could consider defense counsel's arguments 
involving the Rodney King officers for the purpose of weighing 
•the credibility of the witnesses, if they want to examine it in 
that way.1" Id. at 615. This court affirmed the district 
court's treatment of the Rodney King issues. See id. 
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Hl7 Mr. Boyle has failed to demonstrate that Alonzo renders 
Christensen1s counsel's reference to Liebeck erroneous. In both 
this case and Alonzo, counsel used references to iconic legal 
matters to make legitimate points to the jury. Mr. Boyle argues 
that Liebeck is synonymous with excessive verdicts and runaway 
juries, and that may be true. But we see no harm in allowing 
Christensen to use a cultural reference as shorthand to make the 
point that, in Christensen's opinion, Mr. Boyle's damages 
methodology was likely to render this jury's verdict excessive. 
Such an argument is not inappropriate, and Christensen1s 
counsel's use of Liebeck to illustrate the point is surely no 
more objectionable than counsel's usage of what is arguably the 
nation's most famous police brutality case in Alonzo, see id. at 
614-15. 
^18 In sum, we see ho error created by'Christensen's'counselrs 
comment to the jury. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the 
judgment below on this ground. 
III. Mrs. Boyle's Loss of Consortium Claim 
^19 Finally, Mrs. Boyle argues that the district court erred 
when it dismissed her loss of consortium claim. We agree with 
the district court that Mrs. Boyle failed to present evidence 
that would support a loss of consortium claim under the partiesT 
mutual interpretation of the governing statute. 
H20 Loss of consortium claims are governed by Utah Code section 
30-2-11. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11 (Supp. 2008). "The spouse 
of a person injured by a third party . . . may maintain an action 
against the third party to recover for loss of consortium." Id. 
§ 30-2-11(2). However, not every injury to a spouse will support 
a loss of consortium claim. Section 30-2-11 defines the required 
degree of injury: 
11
 [I]njury" or "injured" means a significant 
permanent injury to a person that 
2. We note that Mr. Boyle's counsel also made reference to 
Liebeck in his closing argument, albeit in reply to Christensen1s 
counsel's comment: 
The McDonald's case was mentioned. What was 
not mentioned is the court has a right to, 
and did, fix that. The bad verdict got all 
the press. The fact that the court reduced 
it to less than I think ten percent of the 
original amount of course didn't make the 
press. 
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substantially changes that person's lifestyle 
and includes the following: 
(i) a partial or complete paralysis of 
one or more of the extremities; 
(ii) significant disfigurement; or 
(iii) incapability of the person of 
performing the types of jobs the person 
performed before the injury. 
Id. § 30-2-11(1) (a) . 
|21 Here, both parties argued to the district court and on 
appeal that no loss of consortium claim will lie unless the 
injured spouse suffers paralysis of an extremity, significant 
disfigurement, or job incapacity. Accepting this interpretation 
of the statute for purposes of this appeal, we agree with the 
district court that Mr. Boyle's injuries do not fall within the 
statutory definition of an injury. 
1[22 On appeal, Mrs. Boyle argues that Mr. Boyle's injuries meet 
the job incapacity prong of the statutory definition because he 
11
 is impaired in his ability to perform the job to the same degree 
and extent that he could prior to the incident."4 However, that 
prong of the statute does not speak in terms of impairment but, 
rather, "incapacity." See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11(1}(a)(iii). 
Mr. Boyle's deposition established that he worked in sales and at 
a golf course both before and after his injury. Although these 
jobs apparently caused Mr. Boyle significant discomfort after the 
injury, he was capable of performing them. In light of these 
facts, Mrs. Boyle has not presented evidence that Mr. Boyle is 
"incapab [le] . . . of performing the types of jobs [he] performed 
before the injury." See id. 
f23 Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the district 
court erred in dismissing Mrs. Boyle's loss of consortium claim. 
Mrs. Boyle agreed with Christensen that the relevant statute 
required one of three specific types of injuries in order for her 
3. We express no opinion on whether the parties are correct in 
their interpretation of section 30-2-11(1)(a). 
4. Mrs. Boyle does not argue on appeal that her claim can 
proceed under either of the other statutory prongs--paralysis of 
an extremity or significant disfigurement. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-2-11 (1) (a) (i) -(ii) (Supp. 2008). 
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claim to be actionable, and she failed to present evidence that 
Mr. Boyle!s injuries fell into one of the required categories. 
Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed Mrs. Boyle's 
loss of consortium claim. 
INCLUSION 
^24 We conclude that Mr. Boyle did not adequately preserve his 
argument that the district court erred in failing to ask 
requested juror bias and tort reform questions on voir dire. We 
also conclude that no error arose from Christensen's counsel's 
closing argument reference to Liebeck and that the district court 
properly dismissed Mrs. Boyle's loss of consortium claim. 
Accordingly,, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 
William A. Thome Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
1(25 I CONCUR: 
MCHUGH, Judge (concurring in result): 
^26 While I agree with my colleagues that the decision of the 
trial court should be affirmed, I write separately to indicate my 
differing view on the challenge to Christensen's closing 
argument. Although I agree that the narrow use of the Liebeck v. 
McDonald's, No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309, at *1 (N.M. Dist. 
Aug. 18, 1994), decision was not" prejudicial, I would hold that 
it was improper. Furthermore, I do not read State v. Alonzo, 932 
P.2d 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), aff'd, 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 1998), 
as approving the introduction of such extraneous matter during 
closing argument. 
f27 The Alonzo defendants claimed that police officers had used 
excessive force against them and, in closing argument, cited the 
prison sentences, imposed on the police officers involved in the 
Rodney King case as an example of why police officers would be 
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motivated to lie about their use of force against a defendant. 
See id. at 614-15. The trial court overruled the State's 
objections to the references, but gave the jury a limiting 
instruction that allowed it to consider the references only to 
the extent they related to the credibility of the police 
officers. See id. at 615. Credibility was at issue because the 
stories of the defendants and those of the police officers about 
the circumstances of the arrest varied greatly and because the 
prosecution had suggested that the defendants had a motive to 
lie. See id. at'609, 614-15. After deliberations, the jury 
found the defendants guilty of assault on a police officer. See 
id. at 610. 
^28 On appeal to this court, the defendants argued that the 
limitations on the use of the Rodney King references constituted 
prejudicial error. See id. at 615. This court affirmed, holding 
that "the trial court's restrictions on defense counselfs 
references to the 'Rodney King' officers were not improper." Id. 
On certiorari, the supreme court agreed that "the trial court 
properly restricted certain references to Rodney King as material 
the jury should not consider." State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 
981 (Utah 1998). However, neither this court nor the supreme 
court was asked to consider the issue present here--whether the 
references to the unrelated case were proper at all. 
1J29 After acknowledging the broad latitude generally available 
in presenting closing arguments, the supreme court in Alonzo 
stated, "[S]uch latitude does not extend to counsel calling the 
jury's attention to material that the jury would not be justified 
in considering in its verdict." Id. at 981. Indeed, the opinion 
issued by this court, which was affirmed by the supreme court, is 
more explicit: 
Although counsel has considerable latitude in 
closing arguments, the trial court could have 
reasonably concluded that defense counsel was 
exceeding the bounds of this discretion when 
counsel referred to the Rodney King officers. 
The trial court could have determined that 
defense counsel's references to Rodney King 
were an attempt to inflame the jury or 
suggest that because the Rodney King officers 
were found guilty,-the officers in this case 
were also guilty of using excessive force. 
Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 615 (emphasis added). If the trial court 
could have excluded the references entirely as inflammatory, it 
is not surprising that the limitations placed on the use of the 
Rodney King argument did not constitute prejudicial error. 
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1(30 Moreover, in Alonzo, the Rodney King references could be 
considered by the jury only in weighing the credibility of the 
police officers and their motive to lie. See id. at 615-16; 
These matters were legitimately at issue due to the differences 
between the testimony of the officers and that of the defendants, 
and by the State's suggestion that only the defendants had a 
motive to lie. Here, there is nothing relevant about the Liebeck 
case. Christensen's closing argument suggests that the allegedly 
excessive verdict in Liebeck was caused by that jury's use of a 
per diem analysis like the one Mr. Boyle had proposed in this 
case. As Mr. Boyle correctly notes, however, the damages 
perceived by members, of the public to be excessive in Liebeck 
were punitive damages and did not involve a per diem analysis. 
See Liebeck v. McDonald's. No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309, at *1 
(N.M. Dist. Aug. 18, 1994). Thus, unlike the Rodney King 
references in Alonzo, the reference to Liebeck had no arguable 
relevance to this case. 
TJ31 Under these circumstances, I would hold that the references 
to the McDonald's coffee case improperly "call[ed] the jury's 
attention to material that the jury would not [have been] 
justified in considering in its verdict." Alonzo, 973 P.2d at 
981. Moreover, the fact that the Liebeck case is "iconic," 
"synonymous with excessive verdicts," or even infamous would make 
me more inclined to find its use in oral argument improper rather 
than less so inclined. Supra % 17. 
aw 
CarolyiVB. McHugh , Judged 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: The record should reflect that 
this is Case No. 050912506 in the matter of John 
Boyle versus Kerry Christensen. Mr. Christensen, on 
behalf of your client, Mr. Boyle, are you ready to go 
forward, sir? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And Ms. Van Orman, on behalf 
of your client, Mr. Christensen, are you ready to go 
forward, as well? 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Counsel, Members of the jury panel, first 
of all, I want to thank you very much for your 
appearance here today. I'm going to assume 
automatically that it's highly unlikely that any of 
you stood up and applauded when you received that 
final notification that you're going to be required 
to come to court today and render jury service. I'm 
certain that all of you, to one extent or another, 
have been inconvenienced and I would like for you to 
keep in mind and understand that myself and Counsel 
are going to jealously guard your time and move this 
case along in the most possible efficient and 
CITICOURT, LLC 
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thorough manner that we can. 
I would also, however, like you to keep in 
mind that your jury service here today is very 
important. Your fair and impartial jury service, in 
fact, will help ensure the rights and privileges that 
all of us benefit from and enjoy as citizens of this 
great country and state that we live in. And, in 
fact, without citizens willing to make the necessary 
sacrifices to render jury service in court cases, 
whether it be in this state or in other states in 
this country, of course, our third branch of 
government would come to a screeching -- come to a 
screeching halt. 
I sort of view jury service high on the 
list with other responsibilities of citizenship such 
as voting and military service. So certainly on 
behalf of myself, on behalf of the judiciary of this 
state, on behalf of counsel and their clients, I want 
to thank you very much for your service here today. 
We're going to get started right away with 
the jury selection phase of this particular case. I 
would first like you to know and keep in mind that I 
will be assisted throughout the course of this trial 
by my clerks who are seated to my immediate left, 
Tina and Stephanie, and I will also be assisted by my 
CITICOURT, LLC 
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primary bailiff Kathy. I think you've already met 
her. I don't see her in the courtroom right at this 
very moment but she periodically has to cover other 
courts, as well. And I may have other bailiffs 
substituting for her, as well. 
Keep in mind also, Members of the Jury 
Panel, that also during this course of the phase of 
the case a number of questions are going to be put to 
you. I think it's important for you to know up front 
that none of these questions are really designed to 
pry into your innermost private affairs and, in fact, 
if you think a question touches upon some issue that 
you would rather respond to in private, just let me 
know that, and myself and Counsel and their clients 
can retire to my chamber area and have you give your 
answer to that type of a question in that format. 
However, because of the nature of today's 
case, I'm not sure that you will have any problems 
responding to the questions that are going to be put 
to you. 
The first task that must be performed, 
Members of the Jury Panel, is that the responses to 
the questions that you're going to give must, in 
fact, be under oath. So I do need for you to please 
stand and raise your right hands at this time so you 
CITICOURT, LLC 
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can be placed under oath. 
THE CLERK: You and each of you do 
solemnly swear that you will answer truly such 
questions as may be put to you testing your 
competency to serve as trial jurors in the case now 
before you, so help you God. 
(Jury Panel answers yes in unison.) 
THE COURT: You may be seated. 
Members of the Jury Panel, the first thing 
I would like to do is get some idea of the nature of 
the case that's going to be tried. This case is what 
we generally describe as a civil case. It is a 
personal injury civil case. And in this case the 
plaintiff, and the plaintiff is the party who files 
the lawsuit, the plaintiff is John Boyle, and the 
plaintiff in this case seeks to recover damages on 
account of an automobile/pedestrian accident wherein 
Mr. Boyle was struck by a vehicle operated by Mr. 
Kerry Christensen. 
Mr. Kerry Christensen admits he was 
responsible for causing accident. However, he denies 
that the accident caused Mr. Boyle injuries to the 
extent claimed in this case. The accident occurred 
on or about July the 22nd of 2004 at the Smith's food 
store at 4080 West 90th South in West Jordan, State 
CITIC0URT, LLC 
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of Utah. 
Now, Members of the Jury Panel, the first 
thing I would like to know is whether or not any 
member of the panel is familiar with the particular 
facts of this case. And if so, would you please 
indicate this by raising your hand at this time? 
The record should record that there are no 
hands raised. 
Now, next, Members of the Jury Panel, what 
I would like to do is I'm going to turn to counsel 
and have them introduce themselves to you. They're 
also going to introduce their clients. They are also 
going to identify by naming the witnesses they 
anticipate will testify in this particular case. And 
Members of the Jury Panel, once they have completed 
identifying these individuals, I'm going to ask you 
whether or not you know or are familiar with or have 
any relationship whatsoever with any of these 
individuals. So please pay particular attention. 
Mr . Chri stensen. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. I'm Roger 
Christensen. I've been an attorney for a number of 
years. I'm with the law firm of Christensen & 
Jensen, which is headquartered here in Salt Lake 
City. This is Sue Harrison, who is a paralegal in 
CITICOURT, LLC 
801.532.3441 
Jury Selection * Boyle v. Christensen 8 
that firm who is going to be assisting in the trial. 
This is John Boyle, who is the plaintiff in this 
case. We anticipate calling the following witnesses 
currently: Mr. Boyle; Mr. Christensen; a Dr. Lyle 
Mason, an orthopedic surgeon who also works with the 
Utah Jazz; Mr. Boyle's son Adam; his daughter Laura 
St ice; Dr. Junius Clawson, an orthopedic surgeon with 
the Intermountain Spine Institute, Felton Lancaster, 
A
 someone who works part-time with Mr. Boyle at the 
Glenmoor A Golf Course; Mr. Boyle's son, Tucker 
Boyle; his wife Norrine Boyle; and potentially an 
e y e w i t n e s s , Chris Jones. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Christensen. 
Members of the Jury Panel, first of all, I 
would like to start with Mr. Christensen and his 
client, Mr. Boyle. I would like to know whether or 
not any member of the jury panel knows, is familiar 
with, or has any relationship whatsoever with Mr. 
Christensen or his client, Mr. Boyle, and if so, 
would you please indicate this by raising your hand 
at this time. And the record should reflect that 
there are two hands raised. 
And Mr. Owen, did you have your hand 
raised? 
MR. OWEN: I did. 
CITICOURT, LLC 
801.532.3441 
Jury Selection * Boyle v. Christensen 9 
THE COURT: And I don't want you to go 
into detail at all, Mr. Owen, but I just want you to 
name who it is you recognize. 
MR. OWEN: I'm an attorney and have 
practiced in - -
THE COURT: Well, who is it you recognize, 
sir? 
MR. OWEN: Christensen, Jensen & Powell, 
that firm. 
THE COURT: Okay. And that was why you 
raised your hand? 
MR. OWEN: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much, 
Mr. *Lion -- And, Mr. Owen, I'll be coming back to 
you in just a moment. 
And do you pronounce is it "Ryman"? 
MS. REIMANN: Yes, it is. Very good. 
THE COURT: Ms. Reimann, who is it that 
you recognize? 
MS. REIMANN: My husband is a cousin of 
Sue Harrison's husband. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry, say that again. 
Your husband? 
MS. REIMANN: My husband is Sue Harrison's 
cousin's -- husband's cousin, sorry. 
CITICOURT, LLC 
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THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much, 
ma'am. Did I miss any hands raised in response to 
that question? The record should reflect that there 
are no hands raised. 
Next, Members of the Jury Panel, I would 
like to know whether or not you know, are familiar 
with, or have any relationship whatsoever, if you 
have not already responded, to any of the potential 
witnesses that Mr. Christensen identified may testify 
in this case. And if so, would you please indicate 
this by raising your hand at this time. The reflect 
should reflect that Mr. Owen, you had a hand raised. 
And which witness individual did you recognize? 
MR. OWEN: I am acquainted with Chris 
Jones. I don't know if that's the same one that's 
going to be a witness. 
THE COURT: And the Chris Jones that 
you're familiar with, can you tell us how he's 
employed? 
MR. OWEN: Yes, he's a basketball coach. 
THE COURT: Where is he coaching at now? 
MR. OWEN: He just left the University of 
Utah and went to Utah State. 
THE COURT: Mr. Christensen, is that the 
same or different Chris Jones? 
CITICOURT, LLC 
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MR. CHRISTENSEN: No. This Chris Jones is 
actually a woman. 
THE COURT: Okay. And did I miss any 
other hands raised in response to that question? 
I'm sorry, Mr. Y e a t e s , who did you think you 
recogni zed? 
MR. Y E A T E S : Well, the physician here 
that's going to testify, his name again? He's with 
the Jazz; is that right? 
MR. C H R I S T E N S E : Lyle Mason. 
MR. Y E A T E S : Okay. If I have any 
relationship it's a superficial relationship. 
THE COURT: All right. Did I miss any 
hands raised in response to that question? 
The record should reflect that there are 
no other hands raised. 
Ms. Van Orman, would you do the same, 
please. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: My name is Kristin Van 
Orman. I'm with the law firm of Strong & Hanni. My 
client, Kerry C h r i s t e n s e n , is sitting next to me. We 
will be calling, let's see, three other witnesses: A 
Dr. Pontiff Nors, A he's a neurologist; Dr. Stephen 
Marble, he's a physiatrist; and Dr. Alan Goldman, a 
n e u r o l o g i s t . 
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THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. Van 
Orman. 
Members of the Jury Panel, I would like to 
know, first, if any of you know or are familiar with 
or have any relationship whatsoever with either Ms. 
Van Orman or her law firm or her client, Mr. 
Christensen in this case, and if so, would you please 
indicate this by raising your hand at this time. 
The record should reflect that there are 
no hands raised. 
And finally, Members of the Jury Panel, I 
would like to know whether or not any of you know or 
are familiar with or have any relationship whatsoever 
with any of the potential witnesses that Ms. Van 
Orman just identified, as well. And if so, would you 
please indicate this by raising your hand at this 
ti me . 
The record should reflect that there are 
no hands raised. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, I've been 
reminded we have one additional w i t n e s s . 
THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry, go ahead. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Mr. Merrill Norman who 
is a CPA and a financial expert. 
THE COURT: And Members of the Jury Panel, 
CITICOURT, LLC 
801.532.3441 
Jury Selection * Boyle v. Christensen 13 
Mr. Christensen just identified an additional 
potential w i t n e s s , Mr. Merrill Norman. And if any of 
you are familiar with, know, or have any relationship 
whatsoever with Mr. Norman, would you please indicate 
this by raising your hand at this time. 
And the record should reflect that Mr. 
Owen has his hand raised. 
Mr. Owen, is it through your profession 
that you know Mr. Norman? 
MR. OWEN: Well, it's both. I have hired 
him, he's worked for me, and he is a friend and I've 
met him. A 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Owen. 
Did I miss any response to that follow-up 
question? The record should reflect that there are 
no additional hands raised. 
W e l l , Members of the Jury Panel, I'm going 
to take just a brief moment to summarize for you what 
the roles and responsibilities to the participants in 
this particular case are going to be. And at a later 
point in time I will be going into a more detailed 
description of the law that will apply in this 
particular case which will also further define for 
you what the respective roles and responsibilities 
are. I would like to give you a summary of that 
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description at this time. 
First of all, Members of the Jury Panel, 
let me say to you, obviously it will be the role and 
responsibility for plaintiff in this particular case 
to present their evidence in an effort to establish 
their case. And again, I will go into a more defined 
definition of what those roles and duties and 
responsibilities are in light of the nature of this 
case. 
It will be the role and responsibility of 
Ms. Van Orman, in essence, to represent her client, 
Mr. Christensen and to defend this case. 
It will be the role and the responsibility 
of the jury in this case, Members of the Jury Panel, 
first of all to be fair and impartial to both sides 
of this case. The jury will be required to fairly 
and impartially decide what the facts are in this 
case. And through that process the jury also will be 
called upon to determine what weight should be given 
to the various pieces of evidence and testimony 
that's introduced during the course of this case. 
The jury will be called upon to weigh the credibility 
of the various witnesses that are going to be called 
to testify in this case, as well. 
Additionally, Members of the Jury Panel, 
CITICOURT, LLC 
801.532.3441 
Jury Selection * Boyle v. Christensen 15 
of course, it will be the jury's responsibility to 
fairly and impartially render a verdict in this 
particular case. It's very important for you to keep 
in mind, Members of the Jury Panel, that it will be 
my role and responsibility as the judge in this case 
to decide the issues of law as those issues arise 
during the course of this trial. You should keep in 
mind and understand that it's very common for counsel 
to make objections during the course of the trial to 
a particular question or to a particular piece of 
evidence. That's a normal part of the trial process. 
And what's important for you to know and understand, 
that when a lawyer makes an objection, that he or she 
is simply asking the court, the judge, to make a 
legal decision. So it will be my role and 
responsibility to make those types of legal 
d e c i s i o n s . 
I would like for you to keep in mind that 
I'm going to go out of my way to try to resolve those 
decisions here in open court so that we don't 
unreasonably delay this case. But you should also 
keep in mind and understand, however, that the law is 
fairly clear that there are some legal issues that I 
must hear outside of your presence. So we may have 
the occasion where I have you retire to the jury 
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deliberation room so I can listen to oral argument on 
a particular point of law, resolve that issue, then 
bring you back in. But again, I'm going to go out of 
my way to try to reduce those o c c u r r e n c e s . 
You should also keep in mind and 
understand that at the conclusion of the case, 
Members of the Jury Panel, it will be my role and 
responsibility to instruct you or give you the law 
that applies in this particular case. And it will be 
your sworn duty and obligation, Members of the Jury 
Panel, as jurors on this case, to follow the law as 
given to you by the Court. 
And let me give you an example of a 
portion of the law that I'm going to be instructing 
the jury with at a later point in time in more 
detail. I'm just going to give you an example, a 
summarized example at this point in time. 
Because of the nature of this particular 
case, it's very likely that I'm going to be 
instructing the jury on the subject matter of 
damages. There is governing law in this state which 
governs the issues of damages in this type of a case. 
And our law in this state, in essence, defines 
damages into two separate c a t e g o r i e s . 
First, the first category is defined as 
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economic damages. And economic damages include 
reasonable and necessary expenses for medical care 
and other related expenses, both past and future. 
That's the first category of damages that the law 
recognizes in this type of a case. The second 
category of damages that the law recognizes in this 
type of a case is what the law defines as noneconomic 
damages. And noneconomic damages include, for 
example, damages for pain and suffering, both mental 
and physical; the extent, if any, wherein one is 
prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of their 
life, and to the extent they may be limited in 
enjoyment of their life. 
That's a very brief, general description 
of the types of damages that the law recognizes in 
this particular case. But what is important for you 
to keep in mind and understand, Members of the Jury 
Panel, is that since it is my duty and responsibility 
to instruct you or give you the law that applies in 
this case, it is the jury's sworn duty and obligation 
to follow the law as given to you by me, even if you 
were to think that the law is different from what I 
state it to be, or even if you think the law ought to 
be different from what I state it to be. 
The bottom line is, you don't get the 
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o p p o r t u n i t y to be the Utah State legislature in this 
particular case; you simply must follow the law as 
given to you by the Court. C o n s e q u e n t l y , Members of 
the Jury Panel, I would like to know if there is any 
member of the Jury Panel who is of the opinion that 
you would not be able to follow the law as given to 
you by the Court. Would you please indicate this by 
raising your hands at this time. 
The record should reflect that there are 
no hands raised. 
Now, the next subject I would like to talk 
to you about, Members of the Jury Panel, and I'm 
going to utilize a little bit of history here, I 
guess, I can remember a time when a jury panel member 
could almost give any reasonable excuse and be 
excused from jury service. Fortunately for 
individuals like me who are responsible for 
conducting jury trials, that day has come and gone. 
It really takes some point, some basis which rises to 
a level that would impair your duty and 
responsibility to be fair and impartial to both sides 
of this case. It really takes something that rises 
to the level that would prevent you from giving this 
case the c o n s c i e n t i o u s attention that it deserves 
before you can be excused from jury service. 
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Now, at the same time, Members of the Jury 
Panel, Counsel and myself do not want to be 
insensitive to what your individual needs are. So I 
would like to give you a general overview of what I 
anticipate the schedule and time demands of this case 
are going to be. 
First let me say that I'm describing this 
case as a four-day case. And what I mean by that I'm 
counting today as the first day, so in other words, 
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. I think 
what you also should know and keep in mind in this is 
that I do know that the goal, the shared goal of 
Counsel is to complete all of the evidence of this 
case by Thursday so that Friday can be reserved for 
closing argument and jury deliberation. 
I would like for you to also keep in mind 
and understand that when I say four days, what I 
anticipate is going to occur is this: That we will 
start -- I expect to start promptly each morning at 
9:00 a.m. I also anticipate taking a lunch break 
promptly at noon and reconvening approximately at 
1:15. I also anticipate breaking promptly at 5:00 
p.m. at the end of each day. Of course, then you 
will be recessed to return home. This is not a case 
where you're going to be sequestered in a hotel for 
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the period of time of this trial. 
I also expect that approximately each hour 
we will be taking a 10-minute recess on each day, as 
well. So that is the general overview of what I'm 
expecting for this particular case. 
Now, Members of the Jury Panel, with that 
d i r e c t i o n , and I'm going to actually take your 
response to this next question row by row. And when 
I say row by row, I mean starting on my far left with 
who I believe is Ms. A l l e n - K i d d e r and going straight 
across the front. Then we'll get to the second row 
and third row and fourth row. But starting with the 
front row with that direction and overview of the 
schedule I gave you, is there any member of the Panel 
on the front row who is of the opinion you have some 
matter that is sufficiently pressing that would 
prevent you from rendering fair and partial jury 
service? And if so, would you please indicate this 
by raising your hand at this time on the front row? 
The record should reflect that there are 
no hands raised. 
Then going to the second row, starting 
with I believe it's Ms. Hanson and going straight 
across, Members of the Jury Panel, if you think you 
have such a problem, would you please indicate this 
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by raising your hand at this time. 
The record should reflect that there are 
two hands raised. You may put your hands down. 
Ms. Harrison, you had your hand raised? 
MS. HARRISON: I did. 
THE COURT: Ms. Harrison, can I get you to 
stand so counsel won't have any problems seeing you? 
MS. HARRISON: No problem. 
THE COURT: Ms. Harrison, tell me why you 
raised your hand in response to the --
MS. HARRISON: I'm a school teacher and 
we're just closing school right now. But I also am 
of the opinion if you really need me I'm here and I 
can do things after I get through with the court 
case . 
THE COURT: I'm sorry, I didn't hear your 
last statement. 
MS. HARRISON: If I need to be here, I 
will be here and I'll do things after. I'll just go 
back to my school and finish what I need to in the 
evening time if I need to do that. 
THE COURT: And let's assume for a moment 
you were required to serve. It sounds as if you're 
going to be leaving your work here during the day and 
then, you know, going home or back to school to 
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finish whatever is required there. Are you still 
going to give this case the c o n s c i e n t i o u s attention 
it deserves? 
MS. HARRISON: Yes, I would. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. 
Harrison. 
Ma'am, would you please stand. And is it 
"Botger" or "Boatger"? 
MS. BOETTGER: "Betger" . 
THE COURT: "Betger." Excuse me for not 
pronouncing that correctly. 
MS. BOETTGER: That's okay. 
THE COURT: Why did you have your hand 
raised? 
MS. BOETTGER: It just concerns next week 
We're leaving for a vacation out of the country. So 
if it were to fall in next week, that would be a 
problem. 
THE COURT: You know, let me say this: 
It's always difficult to predict how long a case is 
going to take so that -- I'm usually very reluctant 
to give you a 100 percent guarantee, but I really 
want to give you a 99.999 percent guarantee that 
based upon what I know about this case, at this 
point, for the life of me I can't see how we would 
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end ufJ into next week . But I can't give you a 100 
percent guarantee, but I appreciate that response. 
Okay. Let's go next to the third row. 
And I believe I will be starting with A Mr. Frost. 
And those on the third row, if you have a response to 
this question regarding the schedule, would you 
please indicate this by raising your hand at this 
ti me. 
The record should reflect that there are 
no hands raised. 
And I would like to go next to the fourth 
row and I think Mr. Mills is back there on my far 
left. And if you have a response to this question, 
would you please indicate this by raising your hand 
at this time. 
The record should reflect that there are 
no hands raised. 
MS. PRESTON: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Oh, did I miss one? Okay. 
Just one moment. Is it Ms. Preston? 
MS. PRESTON: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Ms. Preston, would you stand 
for me, please. 
MS. PRESTON: Sure. 
THE COURT: Why did you have your hand 
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raised, Ms. Preston? 
MS. PRESTON: Okay. If I'm correct, this 
is the schedule for the week? 
THE COURT: Yes. I just described it. 
MS. PRESTON: Okay. Tomorrow, I know this 
doesn't sound like it's very important. 
THE COURT: Well, ma'am, let's hear it. 
MS. PRESTON: But I am an Avon 
representative and tomorrow is our day of recognition 
at a luncheon at -- well, it starts at eleven o'clock 
in the morning at Ricotti A . And it's something we 
look forward to from year to year. 
THE COURT: So what is just the general 
time frame, from 11:00 a.m. to --
MS. PRESTON: To about 3:00. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. 
Preston. I appreciate that information. 
Now, Members of the Jury Panel, did I miss 
any hands raised in response to that last question? 
The record should reflect that there are 
no other hands raised. 
Now, Members of the Jury Panel, what I 
would also like to know from you, in light of the 
general schedule that I just described for you, I 
would like to know whether or not any Member of the 
CITICOURT, LLC 
801.532.3441 
Jury Selection * Boyle v. Christensen 25 
Jury Panel is currently suffering from any mental or 
physical limitations or disabilities that would 
prevent you from rendering fair and impartial jury 
service on this case. And if so, would you please 
indicate this by raising your hand at this time. 
The record should reflect that there are 
no hands rai sed . 
Now, Members of the Jury Panel, we're 
going to go next to the questionnaire that you have 
in front of you, and I would like to explain to you 
how we're going to do this. We're actually going to 
do this on an individual basis and we're going to 
start on my far left with Ms. Claudia A l l e n - K i d d e r . 
And when your turn comes I'm going to have you stand, 
and then I'm going to have you begin responding to 
the questions that you have before you. What I would 
like you to understand is don't be surprised or 
caught off guard if I stop you or interrupt you, 
because it's very likely that I'm going to engage you 
with some additional follow-up questions depending 
upon the response that you give. 
A d d i t i o n a l l y , let me say to you that it's 
not necessary for you to read the question and then 
begin responding to it. You can simply begin by 
responding to the question. Also let me say to you, 
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it may very well be that an appropriate answer to a 
question would be no. So I would appreciate -- for 
example, let's take question 7 as an example. If 
your answer to Question 7 is "no," if you would say, 
"The answer to Question 7 is no," that's an 
appropriate response. 
With that direction, let's start with Ms. 
Claudia A l l e n - K i d d e r . Would you stand, ma'am, and 
give us your name. 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Claudia Allen Kidder. 
THE COURT: And your spouse's name? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: William Kidder. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: I am a flight attendant 
and also an operational field service manager for 
D e l t a A i r l i n e s . 
THE COURT: How long have you been 
employed in that capacity? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: I have been there for 
eight years, a little over eight years. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: And my husband is 
privately employed as a dentist A auto number 2. I 
am currently in school and I have six years of 
education getting ready to finish up my A cent. 
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THE COURT: And do you have a particular 
field of expertise you're working on? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Public administration. 
THE COURT: And where are you currently 
attending school? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: BYU. 
THE COURT: Do you have an undergraduate 
degree? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: And so are you working towards 
a Master's or a doctorate? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Master's. 
THE COURT: And where did you get your 
undergraduate degree? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: University of Phoenix, 
and my associate from Dixie College. 
THE COURT: Okay . Great. Question 
Number 4? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: My leisure time 
currently is spent studying. I have very little time 
for leisure with working full-time and going to 
school. 
THE COURT: If you had leisure time, what 
would be some of the first fun things you would be 
interested in doing? 
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MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Traveling is at the 
very top. 
THE COURT: Is that the very top? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: The very top, yes. 
Hobbies, I am a fly fisherman. Fly fisherwoman, I 
should say. 
Clubs and organizations, I'm not in any 
official o r g a n i z a t i o n s . My husband and I are members 
of private duck hunting clubs in the State of Utah. 
I am in a leadership position at work. 
THE COURT: And what is your title at work 
or what is the leadership position. 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: I am an operational 
field service manager. 
THE COURT: Okay. And Number 6? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: I have received 
training in the health profession. Prior to working 
for the airline industry I was a licensed dental 
assistant in the State of California and also a 
receptionist who was involved in submitting claims. 
THE COURT: Through the office you worked 
in? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Yes, uh-huh 
( a f f i r m a t i v e ) . 
THE COURT: And for how many years were 
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you employed in that capacity? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: For 15 years, on and 
off part-time. It was during the time when I was 
raising my children, so it was normally part-time on 
and off for about 15 years. 
THE COURT: Okay. Question Number 7? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Yes, I have served on 
jury duty before. 
THE COURT: When did you do that? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: It was approximately, I 
want to say about ten years ago. 
THE COURT: Was it here in Utah? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Yes, it was. 
THE COURT: Do you remember what kind of 
case it was? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Arson. 
THE COURT: Excuse me. Do you believe it 
to have been a criminal case? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: I think so. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this question: 
Did the jury return a verdict of either guilty or not 
guilty? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Yes, we did. 
THE COURT: And what was the verdict? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Guilty. 
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THE COURT: And anything about that case 
at all that would prevent you from being a fair and 
impartial juror on today's case? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: No. It was an entirely 
different case. 
THE COURT: And any other jury service? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: The last time I was 
summoned to jury duty I was dismissed. 
THE COURT: Okay. Question Number 8? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: A friend. 
THE COURT: And close friend? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Very close friend. 
She's like a sister. 
THE COURT. And what kind of case was it, 
i f you - -
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: It was a medical case, 
an auto accident. She was rear-ended. 
THE COURT And did you have any 
participation in that case at all? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: No, I did not. I was 
not wi th her. 
THE COURT: When did the event occur, the 
accident occur? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Oh, gosh. It was 
several years ago, but it was just settled like 
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maybe, I want to say four years ago. But it happened 
probably about eight years ago. It was kind of a 
long, ongoi ng case. 
THE COURT: And are you aware of the 
nature of her injuries? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Yes, I am. 
THE COURT: And can you describe those 
briefly for us. 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: She has a lot of back 
and neck injuries. 
THE COURT: How often do you associate 
with this friend? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Often. She lives 
across the street from me. 
THE COURT: At least once a week, or more 
than that? 
THE WITNESS: I would say more than once a 
week. 
THE COURT: How would you describe her 
current medical/physical condition, to the best of 
your present knowledge? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: I would say that she's 
in pain just about every day resulting from the 
injuries that she sustained from the accident. 
THE COURT: Any other response to Question 
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Number 8? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: No. 
THE COURT: Now, let me ask this follow-up 
question, Ms. Allen-Kidder. In light of that 
response and my earlier description of the nature of 
today's case, anything about that experience that 
would prevent you from rendering fair and impartial 
jury service on today's case? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Hopefully not. 
Because, again, I wasn't involved in that case. 
THE COURT: Any other response to Question 
Number 8? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: No. 
THE COURT: Let's go on to Question 
Number 9 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Not that I'm aware of. 
THE COURT: Question Number 10. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: And that question, obviously 
to you, is calling for some situation other than to 
which you've already responded? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Right. 
THE COURT: Question Number 11. 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Just a small -- I've 
had a couple of small accidents myself, but nothing 
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that sustained injury. 
THE COURT: Let me start with were they 
auto/pedestrian accidents? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Just one. 
THE COURT: And when is the last time you 
had such an occurrence? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: Oh, gosh, probably 22 
years ago. 
THE COURT: But were there any injuries 
resulting from that occurrence? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Question Number 12. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: Question Number 13. 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: No. 
THE COURT: Question Number 14? 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: No. 
THE COURT: And Question Number 15. 
MS. ALLEN-KIDDER: I can be fair. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. 
Allen-Kidder. 
Ms. May. 
MS. MAY: Heather May. My spouse is Paul 
May. I am employed as a registered nurse, clinical 
analyst. 
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THE COURT: How long have you been 
employed in that capacity? 
MS. MAY: Five years . 
THE COURT: And who do you work for? 
MS. MAY: I work for Intermountain Health 
Care. 
THE COURT: And can you give us some more 
definition of the type of work you do. 
MS. MAY: Sure. I work clinically in the 
trauma ICU for the University of Utah about once a 
month, but I work primarily as an analyst doing 
information systems and developing clinical 
information systems for use in healthcare settings. 
THE COURT: Okay. And how is your spouse 
employed? 
MS. MAY: He owns his own company as well 
as works for an electrical contractor here in Salt 
Lake. 
THE COURT: And the company he owns, is 
that in electrical contracting? 
MS. MAY: No, it is not. It's in 
expedition equipment. 
THE COURT: And Question Number 3. 
MS. MAY: I have a Master's degree in 
nursing infomatics as well as two Bachelor's degrees, 
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one in business, one in nursing. 
THE COURT: Where did you get your degrees 
from? 
MS. MAY: The University of Utah for the 
business degree and the Master's in nursing 
infomatics, and Westminster College for the nursing 
degree. 
THE COURT: And Question Number 4. 
MS. MAY: I like to spend time outdoors. 
I don't have a lot of leisure time, but I understand 
that. A I like to read, bike, hike, camp. 
THE COURT: Question Number 5. 
MS. MAY: I am a member of Sigma Beta Tau, 
it is a nursing honor society, as well as Phi Sigma 
Kappa, which is another nursing honor society. I 
also belong to the Healthcare Information Management 
Systems Society, Utah Nursing Alliance, Nursing 
Network Infomatics Alliance, American Medical 
Infomatics Association. 
THE COURT: Okay. Question Number 6. 
MS. MAY: Yes. 
THE COURT: And when you respond "yes" to 
that question --
MS. MAY: I also, besides my healthcare, 
besides my registered nurse practice, in 1998 I did 
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work for a company that processed medical claims. 
THE COURT: What was the name of the 
company? 
MS. MAY: Health South, their insurance 
division that was run here in Salt Lake. 
THE COURT: And what were your particular 
duties? 
MS. MAY: I was a claims processor. 
THE COURT: Okay. And how long were you 
employed in that capacity? 
MS. MAY: Six months. I have never been 
on a jury. I have not or do not know anybody who has 
been involved in a lawsuit. 
THE COURT: Number 9. 
MS. MAY: No. 
THE COURT: Number 10. 
MS. MAY: No. 
THE COURT: Number 11. 
MS. MAY: Yes. I did in 1999, I had a 
close friend who actually hit a pedestrian. 
THE COURT: Is that here in Utah? 
MS. MAY: It was. 
THE COURT: Did you have any involvement 
in that occurrence at all? 
MS. MAY: Other than going and picking her 
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up after that occurred, no. 
THE COURT: And if I've understood you 
correctly, your close friend was the driver of the 
vehicle? 
MS. MAY: Driver of the vehicle. 
THE COURT: And is this close friend still 
a close friend? 
MS. MAY: No. 
THE COURT: And how often do you see her? 
MS. MAY: I've probably seen her once in 
the last two years. 
THE COURT: Does she live in Utah now? 
MS. MAY: I believe she does. 
THE COURT: And did you have -- do you 
have any knowledge of whether or not any injuries 
resulted from that occurrence? 
MS. MAY: I do know that injuries did 
result and that she was sued, but I was not a part of 
the case at any point. 
THE COURT: So do you know or have any 
idea what the outcome of any lawsuit was? 
MS. MAY: I believe she settled out of 
court. 
THE COURT: Is it correct that you don't 
know any of the details, if there were such a 
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s e t t l e m e n t ? 
MS. MAY: No, I have no i d e a . 
THE COURT: Anything at all about that 
experience that would prevent you from rendering a 
fair and impartial jury service in light of the 
nature of today's case? 
MS. MAY: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's go on to Question 
Number 12 , Ms . May . 
MS. MAY: Yes, I have suffered back 
injuries, most of my nursing friends have suffered 
back injuries. It's - -
THE COURT: Let's talk about yours for 
right now. Any particular event that leads to that 
experience or is it just part and parcel of the type 
of work you do, or some other occasion? 
MS. MAY: Part and parcel of the type of 
work that I do. At the time where a lot of my 
friends in college suffered back injuries, we had a 
lot of A bariatric patients we were moving. In the 
nature of the clinical work that I did, we moved a 
lot of patients. 
THE COURT: And describe for me what your 
current situation is with your back. 
MS. MAY: That's why I don't do clinical 
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bedside work a lot and I went into an area of nursing 
where back injuries are not as prominent. 
THE COURT: Are you currently receiving 
any type of rehabilitation or do you receive medical 
treatment or do you currently take any medical -- any 
medication for your condition? 
MS. MAY: No. I went through about six 
months of physical therapy to get my back stronger. 
THE COURT: Would you describe yourself 
having back pain currently? 
MS. MAY: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's move on to 
Question Number 13. 
MS. MAY: No. 
THE COURT: Number 14. 
MS. MAY: No. 
THE COURT: Number 15. 
MS. MAY: No. Oh, wait, wait. Yes, I can 
be fair and impartial. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. May. 
Ms. Swenson. 
MS. SWENSON: My name is Julie Swenson. 
My husband's name is Curtis Swenson. I am mostly a 
homemaker, mother. I do do massage therapy part 
time. 
CITICOURT, LLC 
801.532.3441 
Jury Selection * Boyle v. Christensen 40 
My husband is -- he works in the mortgage 
lending industry. 
I went to BYU. Got s Bachelor's degree in 
Health Sci ences . 
Some of my hobbies --
THE COURT: I'm sorry. I should ask you 
when you graduated from the Y? 
MS. SWENSON: Oh. It was '90 -- I believe 
'91. 
THE COURT: And did you do anything with 
your Health Sciences degree? And by that, I mean did 
you become employed in the Health Science field? 
MS. SWENSON: Not really. No. No. 
THE COURT: All right. Question Number 4? 
MS. SWENSON: Number 4? Some sewing, some 
dancing, some typing, reading. 
THE COURT: Question Number 5? 
MS. SWENSON: Not -- not -- I'm a primary 
president. 
THE COURT: Number 6? 
MS. SWENSON: Well, no. Not in the health 
care profession, just some health care training just 
through my Bachelor's degree and then massage therapy 
school. 
THE COURT: Okay. Number 7? 
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jury 
MS. SWENSON 
No. 
No. I haven't sat on a 
THE COURT: No to Question 8? 
MS. SWENSON: No to Number 8. 
THE COURT: Number 9? 
MS. SWENSON: No. 
THE COURT: Number 10? 
MS. SWENSON: Number 10? No. 
THE COURT: Number 11? 
MS. SWENSON: No, on 
automobile/pedestrian. 
THE COURT: Number 12? 
MS. SWENSON: Not -- not any serious. I 
mean, my mother had some back problems, but mostly 
from just doing too much. And she's better now. 
No on Number 13. 
No on Number 14. 
And I - - I can be fair. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. 
Swenson 
divorced 
Mr. Vannoy? 
MR. VANNOY: Thomas Vannoy. And I'm 
I'm a receiving clerk for a company called 
L-3 Communications, here in Salt Lake. 
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THE COURT: And how long have you worked 
for L-3 Communications? 
MR. VANNOY: Seven years. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
Number 3? 
MR. VANNOY: Highest grade is eleventh, 
with a GED. And then I received an AA degree from 
Mountain West College. 
THE COURT: Did you go to school here in 
Utah or somewhere else? 
MR. VANNOY: Utah and California. High 
school in California. 
THE COURT: Number 4? 
MR. VANNOY: I play drums in a band and 
road trips in the mountains. 
THE COURT: All right, Number 5? 
MR. VANNOY: No. 
THE COURT: Number 6? 
MR. VANNOY: No. 
THE COURT: Number 7? 
MR. VANNOY: No on number -- well, I was 
summoned to jury duty back in '90. It was dismissed 
THE COURT: Now that question, for the 
panel members, really is designed to determine 
whether or not you actually served on a jury. 
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MR. VANNOY: So no. 
THE COURT: Okay. Number 8? 
MR. VANNOY: I'm not quite sure. I have a 
cousin who was just in a car accident and I'm not 
sure if they are taking it to court or not. 
THE COURT: And when did that accident 
occur? 
MR. VANNOY: I believe it was around 
December. 
THE COURT: You have any involvement at 
all with that occurrence? 
MR. VANNOY: No. 
THE COURT: How often do you see your 
cousin? 
MR. VANNOY: Once a month. 
THE COURT: And to your knowledge, was he 
injured? 
MR. VANNOY 
has some back problems 
He did suffer whiplash and he 
I don't know the details of 
what's taking place, if anything. 
THE COURT: Anything at all about that 
knowledge or experience that would prevent you from 
being a fair and impartial juror on this case, Mr. 
Vannoy? 
MR. VANNOY: No. 
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THE COURT: Okay. Question Number 9? 
MR. VANNOY: Again, I had a friend in 
California that I think they settled out of court in 
a car accident. He was injured. 
And he since has been deceased also. 
THE COURT: Okay. Did you have 
participation or involvement in that situation at 
all? 
MR. VANNOY: No. 
THE COURT: And do you -- are you familiar 
with any of the specifics of the accident or how the 
matter was resolved? 
MR. VANNOY: I believe they settled out of 
court. Again, I don't know how --• what the details 
were. And it was out of state also. 
THE COURT: Are you familiar with the 
nature of his injuries? 
MR. VANNOY: He had a neck injury from it. 
And it was pretty severe. It was causing a lot of 
problems . 
THE COURT: Anything at all about that 
experience that would prevent you from being a fair 
and impartial juror on today's case? 
MR. VANNOY: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Question Number 10? 
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MR. VANNOY: No. 
THE COURT: Number 11? 
MR. VANNOY: No. 
THE COURT: Number 12? 
MR. VANNOY: Uh --
THE COURT: That's other than what you've 
already responded to. 
MR. VANNOY: I, myself, have neck and back 
injuries from a car accident. 
THE COURT: And when did you have that 
accident? 
MR. VANNOY: '80 -- '88. 
THE COURT: What kind of accident was it? 
MR. VANNOY: It was a motor vehicle 
accident. I ran off the road and flipped my vehicle 
and was ejected out of the window. 
THE COURT: So it was a single car 
accident? 
MR. VANNOY: Single car. 
THE COURT: And what were the nature of 
your injuries? 
MR. VANNOY: I sustained a C-5 neck 
injury, sublocated. And fractured my T-7 back. 
THE COURT: And obviously you received 
medical treatment for those injuries? 
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MR. VANNOY: I did. I had to wear a halo 
for three months and some follow-up rehabilitation. 
THE COURT: And when did the follow-up 
rehabilitation cease? 
MR. VANNOY: Well, it really never took 
place because they never prescribed me going to 
anybody. So it was sporadic. I just went to massage 
therapists and chiropractors on my own. And I've 
done that periodically. 
THE COURT: Okay. And when you say you go 
to a chiropractor periodically, how frequently do you 
do that? 
MR. VANNOY: When I can't get up out of 
bed in the morning. But that's very, very, very 
seldom. I'm pretty well functioning. 
THE COURT: I'm trying to get a sense if 
we're talking about a couple of times a year, once a 
month, how frequent do you see a chiropractor for 
those conditions you've just described? 
MR. VANNOY: After the accident, I had a 
personal friend who was a chiropractor and I probably 
saw him maybe a dozen times within a year. 
THE COURT: Well, let me come at this 
question a different way. 
In this year, 2008 --
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MR. VANNOY: Zero. 
THE COURT: -- have you seen a 
chiropractor? 
MR. VANNOY: I haven't seen a chiropractor 
in probably five years. 
THE COURT: Okay. And are you currently 
experiencing back or neck pain? 
MR. VANNOY: It's ongoing, but I'm 
functionable. It's something I live with and deal 
with on a day-to-day basis. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's go then to 
Question Number 13? 
MR. VANNOY: No. 
THE COURT: 14? 
MR. VANNOY: No. 
THE COURT: 15? 
MR. VANNOY: I could be fair. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you, Mr. Vannoy, in 
light of your personal experience with the accident 
you had, the neck issue and back issue which you've 
just described, taking into consideration the nature 
of today's case and if there is evidence in this case 
related to neck and back pain, do you think you would 
be able to be a fair and impartial juror to each side 
of this case? 
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MR. VANNOY I do. 
that? 
THE COURT: Any question at all about 
No MR. VANNOY 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you very 
much, Mr. Vannoy. 
Mr. Pearce? 
MR. PEARCE: Yes. My name is Kent Pearce. 
My wife is Marie. 
I'm employed as a (unintelligible) foreman 
for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. 
My spouse is employed at -- I don't 
remember what it's called 
THE COURT: We won't tell her that. 
MR. PEARCE: Yeah. Well, Distribution 
Services for the Church. Okay. That's what it is. 
They just changed the name, that's why I was off. 
My highest grade, high school. I had four 
years in trade school. 
THE COURT: Where did you get that 
schooling at? Here in Utah? 
MR. PEARCE: Yes. 
I spend my leisure time -- I like to read 
and draw. 
My hobbies are fly fishing, hiking. I 
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snowshoe. 
MR. PEARCE 
THE COURT: 
MR. PEARCE 
THE COURT: 
MR. PEARCE 
I don't have any health care training. 
I have served on a jury before. 
THE COURT: When was that? 
Well, I don ' t know. 
Well --
A long time ago. 
What decade was it? 
15 years ago at least. 
THE COURT: Okay. Here in Utah? 
MR. PEARCE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you remember what kind of 
case it was? 
MR. PEARCE: It was an automobile car -- I 
mean, a motorcycle/car accident. 
And we were instructed by the judge to not 
determine damages, just -- just negligence. 
THE COURT: And do you remember what the 
outcome of the case was? 
MR. PEARCE: We determined that the 
motorcycle was the negligent party. Yeah. 
THE COURT: And was that party the 
defendant or the plaintiff; do you remember? 
MR. PEARCE: I think the defendant. But I 
am not sure. 
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THE COURT: Okay. And anything at all 
about that experience that would prevent you from 
being a fair and impartial juror on today's case? 
MR. PEARCE: No. 
THE COURT: Any other juror service? 
MR. PEARCE: No. 
THE COURT: I guess I should also ask, are 
you a member of any clubs or organizations? 
MR. PEARCE No I am not 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's go then to 
Question 8? 
MR. PEARCE: Question 8 is no. 
9 is no. 
10 is no. 
And 11 is no. 
12 is yes. When I was about 10 or 11, I 
was standing in my tree house next door and it broke. 
I fell about 20 feet and injured my back. I received 
treatment then, but I have no - - no problems with it 
now. I did see a chiropractor maybe two or three 
times a year. That keeps me from having any 
complications at all. I can carry a backpack. I 
think I can do anything. 
THE COURT: Anything at all about that 
experience that would prevent you from rendering fair 
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and impartial jury service on today's case? 
MR. PEARCE: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's go to Question 
Number 13, Mr. Pearce? 
MR. PEARCE: 13 is no. 
And 14 is no. 
And 15 is yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. 
Pearce. 
Mr. Haslam? 
MR. HASLAM: My name is Robin Haslam. I 
don't have a spouse. 
I'm employed with Cache Valley Electric 
for 23 years. 
THE COURT: What do you do there? 
MR. HASLAM: I'm a project 
manager/foreman. 
Had four years of trade school. 
THE COURT: Where did you get the trade 
school? 
in Utah? 
MR. HASLAM: Community College. 
THE COURT: Did you go to high school here 
MR. HASLAM: Yes. Cyprus High School. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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MR. HASLAM: Leisure time, I'm a boater, 
m o t o r c y c l e s , snowmobiler, camping, hiking. 
I'm a member of the Salt Lake Chapter 
Harley's Owners Group. I'm a member IBW local union 
354. 
I've not been trained in health care. 
I served on a jury about - -
THE COURT: What -- what about the legal 
profession or - -
MR. HASLAM: No. 
THE COURT: Or profession that handles 
claims, medical injury? 
MR. HASLAM: No. I served on a jury five 
years ago. It was a criminal case. A kid beat up a 
girlfriend's car. 
THE COURT: And do you remember what the 
outcome of the case was? 
MR. HASLAM: He was found guilty. 
THE COURT: Anything at all about that 
experience that would prevent you from rendering fair 
and impartial jury service on today's case? 
MR. HASLAM: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any other jury service? 
MR. HASLAM: No. That's it. 
THE COURT: Question Number 8? 
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MR. HASLAM: Question Number 8. No to 
Question 8. 
Number 9, I was in a -- I got rear-ended 
January 5th of this year by a drunk driver. 
Currently the insurance companies are paying for 
everythi ng. 
THE COURT: And let's talk about that for 
just a moment. 
Did you require any medical attention? 
MR. HASLAM: Yes. I was taken to the 
hospital. They x-rayed my back, my neck and 
everything to make sure I was okay. My back was sore 
for about a month afterwards. And after that I'm 
good now. 
THE COURT: So did you require any type of 
rehabilitative treatment? 
MR. HASLAM: No. No. No. They just 
wanted to make sure my back and neck were okay. 
THE COURT: Anything at all about that 
experience, Mr. Haslam, that would prevent you from 
rendering fair and impartial jury service on today's 
case? 
MR. HASLAM: No. Huh-uh (negative). 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HASLAM: Let's see. Don't know 
CITICOURT, LLC 
801.532.3441 
Jury Selection * Boyle v. Christensen 54 
anybody that's done a claim against any person yet. 
I've had one of my friends that I grew up 
with got hit by a car and there was a huge claim on 
it. I don't know what the dollar amount was on it. 
THE COURT: What year did that occur? 
MR. HASLAM: That was back in '65, '66. 
THE COURT: Was it here in Utah? 
MR. HASLAM: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And did you have any 
i n v o l v e m e n t at all with that situation? 
MR. HASLAM: No. 
THE COURT: And do you know the extent of 
your friend's injuries when that o c c u r r e d ? 
MR. HASLAM: Busted both legs, busted his 
p e l v i s , broke his back. I think that's about it. He 
was in the hospital for about nine m o n t h s . 
THE COURT: Do you associate with that 
friend at all today? 
MR. HASLAM: Y e s . I s n o w m o b i l e with him. 
THE COURT: Say that -- I'm sorry? 
MR. HASLAM: I s n o w m o b i l e with him. 
THE COURT: A n y t h i n g at all about that 
e x p e r i e n c e that would prevent you from rendering fair 
and impartial jury service to either side of this 
case? 
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MR. HASLAM: No. Huh-uh (negative). 
THE COURT: And did I understand you to 
say that you were not aware of any details of any 
outcome of that situation in terms of court or any 
kind of a crime? 
MR. HASLAM: Just he was awarded a bunch 
of money. I don't think they actually went to court. 
I think it was settled out of court. They gave him a 
bunch of money. I don't know a dollar figure. 
THE COURT: All right. Question Number 
12? 
MR. HASLAM: Question 12. Just my back 
was sore for a month after that wreck is all. 
THE COURT: But again, you did not require 
any types of medical treatment? 
MR. HASLAM: No. 
THE COURT: Any medications? 
MR. HASLAM: No. They -- they -- well, 
they gave me some pain and anti-inflammatory I used 
for a month. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HASLAM: Other than that, no. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. HASLAM: 13? No. No. 
THE COURT: 14 i s no? 
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MR. HASLAM: Do you have any personal or 
religious beliefs -- no. 
Yes. I can give good --
THE COURT: And your answer to 15 is yes? 
MR. HASLAM: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. 
Haslam. 
MR. HASLAM: Uh-huh ( a f f i r m a t i v e ) . 
THE COURT: Okay. Now ma'am, you're going 
to have to pronounce your last name for me. 
MS. FICHIALOS: Sierra Fichialos. My 
husband is Rich Fichialos. 
THE COURT: Fichialos. Thank you very 
much, ma'am. 
MS. FICHIALOS: I am a high school 
teacher. This is there graduation this week. Some 
that are first generation. Like the whole century is 
graduati ng . 
My husband is --
THE COURT: And before you go on, I -- I 
-- particularly because you didn't raise your hand in 
response --
MS. FICHIALOS: I didn't -- I told my 
students I'll see what I can do when I get in here. 
They were on a ( u n i n t e l l i g i b l e ) . 
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THE COURT: I'm sorry. I know I keep 
going back to this and you want to move on, but I 
just want to make sure your response is clear. 
If you were required to serve on this 
jury, you would be able to make the necessary 
adjustments and render fair and impartial jury 
service? 
MS. FICHIALOS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. I'm sorry 
for cutting you off, but I just wanted to be clear on 
your answer. 
MS. FICHIALOS: My husband is an 
irrigation designer for Sprinkler World. 
I'm currently getting a Master's agree in 
School Counseli ng. 
THE COURT: What grade do you teach? 
MS. FICHIALOS: I teach high school. So I 
teach tenth through twelfth. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. FICHIALOS: Resource. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. FICHIALOS: Leisure time, don't have 
much, but when I do it's my children, reading, 
traveling, outdoors and stuff. 
THE COURT: Number 5? 
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MS. FICHIALOS: I'm a member of the PTA. 
6, in-school counseling. We have mental 
health classes and pieces to that. But nothing else. 
Number 7, yes. I served on a jury about 
four years ago. It was a rear-end car accident. We 
were looking at the damages to award. 
THE COURT: Here in Utah? 
MS. FICHIALOS: Yes. 
THE COURT: And do you remember what the 
outcome of the case was? 
MS. FICHIALOS: Well, it was on much was 
going to be awarded. They -- but I don't remember 
how much the award was. 
THE COURT: But you do remember there was 
an award? 
MS. FICHIALOS: Yes. 
THE COURT: And anything at all about that 
experience that would prevent you from rendering fair 
and impartial jury service on this case? 
MS. FICHIALOS: No. 
THE COURT: Do you remember any of the 
facts of that case? 
MS. FICHIALOS: Uh-huh ( a f f i r m a t i v e ) . 
THE COURT: Give me a brief summary of 
what you remember. 
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MS. FICHIALOS: It was a lady who was 
medically fragile. She had had a bunch of accidents 
in the past. And this teen girl had rear-ended her. 
It just tipped over the scales of the medically 
issues. And they were trying to decide how much was 
her -- the third accident complicating what she had 
already received in injuries before. 
THE COURT: And can I assume it was here 
in the Third District Court? 
MS. FICHIALOS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Wasn't in this courthouse; was 
it? 
MS. FICHIALOS: No. 
THE COURT: It was in the older 
courthouse? 
MS. FICHIALOS: No. It was in this one. 
THE COURT: Do you remember what judge 
presided? 
MS. FICHIALOS: It was a female. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. FICHIALOS: My memory is not the 
greatest. 
THE COURT: But again, is there anything 
at all about that experience that would prevent you 
from rendering fair and impartial jury service on 
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this case? 
MS. FICHIALOS: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's move on then to 
Question Number 8? 
MS. FICHIALOS: 8 is no. 
9 is yes. A close friend was in a car 
accident and received a lump sum for mostly neck and 
injuries with -- as a result, like a migraine. 
THE COURT: Does that friend live here in 
Utah? 
MS. FICHIALOS: Uh-huh ( a f f i r m a t i v e ) . 
THE COURT: And when did this accident 
occur? 
MS. FICHIALOS: Over ten years ago. 
THE COURT: And how often do you socialize 
with this friend? 
MS. FICHIALOS: Daily. 
THE COURT: And do you know whether or not 
this friend is still experiencing any physical --
MS. FICHIALOS: Yes, she is. 
THE COURT: -- conditions related to the 
accident? 
MS. FICHIALOS: Yes. She still gets 
cortisone shots in the neck and migraines. 
THE COURT: Did you have any participation 
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or involvement in that case whatsoever? 
(No verbal response.) 
THE COURT: Anything about that experience 
that would prevent you from rendering fair and 
impartial jury service to either side in this case? 
MS. FICHIALOS: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's move on then to 
Question - -
MS. FICHIALOS: 10 is no. 
11 is no. 
12 is no. 
13 is no. 
14 is no. 
15 i s yes . 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
Ms. Kipp? 
MS. KIPP: My name is Carolyn Kipp. And 
my husband's name was Herman, and he's deceased. 
I am not currently employed. 
Graduated from high school and had a year 
of school at the University of Utah. 
My leisure time is skiing in the winter, 
playing golf in the summer and traveling. 
I am in the Assistance League of Salt Lake 
City. 
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THE COURT: You s a i d the A s s i s t a n c e 
League? 
MS. KIPP: League. 
THE COURT: And help me with what type of 
organization that is, ma'am? 
MS. KIPP: That is a women's organization 
We actually -- that I just joined. We help provide 
clothing for children in needy schools and several 
other youth projects. 
I've never worked in the health care 
industry. 
I've never served on a jury. 
8 is no. 
9 is no. 
10 is no. 
11 is no. 
12 is no. 
13 is no. 
14 is no. 
15 i s yes . 
THE COURT: Ms. Kipp, how -- how -- how 
long was your husband a lawyer in this state? 
MS. KIPP: 50 years, I think. 
THE COURT: If it's the same person I'm 
thinking of, your husband was a very fine lawyer, 
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ma am 
MS. KIPP: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Kipp. 
Ms. Hanson? 
MS. HANSON: Lynnette Hanson. I am 
si ngle . 
I am employed as an office manager at a 
local distributor for industrial supplies. I have 
approximately four years of college, but no degree. 
THE COURT: And where did you get those 
four years of college at? 
MS. HANSON: Mostly through BYU and 
extension here in Salt Lake, through the Y. 
THE COURT: Did you have any particular 
fields of interest? 
MS. HANSON: Humanities and history. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MS. HANSON: Very limited leisure time, 
go every weekend to Idaho. I take care of my 
93-year-old, invalid mother. I love to travel. And 
my trips up there are part of that travel and leisure 
time for me. I love history. I love to read. 
I do belong to some circle organizations, 
like Utah Circle Society, the VUP. 
Right currently, I don't have any 
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leadership positions, except my job at work. 
THE COURT: And what's your leadership 
position at your job? 
MS. HANSON: I'm the office manager. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
MS. HANSON: I have not worked -- no, is 
the answer to 6. 
I have not served on a jury. 
No to 8. 
No to 9. 
No to 10. 
No to 11. 
No to 12. 
No to 13. 
No to 14. 
And yes to 15. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. 
Hanson. 
Ms . Harri son? 
MS. HARRISON: I'm Barbara Harrison. My 
husband's name is Joe Harrison. 
I'm presently employed by Jordan School 
District. I teach (unintelligible) science in high 
school. 
I have my teaching degree and Master's. I 
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teach at the U of U and other facilities. 
In my spare time, I spend time with my 
family, reading, camping. 
And as far as organizations, I'm a member 
of UFAC and also UCTE, (unintelligible). Let's see. 
I'm also Department Chairman for my high school 
department. 
Number 6 is no. 
Number 7 is no. 
Number 8 is no. 
9, no. 
10, no. 
11, no. 
12, yes. I have an uncle that a garage 
door fell down on him and he sustained a back injury. 
THE COURT: When did that event occur, Ms 
Harrison? 
MS. HARRISON: I believe in -- 30 years 
ago. It's been quite a long time. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. HARRISON: 13 is no. 
14 is no. 
And 15 , yes . 
THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. 
Harrison. 
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Can you pronounce your name f o r me, again? 
MS. BOETTGER: I t ' s B o e t t g e r . Forget the 
ii n " 0. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. BOETTGER: I am Jill Boettger. My 
husband is David Boettger. 
I'm a speech pathologist and audiologist 
for the State Health Department. I have a Master's 
degree from Utah State University and a Bachelor's 
from University of California Santa Barbara. 
Let's see. I spend my time chasing after 
my sons. And gardening, if there is any time left 
over . 
I'm a member of the American Speech and 
Hearing Association and the Utah Speech and Hearing 
Associ ati on. 
No to 6. 
No, I have not served on a jury before. 
My husband and I were plaintiffs in a real 
estate lawsuit that settled out of court. 
THE COURT: And when was that case filed? 
MS. BOETTGER: That was in 1992. 
THE COURT: Was that here in Utah? 
MS. BOETTGER: Yes. 
THE COURT: And when did the case settle? 
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What year, approximately? 
MS. BOETTGER: The same year, '92. 
THE COURT: Anything at all about that 
experience that would prevent you from being fair and 
impartial to either side in this case? 
MS. BOETTGER: No. 
THE COURT: Any other response to question 
Number 8? 
MS. BOETTGER: Yes, actually. My husband 
is a pediatrician. He is currently a defendant in a 
medical malpractice suit. 
THE COURT: Okay. And is that case here 
in this district or somewhere else in the state? 
MS. BOETTGER: In this district. 
THE COURT: Okay. And do you have any 
involvement at all regarding that case? 
MS. BOETTGER: No. Just supporting him. 
THE COURT: Okay. And anything at all 
about that experience that would prevent you from 
rendering fair and impartial jury service on this 
case? 
MS. BOETTGER: I don't think so. 
THE COURT: Do you have any doubt or 
question about it at all? 
MS. BOETTGER: Well, of course in my 
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husband's case I haven't been paying any insurance 
out. 
THE COURT: That's sort --
MS. BOETTGER: ( U n i n t e l l i g i b l e ) . 
THE COURT: Let me finish. That sort of 
is not my question. 
MS. BOETTGER: Okay. 
THE COURT: What I need to know is whether 
anything regarding your husband's situation would 
have any impact upon your duty and responsibility to 
be fair and impartial to each side of this case? 
That's what I'm -- that's what I'm really 
after 
not 
MS. BOETTGER: Yeah. I think probably 
THE COURT: And, you know, I'm not trying 
to give you a hard time. I'm just trying to probe 
your response. When you use the word "probably," it 
made me think that maybe you had a hesitation? 
MS. BOETTGER: Well, maybe there is a 
little hesitation in terms of just supporting my 
husband and this case making me -- feeling he's 
unfairly being sued. 
THE COURT: Do you -- are you of the 
opinion that -- that that sense of unfairness you 
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would extend to this case? 
MS. BOETTGER: I think I'd be able to 
separate the two out. 
THE COURT: Any other response to that 
question? 
enough. 
MS. BOETTGER: No. That's it. That's 
THE COURT: Okay. Question Number 9? 
MS. BOETTGER: No to number 9. 
No to Number 10. 
No to Number 11. 
And then I do have a history of back and 
neck injuries. 
THE COURT: Describe that history for us. 
MS. BOETTGER: Starting probably about 
1992, when I was lifting my firstborn son, who was 
huge. And have had neck and back injuries since that 
time. 
Then when my second son -- he was huge, 
too -- further injured my back and my neck. 
THE COURT: And give us an idea of your 
course of treatment over that period of time for 
those conditions. 
MS. BOETTGER: So far I've been able to 
avoid surgery. I do -- I receive physical therapy 
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for those back injuries. And I do exercises daily to 
help keep my back strong. 
But I do have discomfort on and off. I 
find it hard to sit for really long periods of time. 
THE COURT: And have you been -- through 
those treatment modalities, have you been diagnosed 
with any particular condition of your back? 
MS. BOETTGER: Yes. I have a herniated 
disc, C-5. And (unintelligible) L-3/4. 
THE COURT: Anything at all about that 
experience that would prevent you from rendering fair 
and impartial jury service in this case if, in fact, 
there were evidence of, in this case, regarding back 
problems? 
MS. BOETTGER: No. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. BOETTGER: And no to 13. 
And no to 14. 
And yes to 15. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
Ms. Rasmussen? 
MS. RASMUSSEN: My name Elda Sue 
Rasmussen. There is no Mr. Rasmussen. 
I work for Qwest. I have done for 
41 years . 
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THE COURT: What do you do there? 
MS. RASMUSSEN: This year I collect bills 
from the long distance carriers. 
THE COURT: And prior years, what have you 
done there? 
MS. RASMUSSEN: I've worked with customer 
service reps for residential, small business, direct 
with complication when the old Mountain Bell had 
telephone books. So a nice, long service career. 
And now I want to play. 
THE COURT: Question Number 3? 
MS. RASMUSSEN: I had high school, some 
college. Some at the University of Utah, not BYU. 
Steven-Henager' s Business College in business 
classes . 
I like to travel some and golf, reading, 
music, needle work. 
I don't belong to any big clubs or 
anything. 
profession 
I'm not in the medical or legal 
I've never been on a jury. 
And I'm going to answer Number 11, first, 
yes. I had a nephew that was involved as a driver in 
an a u t o m o b i l e / p e d e s t r i a n . I don't know of any 
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lawsuits. That took place three and a half years 
ago. A young man wondered into traffic. Two cars 
avoided him and my nephew had to be the one who hit 
him. He died. 
And other than that, I've been -- yes? 
THE COURT: The -- I want to stick with 
that question for a moment. 
MS. RASMUSSEN: Okay. 
THE COURT: As a result of that incident, 
do you know whether or not any lawsuit was filed or 
any claim of any nature --
MS. RASMUSSEN: I'm not aware of any 
lawsui t. 
THE COURT: Did you have any participation 
in that situation at all? 
MS. RASMUSSEN: No. Other than emotional 
support. 
THE COURT: Right. And I'm sorry, what 
year did you say that occurred? 
MS. RASMUSSEN: I think that was about 
three and a half years ago. 
THE COURT: And that was here in Utah? 
MS. RASMUSSEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: And again, you have no 
knowledge of any type of action being taken? 
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MS. RASMUSSEN: I've never heard that 
there was ever a lawsuit filed against him. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything about that 
experience, would it prevent you from being fair and 
impartial to either side of today's case? 
MS. RASMUSSEN: No. It would make me 
probably more aware and fair, not to judge too 
harshly one way or the another. 
THE COURT: Okay. You may go on, ma'am. 
MS. RASMUSSEN: 8, 9 and 10, I'm not aware 
of any. Nor 12. 
No to 13 and 14. 
And yes to 15. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. 
Rasmussen. 
Mr. Cotterman? 
MR. COTTERMAN: My name is Michael Stanley 
Cotterman. I go by Stan. But me legal name is 
Michael. 
THE COURT: And let me just stop you 
there, Mr. Cotterman. 
Members of the Jury Panel, let me just 
tell you, we're -- since we've been in here awhile, 
we're getting very close to taking a ten-minute 
recess. So if you can, be patient with me. 
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Marilyn. 
Go ahead, Mr. Cotterman. 
MR. COTTERMAN: Okay. My wife's name is 
I'm retired, but I am employed part time 
THE COURT: What are you retired from, 
sir? 
MR. COTTERMAN: Just retired. I was 65. 
THE COURT: Well, how were you mainly 
employed when you were working? 
MR. COTTERMAN: Well, I work part time. 
THE COURT: Well, you work part time 
currently? 
MR. COTTERMAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: At this --• at what type of 
work do you do? 
MR. COTTERMAN: Ace Automotive Warehouse. 
I'm an auto parts counterman. 
THE COURT: How long have you worked part 
time? 
MR. COTTERMAN: About three years. 
THE COURT: Where did you work before 
that? 
MR. COTTERMAN: Auto parts, same thing. 
THE COURT: So you've been employed in 
that area for some time? 
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MR. COTTERMAN: Yeah. Since the mid-'60s 
actually. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
MR. COTTERMAN: And my wife's name is 
Marilyn. She's a hair stylist. Has her own beauty 
shop up in Holladay. 
And highest grade was 12. 
THE COURT: Was that here in Utah? 
MR. COTTERMAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: What high school did you go 
to? 
MR. COTTERMAN: West High. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. COTTERMAN: Leisure time, since I have 
quite a bit, I walk a lot. Golf a little bit and 
spend a lot of time in coffee shops. 
THE COURT: What's a "little bit" of golf? 
MR. COTTERMAN: Maybe once every week or 
two. About it. 
THE COURT: Where do you usually golf at? 
MR. COTTERMAN: Oh, I don't know. I just 
spread it around. It's -- it's --
THE COURT: I don't want you to give me an 
exact address -- let me finish my question. I don't 
want you to give me an exact address of where you 
CITICOURT, LLC 
801.532.3441 
Jury Selection * Boyle v. Christensen 76 
live, but do you golf mainly in Salt Lake City? 
MR. COTTERMAN: In Salt Lake. Right. 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: But in Salt Lake City or in 
the County or both? 
MR. COTTERMAN: Salt Lake City. 
THE COURT: When is the last time -- if 
you have, when is the last time you golfed in 
Glenmoor. 
MR. COTTERMAN: Probably about five years 
ago. 
THE COURT: How many total times have you 
golfed at Glenmoor? 
MR. COTTERMAN: Oh, probably 20. 
THE COURT: 20? 
MR. COTTERMAN: It's decreased. My golf 
game has decreased a lot through the years. Just 
haven't gotten any better, to tell you the truth. I 
find doing it less and less (unintelligible). 
THE COURT: Any other response to Question 
Number 4 in terms of your leisure time? 
MR. COTTERMAN: No. 
As far as hobbies go, I love trains. 
Always have. Since I grew up around them when I was 
young. Every chance I get to ride on railroads, I 
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do. And I've ridden Frontrunner three, four -- about 
four times already, to Ogden and back. So that kind 
of shows --
THE COURT: Number 5? 
MR. COTTERMAN: Number 5, no. 
No on Number 6. 
Yes on Number 7. 
THE COURT: When did you give jury 
service? 
MR. COTTERMAN: It was the early '90s 
somewhere. I would say probably '93, '94. Somewhere 
there. 
THE COURT: Here in Utah? 
MR. COTTERMAN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Do you remember what kind of 
case it was? 
MR. COTTERMAN: It was involving a 
concealed weapon. I don't remember too many details 
about i t. 
THE COURT: Was there a guilty or not 
guilty verdict? 
MR. COTTERMAN: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything at all about 
that experience that would prevent you from being 
fair and impartial to either side in this case? 
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MR. COTTERMAN: No. Not at all. 
THE COURT: Any other jury service? 
MR. COTTERMAN: No. That's it. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's go to Question 
Number 8? 
MR. COTTERMAN: No. 
THE COURT: Number 9? 
MR. COTTERMAN: And no on Number 9. 
No on Number 10. 
No on Number 11. 
Yes on Number 12. 
THE COURT: Why did you answer 12 yes? 
MR. COTTERMAN: Okay. My brother was 
involved in a -- he had a serious - - some serious 
back problems. Had them ongoing for quite awhile. 
He was under some pretty extensive medication and 
stuff for them. And I think it was in '78, if I 
remember right, he -- he was out at the Murray -- I 
don't remember what hospital it was out there, a 
hospital in Murray somewhere, and he just kind of 
freaked out and went crazy, was under such severe 
pain. And didn't have medication. I guess he went 
out there trying to get medication, had a weapon. 
And the Murray police shot him. 
THE COURT: What year was that? 
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MR. COTTERMAN: Killed him. '78, I 
beli eve . 
THE COURT: Okay. And the back problems 
that you described that he had, was there some 
singular event that led to those problems or not? 
MR. COTTERMAN: You know, not that I'm 
aware of. I didn't really see an awful lot of him at 
that particular time. But not that I'm aware of. 
No. I think it had just built up. 
THE COURT: Anything at all about that 
experience that would prevent you from being a fair 
and impartial juror to either side of this case? 
MR. COTTERMAN: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's go on then to 
Question Number 13? 
MR. COTTERMAN: No. 
And no on 14. 
And yes on 15. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. 
Cotterman. 
Ms. - - is it Mahler or Mahler? 
MS. MAHLER: Mahler. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Mahler. 
MS. MAHLER: I am Annette Mahler. My 
spouse is Michael Mahler. 
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I am employed at the Utah Medical 
A s s o c i a t i o n . 
THE COURT: What do you do there? 
MS. MAHLER: I'm the Director for some 
subspecialty medical societies. 
THE COURT: And give me a better -- more 
detailed description of the type of work you do. 
MS. MAHLER: It's a -- it's a physician 
membership organization. So anything to do with 
physicians. I do -- I'm the Director for 
Ophthalmology and the Executive Administrator for 
OB/GY N s . 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
MS. MAHLER: I have three-plus years at 
the University of Utah. Did not graduate. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry. I may have missed 
this. Did you say anything about your spouse? 
MS. MAHLER: He's employed as a loan 
officer at a mortgage company. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. Number 3? 
MS. MAHLER: Number 4, I bike and golf. 
THE COURT: And I'm sorry, Ms. Mahler. I 
missed your response to Question Number 3, your level 
of education? 
MS. MAHLER: Three-plus at the University 
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of Utah. 
THE COURT 
I'm sorry. Number 4? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. MAHLER: Three-plus years 
THE COURT: Any particular --
MS. MAHLER: Psychology. 
Psychology. Okay All right 
MS. MAHLER: I golf and I ride a bike. 
THE COURT: How often do you golf? 
MS. MAHLER: In the summertime, typically 
maybe two, three times a month. 
THE COURT: And where do you usually golf 
at? 
MS. MAHLER: I just played Hill Air Force 
Base. That's the last time I golfed. It can vary. 
THE COURT: So you golf all over? 
MS. MAHLER: All over. But not Glenmoor. 
THE COURT: Have you ever golfed at 
Glenmoor? 
MS. MAHLER: No. Not that I can recall. 
THE COURT: All right. Any hobbies? 
MS. MAHLER: I read and travel quite a 
bit. I -- I travel quite a bit with my -- my 
position at the Medical Association. 
THE COURT: And when you travel for your 
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work, what types of events are you usually traveling 
to and the locations? 
MS. MAHLER: It varies. The annual 
meeting for OB/GYNs, I do some legislative traveling 
as well. 
I have obviously worked in the health care 
profession. I have worked several different 
positions within a medical office, a clinical office, 
medical manager. I've worked for BlueCross. 
BlueShield as the Coordinator for the HIP Program, 
which is the Health Insurance Pool. 
THE COURT: When did you -- how long were 
you employed in that capacity? 
MS. MAHLER: Two years at BlueCross. 
Approximately 15 years in the medical profession. 
Number 7, no. 
8 , no. 
9, no. 
10, no. 
11, no. 
12, no . 
13, no. 
14, no. 
And 15, I believe I can be fair and 
impartial, yes. 
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THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. 
Mahler . 
Mr. Wright? 
MR. WRIGHT: My name is Denton Wright. My 
wife's name i s Karen. 
I'm employed as a truck driver. And she's 
employed as a banker. 
THE COURT: And when you say you're 
employed as a "truck driver," I mean, independently, 
for a company? 
MR. WRIGHT: No. Penske Delivery 
Industries. 
THE COURT: And do you drive -- where do 
you drive? 
MR. WRIGHT: Just locally. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
MR. WRIGHT: 24 years accident free. 
THE COURT: Okay. Number 3? 
MR. WRIGHT: Eleventh grade. 
THE COURT: Here in Utah? 
MR. WRIGHT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WRIGHT: I spend my leisure time 
boati ng. 
My hobbies, I play with my grandkids. 
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Wri ght. 
And no on 5. 
No on 6. 
No on 7. 
No on 8. 
No on 9. 
10, no. 
11, no. 
12, no. 
13, no. 
14, no. 
And 15, yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr 
Ms. Glazier? 
MS. GLAZIER: Yes. My name is Cheree 
Glazier. My husband is Scott Glazier. 
I am employed through Jordan School 
District as a teacher's assistant for a kindergarten 
class . 
And my husband is employed through a sign 
company as an install foreman. 
My highest grade is 12th grade, West 
Jordan High School, here in Utah. 
Leisure time with my kids, reading, 
playing the piano. 
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Member of the PTA. 
I have no -- Number 6 is no. 
7 , no. 
8, yes. 
THE COURT: And why did you answer yes to 
8? 
MS. GLAZIER: Well, my husband was a 
witness in an automobile accident. It was actually 
part of -- got -- it was nine years ago. 
THE COURT: And when you say he was a 
"witness," does that mean he actually testified in 
court? 
MS. GLAZIER: He did have to go to court. 
I don't believe he was ever called up. 
THE COURT: Okay. And did he have any 
other role in that incident you just described? 
MS. GLAZIER: As in the trial or --
THE COURT: Yeah. In the -- in the 
accident itself? 
MS. GLAZIER: He was actually -- it was an 
automobile accident. The driver was under the 
influence. My husband was injured in it. Yes. 
THE COURT: And what was --
MS. GLAZIER: He was in the car. He was 
not driving. He was in the car with the driver. 
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THE COURT: And what were the extent of 
your husband's injuries, if I heard you correctly. 
MS. GLAZIER: Just had to have his ear 
partially sewn back on, his lip. Had a bunch of 
cracks and stuff in his head. 
THE COURT: And did you have any other 
participation in that situation at all? 
MS. GLAZIER: No. 
THE COURT: And do you have any idea as to 
what the outcome of any lawsuit was? 
MS. GLAZIER: I do not know what the 
outcome was. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any other response to 
Question Number 8? 
MS. GLAZIER: Yes. My parents were 
involved -- my -- well, let's take care of two. 
My brother was hit by a car walking home 
from school. And I don't know if it was my parents 
-- well, I know my parents were involved in the 
process, the legal process. . I believe they were --
they received partial -- his medical bills were paid 
partially by the driver. 
THE COURT: When did that event occur? 
MS. GLAZIER: That was about 20 years ago. 
THE COURT: How old was your brother at 
CITICOURT, LLC 
801.532.3441 
Jury Selection * Boyle v. Christensen 87 
the time? 
MS. GLAZIER: He was 15, I believe. Yeah, 
Right before he turned 16. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry to do this to you --
MS. GLAZIER: That's okay. 
THE COURT: -- how old were you at the 
time? 
MS. GLAZIER: I was -- well, he's six 
years older than I. So I was 9. 
THE COURT: And what can you tell me, if 
anything, about your brother's injuries? 
MS. GLAZIER: He broke both of his legs. 
He had problems with his face. He had to have teeth 
broken out, sewn up. 
THE COURT: And to your knowledge, does 
your brother still currently deal with any of the 
issues or conditions resulting from that accident? 
MS. GLAZIER: With his knee, yes. 
THE COURT: And describe that briefly. 
MS. GLAZIER: He -- it's not enough -- I 
mean. He's a runner. So -- but he has suffered from 
the knee injuries. But he does not -- he's not 
treated for it. 
THE COURT: Anything at all about that 
experience that would prevent you from rendering fair 
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and impartial jury service to either side of this 
case? 
MS. GLAZIER: I don't believe so. 
THE COURT: All right. Any further 
response to that question? 
MS. GLAZIER: My parents were also 
involved in a lawsuit because my brother -- a 
different brother -- in an automobile accident, where 
they were suing for personal injury. 
THE COURT: What year did that accident 
happen? 
well 
MS. GLAZIER: It was a long time ago as 
THE COURT: More than ten years ago? 
MS. GLAZIER: Yes. 
THE COURT: And do you know what injuries 
your other brother sustained? 
MS. GLAZIER: My brother was not injured. 
It was the other person, the person who hit him. 
THE COURT: So it was your brother, you 
believe, was being sued? 
MS. GLAZIER: He was a minor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any 
knowledge of any -- of the outcome of that situation 
at all? 
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MS. GLAZIER: I -- I don't believe. I --
THE COURT: Is there anything -- is there 
anything about that particular experience that would 
prevent you from being fair to either side of today's 
case? 
MS. GLAZIER: No. 
THE COURT: Any other response to that 
question? 
Glazier 
MS. GLAZIER: I don't think so. 
THE COURT: Question Number 12? 
MS. GLAZIER: No. Not that I know of. 
THE COURT: 13? 
MS. GLAZIER: No. 
THE COURT: 14? 
MS. GLAZIER: No. 
THE COURT: And 15? 
MS. GLAZIER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. 
Members of the Jury Panel, we are going to 
take a -- I'm going to call it a 15-minute recess at 
this time. 
Please -- it's very important, number one, 
that when you return to the courtroom, that you 
return to the same seats that you're currently 
CITICOURT, LLC 
801.532.3441 
Jury Selection * Boyle v. Christensen 90 
sitting in. 
Additionally, Members of the Jury Panel, 
during this recess, it's very important that you go 
out of your way to have no contact whatsoever with 
any of the lawyers, their clients or any of the other 
participants in this particular case. 
Additionally, I'm going to have to require 
that you have no discussions or conversations with 
anyone regarding anything that's taken place here 
this morning so far. And that means no conversations 
amongst yourselves about this case as well. 
We'll recess for 15 minutes at this time. 
And Counsel, in about five minutes, I 
think I'd like to see you in chambers. 
We are in recess. 
(Recess taken at 11:15 to 11:30 a.m.) 
(Discussion held in chambers.) 
THE COURT: We are on the record. 
And -- and the record should reflect, 
again, this is case number 050912506. I have in 
chambers Mr. Christensen and Ms. Van Orman. 
And we're at a point in the jury selection 
phase of the case where we have questioned 16 panel 
members. 
And I understand that Ms. Van Orman wishes 
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to challenge for cause one of the first 16 panel 
members . 
Go ahead, Ms. Van Orman. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Yes. I would challenge 
for cause Juror Number 1, Claudia Allen-Kidder. She, 
when questioned, talked about her very close friend 
who lives across the street who was rear-ended and 
was a plaintiff in a lawsuit. She said that she --
her friend was in pain every day from back problems 
resulting from the motor vehicle accident. And that 
she -- appeared that she was very concerned about 
that. 
When she was asked if this would effect 
her ability to be impartial in this case, her 
response was "hopefully not." I feel that that shows 
that there is some partiality there. She did not 
answer unequivocally. And therefore, I think she 
would be parti al. 
And there is a challenge for cause. 
THE COURT: Do you wish to respond, Mr. 
Christensen? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. I don't think that 
the level of concern that's been raised there is any 
higher than we may raise over several others. I 
don't think it arises to the level of a valid 
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challenge for cause. 
THE COURT: Now let me say that in my 
questioning of Ms. Allen-Kidder, I think she 
responded substantially consistent with the manner in 
which Ms. Van Orman described it. I had a different 
view of her response, though. I was satisfied, based 
upon her response, that she could be fair and 
impartial. I did attempt to probe her with more 
detail as it related to her neighbor, who she 
indicates that she has these problems - - that has the 
problems, back and neck injury, that she associates 
with frequently. 
But I am satisfied that she did, in fact, 
give sufficiently satisfactory responses, that she 
could, in fact, be fair and impartial. So I'm going 
to deny the challenge for cause. 
Ms. Van Orman, are there any other 
challenges for cause as it relates to the first 16 
panel members who have been questioned? 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Not at this time. Unless 
-- I -- I would like to question Juror Number 8. 
THE COURT: And let me tell you what I'm 
intending to do. When we recess, I'm going to go 
back out and I'm going to start in with Ms. Kipp and 
get some additional information from her. And then 
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once we have her responses on the record, then what 
I'm going to ask is with - - whether or not you pass 
the panel for cause, with the exceptions already 
taken. If you pass the panel for cause, then I'm 
going to have you commence exercising your preemptory 
challenges. 
And I just want to make clear on the 
record, you have no challenges for cause; is that 
correct, Mr. Christensen? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 
MS. VAN ORMAN: No. 
THE COURT: How long -- how long do you 
think your opening statements are going to be? 
Even though I think what we're going to do 
is recess for lunch and come back. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: My guess is 30 minutes. 
THE COURT: Yeah. We'll get the jury 
picked. Then we'll recess and come back. Okay. 
(Recess taken from 11:34 to 11:37 a.m.) 
THE CLERK: All rise. 
The Court is again in session. 
Please be seated. 
THE COURT: The record should reflect that 
the jury panel has returned to the courtroom. And 
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counsel and their clients are also present. 
Mrs. Kipp, I'm going to ask that you 
stand. I have some additional follow-up questions 
I'd like to put to you. 
You previously described for us that -- I 
think you said, anyway, your husband was a lawyer in 
this community for 50 years; is that correct? 
MS. KIPP: Yes. Uh-huh (affirmative) 
(affirmative) ( a f f i r m a t i v e ) . 
THE COURT: And to the best of your 
knowledge, are you -- what firms was he associated 
wi th? 
MS. KIPP: He had his firm, Kipp & 
Christensen. 
THE COURT: And was that the only firm he 
worked with? 
MS. KIPP: Yes. He started it. 
THE COURT: And -- I know this question 
may seem obvious to you, and I'm not looking for an 
exact year, but as best as you can remember, what 
year was the firm established? 
MS. KIPP: Well, it was Kipp & Charlier 
when he graduated -- right out of law school. Kipp & 
Charlier started a law firm. And then it became Kipp 
& Christian. 
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But you know, it was probably 50 years 
before. Yeah. He had that firm and he didn't go 
anywhere else. 
THE COURT: And did your husband have a 
specialty in his legal practice? 
MS. KIPP: He did insurance defense. He 
did malpractice. He did business -- did some 
plaintiff work also, but a lot of defense. 
THE COURT: And -- and you may not know 
the answer to this question because you've stated 
that he did mostly defense. 
Do you have any way of determining, just 
by estimate, the percentage of work he did on the 
defense side versus on the plaintiff's side? 
MS. KIPP: Yeah. Probably 70 percent. 
You know, I'm just guessing. 
THE COURT: When you say "70 percent," 70 
percent on the --
MS. KIPP: Defense. 
THE COURT: -- defense side? 
MS. KIPP: Uh-huh (affirmative) 
(affirmative) (affirmative). 
THE COURT: And maybe 30 percent on the 
plaintiff's side. 
Did you often discuss the cases he worked 
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on with him? 
MS. KIPP: Not a lot. Yeah. I kind of 
knew what was going on. You know, if they were big 
cases, I guess we did, It's been so long ago. 
I also worked as a legal secretary. I 
forgot to say that in that one thing we said. 
THE COURT: Where did you work at as a 
legal secretary? 
MS. KIPP: Kipp & Christian; Ray, Quinney 
and Nebeker, and Jones and something. 
THE COURT: Jones Waldo maybe? 
MS. KIPP: No. It was small. 
THE COURT: No. Okay. What --
approximately what years did you work as a legal 
secretary? 
MS. KIPP: I worked as a legal secretary 
until 1977. So it was in my earlier life. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm curious to know as 
a result of the -- I'll describe it as legal 
experience that you've had, have you formed any 
opinions that would prevent you from being fair and 
impartial to either the plaintiffs or the defendants 
on this case? 
MS. KIPP: Not at all. Not at all. 
THE COURT: Are you satisfied that with 
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the experience you've described, that you can be a 
fair and impartial juror? 
MS. KIPP: Yes. Very much. 
THE COURT: Did you have any particular --
you had no particular field of expertise as a legal 
secretary or did you? 
MS. KIPP: Just --
THE COURT: Did some of everything? 
MS. KIPP: Yeah. 
THE COURT: All right Counsel , would you 
approach? 
And you may be seated. 
MS. KIPP: Thank you. 
(Bench conference held.) 
THE COURT: Did you have any other 
questions you want me to put to her? 
MS. VAN ORMAN: That's fine. Thank you. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No. 
(Bench conference concluded.) 
THE COURT: Now counsel, starting with Mr. 
Christensen, do you pass the panel for cause, with 
the exception of the exceptions already taken? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes, to the extent we've 
questioned the jurors. 
THE COURT: Ms. Van Orman? 
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MS. VAN ORMAN: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
Members of the Jury Panel, what that means 
at this point is that counsel are going to exercise 
what the Rules call their preemptory challenges. The 
Rules give each side of the lawsuit a certain number 
of - - there is no other way, but to say strikes. 
They are called preemptory challenges. It simply 
means that counsel can strike certain panel members' 
names off of the jury panel list. 
You should know that they don't need my 
permission to exercise their preemptory challenges at 
this point. 
And as soon as the -- counsel have 
exercised their preemptory challenges, what we will 
do next then is identify those who have been selected 
to hear this case and then we will immediately excuse 
those who have not been selected. 
And then for those who are selected, I 
have some brief preliminary instructions for you and 
then we're going to take the lunch recess. 
Just one moment. 
And counsel, you may begin to exercise 
your preemptory challenges. 
(Jury selection process from 11:43 to 
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11:50 a.m.) 
THE COURT: Members of the Jury Panel --
excuse me -- as your names are called, would you 
please stand, step forward and have a seat in the 
jury box at the Clerk's direction. 
THE CLERK: Heather May, Kent Pearce, 
Carolyn Kipp, Lynnette Hanson -- Lynnette Hanson, 
Barbara Harrison, Elda Sue Rasmussen, Michael Stanley 
Cotterman, Annette Mahler. 
THE COURT: Mr. Christensen, is this the 
jury you've selected, sir? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Van Orman, is this also 
the jury you've selected? 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And counsel, do either of you 
have any objection with the remaining panel members 
being discharged at this time? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: No. 
THE COURT: You may be seated. 
Members of the Jury Panel who have not 
been selected, again, thank you very much for your 
appearance and participation here today. We will 
keep you no longer and you are excused at this time. 
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Thank you very much. 
And Counsel, at this time, you may reverse 
your seating as well at this time. 
(End of requested portion of transcript.) 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: This is case number 050912506. 
Counsel, would you identify yourself for 
the record, please? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN; Roger Christensen for 
the plai nti ffs. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Kristin Van Orman on 
behalf of the defendant. 
THE COURT: You may go forward, 
Miss Van Orman. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Thank you. 
Your Honor, we are here with three 
motions. And I don't know if you have a particular 
order that you would like me to address them or one 
at a time or just do them all. What is your 
preference? 
THE COURT: Well, we probably should start 
with the fact that I thought you were initially here 
only on one motion but that's probably my mistake. 
MS. VAN -ORMAN: Oh, no. Okay. 
We are here this morning on three motions. 
The first is the motion to dismiss the loss of 
consortium claim from Mrs. Boyle. 
The second --
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THE COURT: And that's the one I think I 
definitely knew was on the calendar. But go ahead. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Okay. The second is the 
motion to dismiss Dr. Mason as a -« an expert witness 
in the case. That was filed back in December, I 
bel i eve. 
THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: And the third is a motion 
to dismiss Helen Woodard as an expert in the case. 
So those are the three. 
THE COURT: I did start reading the motion 
to dismiss of at least Miss Woodard --
MS. VAN ORMAN: Okay. 
THE COURT: So I have some knowledge of 
what that issue is about, but go forward. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Okay. I'll just start 
with loss of consortium. 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: And all of these motions 
are going to be straightforward and pretty brief. 
This particular case, as the Court is 
aware, we are set to go to trial in, I think, about 
two weeks. It's an automobile/pedestrian accident 
where the plaintiff was coming out of Smith's. We 
were coming around the corner, struck him in front of 
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Smith's. Liability is not in dispute in the case. 
It's an issue of causation and damages. 
The plaintiff, Mr. Boyle, has brought the 
suit. His wife, Norinne, has brought a -- a claim 
for loss of consortium. And we have filed the motion 
to preclude that claim based on the language in the 
statute. And we do not believe that they meet this 
as a matter of law and that she should not be able to 
proceed in front of the jury with her claims. 
Under the law, in order to establish a 
claim for loss of consortium, there is, as the 
Court's aware, some criteria. And I think we talked 
about this in our pretrial back in chambers. 
The first is there has to be a significant 
permanent injury that substantially changed the 
plaintiff's life, Mr. Boyle's life. That I would 
degree is in dispute in this case so there are issues 
of fact on that. 
However, taking that aside, the other 
criteria that must be met by the plaintiff is that 
there must be either a partial or complete paralysis 
of one or more extremity, significant disfigurement 
or incapable of performing the types of jobs 
performed before the injury. 
We don't believe that Mr. Boyle can meet 
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this threshold requirement of any of these. 
Number one, there was no complete or 
partial paralysis. He had a back injury. He has 
claimed that he has sustained a herniated disk in the 
accident and that he underwent a diskectomy. 
I don't think there are any allegations 
that he has had a partial or complete paralysis. 
There is no residual numbness or inability to move 
any of his extremities, nothing like that in this 
parti cular case. 
The second requirement is significant 
disfigurement. I don't believe that there are 
allegations of a significant disfigurement. I think 
in the briefing they have addressed the possibility 
of the scar where -- the small scar where the 
incision was made for the diskectomy. I don't 
believe that that qualifies as a significant 
disfigurement to establish a loss of consortium 
claim. 
And the third is incapable of performing 
the types of jobs .performed before the injury. In 
the current case, .pursuant to the plaintiff's very 
own deposition testimony, he is currently working. 
He is working 30-plus hours a week. His job is 
nearly the same as before. He works in the -- it's a 
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desk job kind of - - I want to say the mortgage 
industry but it's not really the mortgage industry. 
He works for Occurrence. It's -- perhaps counsel 
could better enlighten the Court on what this job 
entails. Prior to the accident he was working for 
Mascot Financial. He. worked there approximately a 
month or two. My understanding is that Mascot 
Financial is no longer in business, so he couldn't be 
working there anyway. 
But he, pursuant to his own deposition 
testimony, said that -- he was asked if his back 
prevents him from doing anything at work. And his 
response was "Not at that work." 
He is able to work. He is able to put in 
a substantial work week. He is also -- the testimony 
is - - was undisputed, he has maintained his 
employment at Glenmoor Golf Course where he works I 
believe one day a week in order to keep up his 
privileges to golf once a week for free. That has 
been consistent since the accident. And s o j don't 
believe that there o's any evidence that he is 
incapable of performing the types of jobs performed 
before the injury. 
There is no evidence in this case from any' 
physician and I don't anticipate that there will be 
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expert testimony. It's not in any of the reports 
that he could not go back to the same job that he was 
in prior or that he had any kind of work restrictions 
placed on him. 
So, for those reasons we do not believe 
that he meets the criteria for his wife, Norinne, to 
establish a loss of consortium claim. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Would you like counsel to 
respond or would you like me to just go through the 
othe rs? 
THE COURT: Unless he has a real problem 
with it, I would prefer you move on with all three 
motions. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Very well . 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's fine. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Very well. Thank you. 
All right. Let's talk about Helen Woodard 
first since the Court has indicated that you've read 
part of that briefing. That is a very, very 
straightforward mo.tton. 
Let's see. Our - - we had a case 
management order in this case -- in this particular 
case that was put into place. Expert disclosures 
were due August 29th, 2007. So last August. 
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For Helen Woodard, she was, in fact, 
disclosed to us August 3rd of 2007, so she was 
disclosed timely. There was an amended disclosure 
that listed her as an expert witness. 
However, that - - at that time the 
designation did not contain any kind of reports, 
nothing like that. 
The disclosure date came and went, 
August 29th, 2007, still no report. 
We basically had our pretrial conference 
about a month ago and I have not seen a report still 
from Helen Woodard. 
I inquired from counsel if he was still 
intending to call her. In fact, I sent a letter on 
April 10th of 2008 asking if she was still intending 
to testify because she was listed on the final trial 
witness designation. 
As of April 10th, 2008 we still had no 
report from her. We were told by a letter in 
response to counsel that she would still be called to 
testify and that they would be producing her report 
shortly. 
We filed our motion on April 14th, 2008 to 
exclude her as a witness. We finally received a 
report from her May 6th, which is a long time after 
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the disclosure date has come and gone. 
Trial is set to begin the first week of 
June. I think producing a report one month prior to 
trial, when we had not received any type of report, 
is inappropriate and she should be precluded from 
testifying in this case. 
That's Helen Woodard. 
Dr. Mason is a bit more complicated but 
not a whole lot. 
By the way, Helen Woodard I believe is 
like a lifetime planner. I believe that's her - -
that's her expertise. 
Dr. Mason, he is, I believe, a surgeon. 
He was not the surgeon in this particular case. That 
was Dr. Clawson. Dr. Clawson will be testifying in 
this case. So it's our position that excluding 
Dr. Mason from testifying would not be prejudicial to 
the plaintiff. 
In fact, Dr. Clawson, in his own operative 
report, which I thought was quite interesting, as 
kind of a side not.e; but in his own operative report 
he opined regarding causation in the accident. So 
it's not something that the plaintiff, by excluding 
Dr. Mason -- that that would prejudice them by not 
having him testi fy . 
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Let's talk about Dr. Mason. Again, the 
case management order in this case, expert 
disclosures and reports were due August 29th of 2007. 
We had a -- let me go to my timeline here. 
We had a mediation set September 28th, 2007. That's 
when the mediation was held in this case. 
We received Dr. Mason's first report, 
which essentially was a one-paragraph letter. No --
none of the Rule 26 disclosure requirements had been 
met. None of his background, not his CV, his rates, 
anything that he had testified prior to. And the 
one-paragraph report -- we've submitted it with our 
briefs -- was very, very brief, did not talk about 
any of the records that had - - he had reviewed, 
nothing. It just basically in one paragraph said, 
"I've looked at everything and I think that the 
surgery was related to the accident." That's a very, 
very small paragraph. 
I don't even recall getting this via fax. 
THE COURT: And, again, because of my lack 
of information on -this motion --
MS. VAN ORMAN: Sure. 
THE COURT: -- Doctor -- do I understand 
that Dr. Mason is not a treating physician? 
MS. VAN ORMAN: That's correct. 
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THE COURT: He is an expert. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: He is essentially an IME 
doctor retained by the plaintiff. 
THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: My records at work look 
like two days prior to the mediation that paragraph 
letter was faxed to my office. I don't recall even 
receiving it until the date of the mediation, 
September 28th. 
Again, regardless of either of those 
dates, it's a month late for the one-paragraph 
report. That one-paragraph report was absolutely not 
sufficient. 
Counsel is an excellent, excellent lawyer. 
His reputation in the community is the highest. He 
knows what is sufficient and what is not. 
We had a scheduling conference before this 
Court November 29th of 2007. At that time your Honor 
asked me what motions we intended to file in this 
case. And I had indicated the loss of consortium 
motion and also a motion regarding Dr. Mason, to 
exclude him as an expert. 
And shortly thereafter, December 5th, we 
received a new report from Dr. Mason that was more in 
keeping with the Rule 26 disclosures. It was 
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still -- let's see, August, November, December -- two 
months late. And our motion was filed to preclude 
him from testifying December 10th. It had actually 
crossed in the mail so we had prepared the motion 
prior to receiving the new report. 
However, once we got the new report it was 
still deficient. It's still deficient, especially in 
time as it did not comply with the case management 
order unless -- also note that there were no requests 
for extensions. There was no request, which I would 
have given, but they weren't -- it wasn't asked. And 
no request for extensions, no request for the 
opportunity to provide a supplemental report. 
And, again, we think that the case 
management order should be upheld in this case. 
There is no excuses for not. And excluding Dr. Mason 
would not prejudice the plaintiff in this case. They 
do have another doctor who is going to testify 
regarding causation. This is merely duplicative for 
the doctor to testify regarding it. 
Counsel,- I believe, is going to make a 
suggestion that, well, we didn't depose any of their 
experts and so it doesn't matter when they have 
disclosed them. And I think that's inappropriate. 
We did take the deposition of Dr. Clawson. 
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We knew he would be testifying. 
Dr. Mason, I had his deposition scheduled. 
But then I looked at the report and I said, "This is 
a paltry report, he should not be allowed to 
testify," and we filed the motion. 
That's where we are and I will submit it 
at this time. 
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, with respect 
to the motion to dismiss Mrs. Boyle's claim for loss 
of consortium, it is true this statute, the Utah 
statute on loss of consortium is not a model of 
clarity. But it does appear that what is 
contemplated is an injury that's sufficiently severe 
that it substantially changes someone's lifestyle. 
And as counsel has admitted, they don't dispute that. 
And that it makes --
THE COURT: Can I -- I hope you won't mind 
a question. Sufficiently severe - -
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Sure. 
THE COURT: -- to impair a party's 
lifestyle, is that language in the statute? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I think it's changed, to 
change their -- substantially change their lifestyle. 
THE COURT: Okay. But that's out of the 
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statute? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Which has clearly 
happened in this case. 
It also talks about also involving 
paralysis. In this case Mr. Boyle did go through a 
period where he had numbness because of the herniated 
disk. It talks about disfigurement, although it 
doesn't give us a lot of guidance on what that means. 
Obviously he has a scar from the major 
back surgery that he had. It also talks about not 
being able to do the kinds of -- and I believe the 
word is jobs -- previously done. I think that it's 
generally been interpreted as jobs around the house, 
employment, various things. 
Clearly Mr. Boyle, with the -- well, with 
the injury he sustained there is a lot of jobs he 
can't do. It -- the statute does not say, as counsel 
has suggested, that it is limited to the employment 
that he had at the. time he was hurt. Although his 
testimony was he could not return to that for the 
better part of the year. 
He gives us insight. Years ago he was 
a pro for a golf course. He gave that up a number of 
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years ago because it was too many hours away from his 
family. He was not doing that job at the time, I 
think it's pretty clear, there is no way he can do it 
now if he chose to. 
He described what he is doing at Glenmoor 
Golf Course. "I bring out the carts, the golf carts, 
and I tend the shop - - the pro shop. And I find that 
I can't lift two buckets of balls. They may be 
eight pounds each. I can't lift two of them at once. 
By the end of the shift my back really hurts and I go 
home and I get in the recliner for a couple of hours 
so it just won't hurt so much. I used to do lifting, 
I used to do things that I can't do anymore." 
He has testified that since this accident, 
again, which involved a herniated disk, severely 
compressing the L-5 nerve root, that -- he gave this 
testimony. "I can't recall having slept through the 
night twice since the accident. One was the first 
day that this friend gave me a Lortab, gave it to me 
about 4 o'clock when we went to play golf. I came 
home and sat in my recliner after 6 o'clock and I 
woke up the next morning at 6. That's probably three 
times longer than I've slept any time - - any one time 
since the accident." 
And then he goes on to explain that his 
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lack of sleep causes problems in everything he does 
"I get frustrated much more quickly I don't have 
endurance I don't work eight hours a day because 
six is about all I can handle And some days I can't 
handle that I wake up tired every day Very often 
I go back to bed Not to bed but to a recliner for 
10 or 15 minutes ]ust so I can function " 
Obviously someone with this level of 
disability, there are a lot of jobs that he can't do 
that he could do before he had that disability 
I think -- and also, your Honor, there is 
no question this has had an impact on his 
relationship with his wife They can't sleep in the 
same room anymore. He spends the night bouncing 
around the house from recliners to other things and 
just a lot of the night unable to sleep. 
I think we more than meet the statutory 
requirements for loss of consortium here. And, of 
course, this is Mrs. Boyle's claim. 
THE COURT Go ahead. 
MR CHRISTENSEN. With respect to Helen 
Woodard We disclosed Helen some time ago We asked 
her for a report She has had some problems with her 
husband's health and other things She was much 
slower than we had expected in getting the report 
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That did get provided to counsel recently. 
Helen Woodard is not a mystery in the 
personal injury area in Salt Lake. I suspect counsel 
is quite familiar with Miss Woodard. She does have 
her full report. 
To be candid with the Court and counsel, I 
am seriously questioning at this time whether it's 
worth the investment to fly Miss Woodard in from 
Denver to testify and the likelihood is that we will 
not do that. So that may be a moot issue. But I 
don't see any prejudice to the defense in this case. 
They have her report well in advance of trial and 
it's straightforward. And, again, this is a woman 
who testifies frequently in the more serious personal 
injury cases . 
Frankly, I am surprised that they are 
pushing the issue with Dr. Mason. We had an initial 
deadline in this case for disclosing experts. We met 
the deadline. The defendant didn't. And the 
defendant called and asked for several more months, 
which I agreed to, which I have found in my practice, 
life's too short tp create too many unnecessary 
hassles for opposing counsel. Those always basically 
come back to you. 
So we worked with them. They have now 
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designated three experts that don't even necessarily 
agree with each other But they have three medical 
experts 
We have designated one other -- other than 
the treating physician, Dr Clawson We provided a 
report to Dr -- giving them details on Dr Mason 
This was September of '06, so almost two years ago 
At least a year and a half ago 
He stated, "I have reviewed the records 
forwarded to me regarding the treatment of injuries 
suffered by Mr Boyle in an accident on 7-22-04 I 
did not have the opportunity to review the 
particulars of the accident itself but only the 
treatment rendered for his back problem 
"The record indicates that after the 
accident in question he experienced back and leg pain 
and was let in to receive treatment, which included 
chiropractic manipulation, medication and injections 
Because these modalities did not produce long-term 
benefit he sought the advice of a spine surgeon 
"He underwent an MRI scanning which 
revealed multi-level degenerative disk disease and a 
disk herniation at L4-L5 on the left which compressed 
the L-5 root on that side 
"He eventually underwent diskectomy at 
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L 4 - 5 on the left, which initially resolved his pain. 
As time has progressed some pain has returned, which 
studies have shown to be due to scarring at the 
surgical site, which is not uncommon. Unfortunately, 
it is likely this pain will be permanent. 
"Based on the records reviewed, I believe 
to a high degree of medical certainly that the disk 
herniation was due to the accident of 7-22-04. That 
the surgery was indicated by the disk herniation and 
that the scar pain is a direct result of the surgery. 
"It is extremely likely that he will have 
to deal with that scar pain for the rest of his 
life." 
That pretty well says it. That was the 
i n i t i a 1 r e p o r t. 
They had asked to take Dr. Mason's 
deposition. We scheduled that, we cooperated fully. 
Shortly before it was taken they cancelled. 
We said, "Let us know when you want to 
depose him. We will make him available." 
They h.ave chosen not to depose him. 
When we were over here a few months ago 
and counsel indicated for the first time, to my 
knowledge, the concern there, I got with Dr. Mason 
and got her a - - an extensive report the next day, 
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which addressed the concerns that were raised. I 
personally think this is more than adequate. In 
fact, I think brevity is a virtue, not a vice. But 
we've provided a second - - provided a second expert 
report from Dr. Mason outlining all the records he 
looked at and so forth. As the Court may recall, 
this trial got rescheduled once to accommodate 
Dr. Mason's schedule. He is the orthopedist for the 
Jazz. And because of the playoffs it conflicted with 
our prior trial schedule. That's now a moot issue as 
of Fri day ni ght. 
It would be highly prejudicial for us to 
not be allowed to use Dr. Mason. He has been the 
main one that is prepared to address the various 
causation issues which the defense has raised here. 
It is true that the orthopedic surgeon 
that did the surgery is on our witness list but he 
hasn't looked at this in nearly the detail that 
Dr. Mason has. 
In this case, your Honor, the defense has 
gone back I think -at least 40 years and gathered up 
medical records on Mr. Boyle. Every time a medical 
record showed any sort of a back pain it's been noted 
and made an issue. 
And, as I mentioned before, they have 
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three experts on their witness list and it would be 
very unfair to us not to have Dr. Mason allowed to 
testi fy . 
Honestly, I don't see the concern. There 
has been no unfairness here. They have been on 
notice for almost two years of what the crux of his 
expert testimony would be. At the time that was 
provided it was expected that he would be deposed. I 
am surprised he hasn't been, but that's their choice. 
We provided even more detail later. They 
have had all the records. It frankly seems to be 
some level of gamesmanship here to -- rather than 
addressing this case on the merits, to try to 
eliminate probably our single most important witness 
because liability has been stipulated. 
So, your Honor, we would strongly urge the 
Court to deny that motion. 
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
Miss Van Orman. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: I will be very brief. 
As to .the loss of consortium, the test is 
that the plaintiff, Mr. Boyle, is incapable of 
performing the types of jobs performed before the 
injury. 
He is going to get - - it's pretty much 
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guaranteed, he is going to get damages for his own 
pain and suffering in this case, so the things that 
counsel has talked about, him not being able to sleep 
well, et cetera, et cetera, he will get compensated 
for that. 
A loss of consortium claim takes it to a 
different level. It's a different claim. It's a 
claim of his wife. And it takes complying with the 
statutory requirements in order for her to make this 
claim. And I don't believe that he does that. I 
don't believe there is evidence to support that fact, 
that he makes it to that level for her to bring a 
claim. He is going to have his claim for his pain 
and suffering. He will get money for that. It's her 
claim that just does not stand. 
As for Dr. Woodard -- Helen Woodard, I am 
not going to address that. I think that that has 
been sufficiently dealt with. 
The only thing I would add to Dr. Mason. 
Counsel -- maybe he misspoke -- said that September 
of 2006 that one-p.afagraph letter was produced. It 
wasn't -- the date on the letter was from 
September 2006. I think that's when Dr. Mason wrote 
it. It wasn't produced until a year later, in 2007, 
at the time of the mediation. He was designated 
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timely but the disclosure - -
THE COURT: Are there any type of mailing 
certificates or anything like that on that letter 
reflective of when it at least was served --
MS. VAN ORMAN: Right I don't -- I could 
not find any type of a mailing certificate. I looked 
and I looked. I asked my paralegal to find when --
excuse me -- what documentation we have. And I think 
on the top there is a fax date of September 26th. 
My own recollection was that we were at 
the mediation and I recall the mediator coming in and 
saying - - you know how they, of course, play devil's 
advocate. He says, "What about Dr. Mason?" 
I said, "What about Dr. Mason? Who is 
Dr. Mason?" 
And he says, "Well he has been listed as 
a - - an expert." 
I said, "Well, that's great but I haven't 
seen him anything from him." 
And so he got permission from counsel to 
bring in the one-page letter and that's where -- my 
first recollection of ever seeing this one-paragraph 
letter that counsel read to you in full. 
So that was September 28th, giving them 
the benefit of the doubt from the date of the fax, 
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two days before the mediation, September 26th of 
2007, which is, you know, a month late. 
But the issue is, once we get that, that 
doesn't comply with Rule 26. Those aren't 
appropriate disclosures. We didn't get the 
appropriate disclosures until December 5th. 
So I just wanted to clear that up. 
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. Listen, 
I'd -- we'd like to set, if it works with the two of 
you, Wednesday at 8:15 in the morning for a telephone 
conference call on the record where I am going to 
rule on these three matters. 
Does that time work for both of you? 
MS. VAN ORMAN: It does. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: This coming Wednesday. 
And what was the date again, your Honor? 
THE COURT: What is this Wednesday? 
THE CLERK: The 21st. 
THE COURT: The 21st. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: And at what time. 
THE COURT: 8:15. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes, that would be 
wonderful. That would work. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Your Honor, may I 
just have - - I have one small request. If - - and I 
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don't know what your ruling is going to be. On 
Wednesday if you do rule that Dr. Mason may testify, 
I would ask -- I know it's short notice and I know we 
both have busy schedules -- I do want to depose him. 
I have wanted to depose him all along but I needed to 
see if he was going to be testifying first. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. You wish to say 
anything, then? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I have been clear that 
we would make him available from day one for 
deposition. And I -- I would also like to say, your 
Honor, it is my belief - - but I did not appreciate it 
was going to be this kind of an issue -- it was my 
belief that we sent this letter to opposing counsel 
shortly after we received it and certainly --
THE COURT: Do you evidence of that? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I don't know. I'm going 
to have to go look through my file. 
THE COURT: That's why I asked the 
question of counsel, whether or not there was any 
type of mailing certificate evidencing service. 
*""*" MR. CHRISTENSEN: I - - I'll be extremely 
surprised if they first learned of this letter at the 
mediation. Now, I don't question if that's what 
counsel recalls, but that would be very different 
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from my normal practice, not to give counsel a copy 
of this kind of information from an expert shortly 
thereafter, although the point remains, either way 
there is no prejudice to them and we will cooperate 
on producing Dr. Mason for deposition even at this 
late time. But, as I mentioned, I think counsel has 
decided to try to take a technical approach to get 
rid of a key witness rather than deal with the 
substance of the witness's testimony. 
THE COURT: I really just wanted to know 
if you had anything else to say only about the - - the 
deposition issue. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Oh. We will work with 
them. We'll make sure it happens. 
THE COURT: I'll talk to both of you then 
on Wednesday at 8:15. 
Court will be in recess. 
(Proceedings concluded.) 
# * * 
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OPINION 
ORDER and MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Now before the court is Defendant Ferber Resort's 
motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the 
alternative, for a new trial or remittitur (Dkt. No. 26). l 
For the reasons discussed below, this motion is DENIED 
in its entirety. 
1 Ferber Resorts' motion for oral argument on 
this matter (Dkt. No. 107) is DENIED. Ferber 
Resorts has already had two opportunities to 
argue its position at summary judgment and at 
trial. Moreover, oral argument will not assist the 
court in resolving this motion, as it is not 
particularly complicated. Under DUCiv.R. 7-1(f), 
therefore, Ferber Resorts has not shown good 
cause to hold a hearing and this motion [*2] will 
be decided on the basis of the written memoranda. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs E. James Spahr and Colleen Spahr brought 
this action for negligence and loss of consortium against 
Ferber Resorts. In short, Mr. Spahr suffered a serious 
knee injury after falling into a six foot deep concrete 
ditch while he walked from his room toward the motel 
office across a parking lot of the Rodeway Inn operated 
by Ferber Resorts. The Rodeway Inn was located in 
Springdale, Utah and the accident happened in the early 
morning hours. The Spahrs contended that Ferber Resorts 
failed to provide adequate lighting and protection for 
guests against falling in the ditch, since it was open, very 
near the parking lot connecting the guest buildings and 
the office building, and could be mistaken for a 
continuation of the parking lot in the early morning 
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darkness. 
A week-long jury trial was held starting on October 
19, 2009. At the close of the Spahrs' evidence, Ferber 
Resorts moved for a judgment as a matter of law on both 
counts. The court denied this motion. On October 23, 
2009, the jury reached a verdict in favor of the Spahrs on 
both claims, finding on the negligence claim that Ferber 
Resorts was 99% at fault for [*3] the accident, while Mr. 
Spahr was 1% at fault. The court entered judgment on the 
jury's verdict on October 29, 2009 in the amount of $ 
393,001.45 in favor of Mr, Spahr and $ 42,498.55 in 
favor of Ms. Spahr. 
Ferber Resorts made a timely motion for judgment as 
a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 50 or alternatively for remittitur or a new trial 
pursuant to Rule 59. In support of its motion for judgment 
of a matter of law, Ferber Resorts contends that the 
verdict was contrary to law because Ferber Resorts owed 
no duty to Mr. Spahr and because Ms. Spahr did not 
satisfy the requirements under Utah law for her loss of 
consortium claim. In support of its request for new trial 
or remittitur, Ferber Resorts asserts that the verdict was 
against the weight of the evidence, that the awards were 
excessive, and that the jury was improperly prejudiced by 
the Spahrs' closing arguments. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Legal Standards 
A. Judgement as a Matter of Law under Rule 50 
"Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only 
when the evidence presented at trial does not permit a 
reasonable jury to find for the non-movant." Manzanares 
v. Higdon, 575 F3d 1135, 1142 (10th Or. 2009) 
(citations omitted). [*4] In deciding such a motion, a 
court must "not weigh evidence, judge witness 
credibility, or challenge the factual conclusions of the 
jury." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Further, the court "must view the evidence and all 
inferences in the light most favorable to. . . the 
non-moving party, and. . . must be guided by the 
requirements of the underlying cause of action." Palmer 
v. City of Monticello, 31 F.3d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir. 
1994). 
B. New Trial or Remittitur under Rule 59 
A motion for a new trial or remittitur under Rule 59 
should be granted only if the jury's verdict is "clearly, 
decidedly or overwhelmingly against the weight of the 
evidence." Escue v. Northern Okla. College, 450 F.3d 
1146, 1157 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). Moreover, when considering such a 
motion, "the jury's award is inviolate unless. . . it [is] 'so 
excessive that it shocks the judicial conscience and raises 
an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, 
corruption, or other improper cause invaded the trial.'" 
M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 565 F.3d 753, 766 
(10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). As with a motion 
under Rule 50, when considering a [*5] motion under 
Rule 59 for a new trial or remittitur, all evidence must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing 
parties. See Escue, 450 F.3d at 1156. 
II. Ferber Resorts' Motion 
A. Judgement as a Matter of Law under Rule 50 
Ferber Resorts argues that it is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law on both Mr. Spahr's negligence claim 
and Ms. Spahr's loss of consortium claim. The evidence 
at trial was sufficient to support the jury verdict finding 
Ferber Resorts liable on both claims, requiring the court 
to deny both motions. 
1. Ferber Resorts Owed a Legal Duty to Protect Mr. 
Spahr from a Dangerous Condition. 
Ferber Resorts contends that Mr. Spahr knew that he 
was walking into the darkest part of the property and took 
the risk that he might be injured as a result. According to 
Ferber Resorts, Mr. Spahr's doing so relieved Ferber 
Resorts of any legal duty to Mr. Spahr. 
The court concludes that the evidence does not 
compel a finding that, because Mr. Spahr knew it was 
dark, the dangerous condition at the Rodeway Inn should 
have been open and obvious to him. To the contrary, Mr. 
Spahr presented evidence that reasonably supported the 
jury's finding that Ferber Resorts had a legal duty [*6] to 
provide adequate lighting and otherwise protect against 
the risk that a person would not see the ditch while 
attempting to walk from the motel rooms to the motel 
office. For example, Mr. Spahr testified that while 
attempting to reach the office in the early morning hours 
he was not simply walking into a pitch dark area. Rather, 
he recalled that there was bright lighting near the guest 
buildings and ambient lighting as he walked away from 
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the guest buildings. Moreover, there was a light on near 
the office which he testified he was walking directly 
toward. There was also evidence that the drive way light 
on the pole next to the ditch was not on, the automatic 
timer apparently having turned the light off long before 
day light. This testimony was corroborated by other 
evidence. Mr. Spahr further testified that the area of the 
ditch that he walked into appeared to him to be a 
continuation of the pavement, not simply an abyss. The 
photographs of the ditch and its surroundings, as well as 
other evidence, support this testimony. This testimony, 
along with other evidence, supports a finding that the 
darkness into which Mr. Spahr walked did not alone 
reasonably put him on notice of a danger. [*7] 2 
2 Ferber Resorts also argues in reply that the 
darkness was the only possible source of 
negligence and that darkness was a temporary 
condition of which Mr. Spahr did not show Ferber 
Resorts had notice. First, because Ferber Resorts 
makes these arguments for the first time on reply 
and not in response to any argument in Mr. 
Spahr's opposition, they may be disregarded In 
any event, these arguments have no merit. The 
facts support a conclusion that it was negligent for 
Ferber Resorts to leave the ditch unlit and 
unprotected because it was reasonably foreseeable 
that someone exercising proper care might 
nonetheless fall in the ditch. More specifically, 
the jury could have reasonably concluded that it 
was reasonably foreseeable to Ferber Resorts that 
a guest in low lighting might mistake the ditch for 
a continuation of the parking lot's pavement. 
Moreover, it is clear that Ferber Resorts made a 
decision to place the lights on an automatic timer 
that turned the lights off before day light during 
part of the year. The dangerous condition was 
created by the lack of lighting and the unprotected 
ditch opening. While providing lighting might 
have helped to avoid a negligence claim, the lack 
[*8] of lighting was not the only cause of the 
dangerous condition here. Accordingly, the jury 
could have reasonably concluded that even if the 
accident had occurred before the automatic light 
turned off, Ferber Resorts was still aware of a 
dangerous condition under Ferber Resorts' 
control. In any event, in Instruction 22, the jury 
was specifically informed that a business owner 
cannot be held liable for a condition of which the 
owner had no knowledge. Ferber Resorts was 
therefore free to argue to the jury that it had 
insufficient notice to say that it knew of any 
danger. 
Ferber Resorts relatedly argues that the question 
regarding an open and obvious danger on the verdict 
form was improper. On the form, the jury was asked if 
the condition of the land was an open and obvious danger 
to Mr. Spahr. Ferber Resorts contends that the jury 
should have been separately asked whether the darkness 
alone was open and obvious to Mr. Spahr and whether he 
knowingly took a risk by walking into that darkness. But 
there is no Utah case in which darkness by itself 
governed the open and obvious inquiry. Rather, in cases 
such as Black v. Nelson, 532 P.2d 212, 212-14 (Utah 
1975), Utah courts look at all the circumstances [*9] in 
which the plaintiff found him or herself in darkness, 
including, among other things, the degree of the darkness, 
the characteristics of the area in which the plaintiff 
encountered the darkness, and the obvious alternatives to 
walking into the darkness. The Second Restatement of 
Torts, on which Ferber Resorts relies, underlies this 
principle, stating that if a "person knows of the actual 
conditions and dangers involved," then such a person can 
be said to have purposely incurred a risk. Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 343(A) (emphasis added). This 
statement of the law makes plain that darkness is but one 
factor in the factual analysis of whether there was a 
known danger. In this case, the evidence fairly supported 
a jury finding that the darkness was only one factor that 
created the dangerous condition. 
In any event, Ferber Resorts was free to, and did, 
argue to the jury that the darkness was so extreme that 
any reasonable person would have taken the darkness 
alone as a danger. Ferber Resorts also made other 
arguments that the danger was open and obvious. For 
example, Ferber Resorts pointed to safer alternatives that 
Ferber Resorts contended should have been obvious to 
Mr. Spahr. Ferber [*10] Resorts also argued that Mr. 
Spahr was not walking on pavement immediately before 
he fell into the ditch, and the characteristics of the terrain 
on which he was walking should have given him notice 
of a potential danger. Ferber Resorts also suggested that 
during his several day stay at the motel Mr. Spahr had 
seen or should have seen the area into which he fell 
before he atlempted to walk to the office in the dark. 
None of these arguments were precluded by the form of 
the question on the verdict form. If the jury had accepted 
them, it would have been reasonable for the jury to find 
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that the danger was open and obvious to Mr. Spahr on 
Question 1 of the form, or alternatively that Mr. Spahr 
was over 50% at fault. And the jury was expressly 
instructed to, and in fact did on the verdict form, consider 
and quantify the extent of Mr. Spahr's own actions in 
causing the accident. 
And the evidence indeed reasonably supported the 
jury's nearly complete rejection of Ferber Resorts' 
arguments, which was reflected in the verdicts that the 
dangerous condition of the land was not open and 
obvious to Mr. Spahr and that he was only 1% at fault. As 
already mentioned, Mr. Spahr testified that he was not 
[*11] in total darkness and did not believe he was 
walking into it either. This testimony rebuts the 
arguments that the darkness alone was a known danger to 
Mr. Spahr and that he had some reason to seek out 
another route. Mr. Spahr also testified that he was 
walking on pavement immediately before he fell which 
the jury could have reasonably believed. Mr. Spahr 
further testified that he had not previously noticed the 
ditch into which he fell which the jury was also free to 
believe. 
In sum, Mr. Spahr presented evidence sufficient to 
support his contention that the dangerous condition at the 
Rodeway Inn was not open and obvious to him. He was 
therefore not precluded from claiming that Ferber Resorts 
owed him a legal duty of care. 
2. The Evidence Supports the Verdict for Loss of 
Consortium. 
Ferber Resorts asserts that Ms. Spahr did not prove a 
significant injury to Mr. Spahr sufficient to satisfy Utah 
Code Annotated § 30-2-11, the loss of consortium statute. 
Specifically, Ferber Resorts contends that Ms. Spahr did 
not present evidence that Mr. Spahr was "paralyzed," that 
he had a "significant disfigurement," or that he was 
"incapable" of performing the types of jobs he did before 
the injury as [*12] required by § 30-2-1 l(l)(a). 
Mr. Spahr did not claim to have been paralyzed and 
no evidence was offered to support such an assertion. Ms. 
Spahr did, however, present evidence of scars on Mr. 
Spahr's knee, a fact that Ferber Resorts concedes. The 
most striking evidence was a photograph taken shortly 
after the injury showing massive and deep scarring. This 
photograph was received together with testimony that the 
scarring was at present slightly less pronounced than in 
the picture. There was further testimony that Mr. Spahr 
was ashamed to be seen in shorts because people might 
see the scarring to his knee. While neither party has cited 
any Utah authority establishing what exactly is required 
to show a "significant disfigurement" under § 
30-2-1 l(l)(a)(ii), the court is convinced that the extreme 
scarring to Mr. Spahr's knee reasonably meets that 
definition. 3 
3 The court is not convinced to the contrary by 
Stone v. Ware Shoals Mfg. Co., 192 S.C. 459, 7 
S.E.2d 226, 227-29 (S.C. 1940), which is an 
extremely dated, non-Utah case interpreting the 
question of what was meant by "serious bodily 
disfigurement" under South Carolina's 
then-existing worker's compensation statute. 
Moreover, there was evidence that [*13] Mr. Spahr 
was unable to perform key aspects of the types of jobs he 
did before the injury. For example, Ms. Spahr presented 
evidence that Mr. Spahr could not kneel to garden and 
could not climb ladders to engage in carpentry. Ferber 
Resorts contends that "incapability" in § 
30-2-11(1)(a)(Hi) must be read literally, meaning that if 
Mr. Spahr has any possible means to perform jobs, he is 
capable of those jobs. 4 Such a literal reading of the 
statute is not warranted by the face of the statute. Unless 
they are paralyzed (which is covered separately by § 
30-2-11(1) (a) (i)), resourceful people may often find new 
and inventive ways to accomplish many of the same jobs 
they did before injury. For example, Mr. Spahr may be 
able to garden laying down, or to buy a hydraulic lift to 
help him build ceilings or complete other jobs that would 
be normally done on a ladder. Rather than being literally 
and completely incapable of doing a job even in a most 
limited and extraordinary way, then, being unable to 
engage in an essential part of a job in a routine manner 
must suffice to make one incapable of performing that 
job under the statute. In this case, the evidence 
reasonably supported a finding by [*14] the jury that Mr. 
Spahr was incapable of performing many of the jobs he 
had done before the injury. It cannot be reasonably 
disputed that as a routine matter, gardening requires 
kneeling and carpentry requires climbing ladders. 
4 Ferber Resorts also contends that "jobs" must 
mean paid employment. There is nothing in the 
statute that compels that reading, and the word 
jobs is commonly understood to include paid and 
unpaid pursuits. 
The Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Boyle v. 
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Christensen, 219 P.3d 58, 63, 2009 UT App 241 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 2009) does not persuade the court otherwise. In 
Boyle, the injured party admitted in his deposition that he 
had performed the same jobs after his injury that he had 
performed before his injury, albeit in "significant 
discomfort." Id. In that context, the Boyle court found 
that the party was capable of doing those jobs, noting that 
"the statute does not speak in terms of impairment, but, 
rather, 'incapacity."' Id. (citing Utah Code Annotated § 
30-2-11(1)(a)(in). Here, the record supports a conclusion 
that Mr. Spahr is not simply in discomfort doing jobs he 
had done before, but is incapable of kneeling and 
climbing ladders. Accordingly, Ms. Spahr's claim does 
not hinge [* 15] on an argument that he is impaired in his 
gardening and carpentry, but on proof that he is 
altogether precluded from them. 5 
5 Even if the court has improperly distinguished 
Boyle and a more correct reading of the statute 
would lead to the conclusion that Mr. Spahr is not 
incapable of performing these jobs, a straight 
forward reading of the statute makes clear that 
Ms. Spahr needed only to prove one of the three 
factors under § 30-2-11(1)(a)(i)-(in). 
For the above reasons, the evidence supports a 
finding by a reasonable jury that Mr. Spahr was either 
significantly disfigured, incapable of performing jobs he 
did before the injury, or both. Either of these findings 
supports the conclusion that Mr. Spahr was significantly 
injured as defined by the Utah loss of consortium statute. 
Accordingly, Ms. Spahr was not precluded as a matter of 
law from proceeding on her loss of consortium claim. 
B. New Trial or Remittitur under Rule 59 
Ferber Resorts argues that a new trial or remittitur 
should be granted for several reasons, all of which are 
broad and largely without objections made during the 
trial. First, it argues that no substantial evidence 
supported the amounts awarded by the jury. Next, it 
[*16] argues that the verdicts resulted from inappropriate 
and reversible passion, bias and/or prejudice stemming 
from the Spahrs' closing arguments. The court will 
address the Ferber Resorts' arguments below. 
1. The Size of the Non-economic Damage Awards is 
Not Excessive Given the Evidence Presented. 
Ferber Resorts contends that the size of the damage 
awards - about $ 393,000 in Mr. Spahr's favor and about 
$ 42,500 in Ms. Spahr's favor (both to be reduced by 1% 
due to Mr. Spahr's fault in the accident) — are either 
shocking to the judicial conscience or are so excessive as 
to "raise an irresistible inference of passion, prejudice or 
other improper cause." Blanke v. Alexander, 152 F.3d 
1224, 1237 (10th Or. 1998). As a remedy, Ferber Resorts 
seeks either remittitur of the awards or a new trial. 
Ferber Resorts' arguments are not well taken. Far 
from making a bare or unsupported assertion of 
non-economic damages, the Spahrs put on a great deal of 
evidence to support that claim. Mr. Spahr testified to the 
considerable pain, mental and emotional suffering and 
serious life consequences he has experience since his 
injury. 6 Mr. Spahr described in detail the agony he 
suffered when he fell into a [*17] nearly six-foot 
concrete ditch in which he landed almost full-force on his 
knee. He testified that the fall was a complete surprise 
and that he had no opportunity to brace or otherwise 
protect himself from injury on impact. He recalled calling 
for help for 20 minutes or more without any response and 
not knowing when he might be found. He explained that 
he had to stand on an injured leg to cry for help. He 
described having to devise a strategy to save his strength 
to maximize his chances of being rescued and not exhaust 
himself from 3'elling. He recounted having to hide his 
bloodied knee when he was finally pulled from the ditch 
so that his wife would not be overly traumatized by the 
sight of it. There was evidence that the long ambulance 
ride to the hospital was bumpy and painful for Mr. Spahr. 
There were photos of the injuries on Mr. Spahr's entire 
body from the fall, not limited to his knee. He presented 
evidence of the need for emergency surgery and the 
hospital stay afterwards. The painful and awkward 
multi-legged trip home from Utah to Nevada to Michigan 
was detailed. And there was evidence of the arduous, 
painful, and uncomfortable months-long period of 
recuperation and physical [*18] therapy. Mr. Spahr 
further put on evidence that he could expect pain, 
suffering, and a limited range of motion in his knee into 
the future. 
6 Oddly, Ferber Resorts cites Smith v. Northwest 
Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1416 (10th 
Cir. 1997) to suggest that only "exceedingly 
graphic or detailed" testimony will support 
substantial non-economic damages. The court 
reads Smith as making clear that graphic or 
detailed testimony is not needed for such 
damages, especially when the totality of the 
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circumstances is considered along with the 
testimony. See id. While Mr. Spahr was somewhat 
stoic during his testimony, the court does not 
believe that this stoicism compels a conclusion 
that the accident had an insignificant physical and 
emotional effect on him. In any event, the jury 
could reasonably find that Mr. Spahr gave 
detailed and graphic description of his injury. 
Mr. Spahr also detailed the effects of the injury on 
his personal life. There was evidence that the injury 
interfered and continues to interfere with the intimacy 
between the Spahrs. There was evidence that Mr. Spahr 
will no longer be able to garden or work as a carpenter. 
There was further evidence that he will be impaired 
[*19] or unable to do other activities that he was looking 
forward to in his retirement, such a water skiing, snow 
skiing, racquetball, jogging and hiking. The evidence was 
that Mr. Spahr enjoyed these activities before the injury 
and would no longer be able to engage in them. Indeed, 
the Spahrs were at the Rodeway Inn to hike in national 
parks. 
In light of the evidence that Mr. Spahr put on 
regarding his non-economic harm, the court's conscience 
is not shocked by the size of the award. While $ 393,000 
is a considerable sum, it can hardly be called a windfall 
when one considers the evidence put on about the 
incident and its consequences. Moreover, while this 
figure is more than ten times the approximately $ 30,000 
in medical bills that Mr. Spahr put on as evidence, there 
is no question that the injury was serious and extensive 
and required a significant period of recuperation. The law 
does not require a direct correlation between the evidence 
of the amount paid for medical care and the award for the 
total injury. The overall harm to the person, taking into 
account the impact it may have on all aspects of life, may 
significantly exceed the out-of-pocket costs for medical 
care. For all these [*20] reasons, the court does not 
believe the award to Mr. Spahr to be so excessive as to 
"raise an irresistible inference of passion, prejudice or 
other improper cause." Blanke, 152 F.3dat 1237. 
Likewise, Ms. Spahr put on ample evidence of the 
non-economic impact of the accident on her. She testified 
to the shock and trauma of being awakened by a stranger 
and then discovering Mr. Spahr visibly injured and in 
agony. She described having to take on unfamiliar 
responsibilities at a time of great stress. She detailed her 
own emotional pain at watching Mr. Spahr in physical 
and emotional pain and discomfort from the time of the 
accident until the present. She testified to her interrupted 
sleep, life, and work schedules while helping Mr. Spahr 
recuperate. She affirmed the negative impact on her 
intimate life with Mr. Spahr. And she described the loss 
of Mr. Spahr's companionship while she participates in 
activities that he is unable to do or finds too painful to 
enjoy. 
To be sure, $ 42,500 is a not an insignificant amount 
of money. But given the evidence that Ms. Spahr put on, 
it can hardly be said to shock the conscience. Moreover, 
while Ms. Spahr put on evidence of lost wages of only 
about $ [*21] 3,000, the impact of this accident was felt 
by Ms. Spahr in every aspect of her life, not just 
professional. The award to Ms. Spahr is thus not "so 
excessive as to raise an irresistible inference of passion, 
prejudice, or other improper cause." Id.1 
7 The court agrees with the Spahrs that the facts 
and the figures in this case are strikingly similar 
to those in Blanke, in which the court upheld 
substantial non-economic damage awards. While 
Blanke gives a comfort level that the awards here 
are appropriate, the court is aware that each case 
must be considered on its own individual merits, 
and it has done so here. 
2. The Spahrsf Closing Argument, While 
Inappropriate or Inartful in Some Aspects, Did Not 
Unduly Prejudice Ferber Resorts. 
Ferber Resorts contends that the Spahrs' closing 
argument was so improper as to warrant a new trial. 
Ferber Resorts points to four main categories of argument 
that it maintains were improper: referring to matters out 
of evidence, advancing personal opinions of counsel, 
implying intentional malevolence by Ferber Resorts, and 
making improper references to Ferber Resorts' actions in 
defending this lawsuit. 
First, Ferber Resorts' complaint is procedurally 
flawed. [*22] It is well established that a party must 
bring to the attention of the court errors that can be 
corrected during the trial. Ferber Resorts objected only 
once to one line of argument during Spahrs' closing and 
the objection was immediately sustained. Ferber Resorts 
did not object to any other part of the closing and did not 
request a corrective instruction. Moreover, Ferber Resorts 
did not move for a mistrial based on the closing argument 
before this case was submitted to the jury. In Computer 
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Systems. Engineering Inc. v. Qantel Corp., 740 F.2d 59, 
69 (1st Cir. 1984), the court ruled that a party's failure to 
object during close or to move for a mistrial barred the 
party from later "urging the improper argument as 
grounds for a new trial after the jury had returned its 
verdict." (citations omitted). The court reasoned that '"a 
party may not wait and see whether the verdict is 
favorable before deciding to object.'" Id. 
While the Spahrs do not cite a Tenth Circuit case in 
which a party was barred from requesting a new trial on 
these grounds, Computer Systems and its ruling was cited 
with approval in Angelo v. Armstrong World Industries, 
Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 962 (10th Cir. 1993). It is therefore 
[*23] probable that the Tenth Circuit would approve of 
the court following Computer Systems in this case. 
Accordingly, the court agrees with the Spahrs that Feiber 
Resorts' failure to object alone justifies the denial of this 
motion to the extent it is based on improper close. This is 
especially true in light of the fact that the one time Ferber 
Resorts did object, the objection was immediately 
sustained. 
Second, even if Ferber Resorts' failure to make 
timely objections or a motion for a mistrial does not 
preclude this motion, the court alternatively finds that any 
claims of impropriety in the closing did not, in context 
and in the totality of the argument, unfairly prejudice 
Ferber Resorts. Ferber Resorts fails to meet the relevant 
standards for the motion to prevail. In the Tenth Circuit, 
vacating a jury award and ordering a new trial on the 
basis of an inappropriate closing argument is an extreme 
remedy only to be granted in unusual cases. This 
proposition is made clear in Whittenburg v. Werner 
Enters. Inc., 561 F3dll22, 1124 (10th Cir. 2009), a case 
relied upon heavily by Ferber Resorts. In Whittenburg, 
the Tenth Circuit described itself as "reluctant" to order a 
new trial based on [*24] an improper closing argument. 
This reluctance would be unremarkable except for the 
fact that the Whittenburg court analyzed a closing 
argument that was blatantly improper in its entirety, since 
it compromised mostly of "fictitious admissions," and 
"vituperative and unprovoked attacks on defendants and 
their counsel" made with unusual "volume and 
volubility," that the impropriety continued "unrebuked 
despite contemporaneous objections" and that the 
impropriety had an "apparent influence" on the jury's 
verdict. Id. The Whittenburg court emphasized that it was 
only a "confluence of these three factors-the 
extensiveness of the improper remarks, the absence of 
any meaningful curative action, and the size of the 
verdict" that compelled the new trial in that case. Id. at 
1133. 
Put another way in another Tenth Circuit case, "even 
though an argument may be improper, a judgment will 
not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that the 
challenged remarks influenced the verdict." Lambert v. 
Midwest City Mem. Hosp. Autk, 671 F.2d 372, 375 (10th 
Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). Further, "[i]n applying this 
standard, we have consistently afforded trial counsel 
considerable leeway." Id. On the other [*25] hand, when 
"extraneous matter" is included in closing, the court must 
decide whether they had a "reasonable probability of 
influencing the jury." Id. (citation omitted). 
The Spahrs' closing arguments in a few instances 
crossed the sometimes fuzzy line between proper and 
improper. On occasion counsel spoke in terms that could 
have been understood by the jury to be his personal 
beliefs as to how the evidence should be viewed. But as a 
whole, the court is confident that the closing fell 
considerably and decisively short of the level of 
impropriety that would merit a new trial. Ferber Resorts' 
arguments otherwise, discussed below, are not 
persuasive. 
First, Ferber Resorts contends that the Spahrs made 
at least seventeen arguments based on matters not in the 
record. Before addressing any of these points specifically, 
it must be pointed out that the court gives weight to the 
fact that in this case, the jury was instructed that attorney 
argument is not evidence on two occasions: once before 
the opening statements and once before the closing 
arguments. The Tenth Circuit has emphasized that such 
instructions can mitigate the effects of references to 
matters not in evidence. See Whittenburg, 561 F.3d at 
1131 [*26] ("[W]e have sometimes suggested that a 
general instruction at the close of trial, reminding the jury 
that counsels' arguments are not evidence, can help 
mitigate an improper closing argument.") (citation 
omitted). Moreover, in the instructions given before 
closing arguments, the jury was told in Instruction 11 that 
"If any reference by the court or by the attorneys to 
matters of evidence does not coincide with your own 
recollection, it is your recollection which should control 
during your deliberations." Even further, the court 
provided each juror with a written copy of the jury 
instructions, including the instructions making clear that 
attorney argument is not evidence and that the jurors' 
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recollection controls. The jurors were allowed to follow 
along on the written instructions while the court read 
them and to take their individual copies into the jury 
room. The court is thus satisfied that the jurors were well 
informed that they should ignore any allegations or 
argument that were not supported by the record and 
assumes that the jury understood that charge. 
Turning to the substance of the arguments, the court 
agrees with the Spahrs that many of the arguments that 
Ferber Resorts asserts [*27] are unsupported by the 
record were in fact "comments to evidence in the record 
and reasonable inferences from that evidence." Id. at 
1125 (citations omitted). For example, the court agrees, 
after looking at pictures of the ditch as it existed at the 
time of the accident, the jury could reasonably infer that a 
child could have fallen into it. Making this argument did 
not require evidence that a child had actually done so. As 
another example, Ferber Resorts emphasized at various 
points in its examination and evidence presented during 
the trial the fact that Mr. Spahr had beer in his cooler at 
the time of the accident. It was also Ferber Resorts that 
elicited testimony from the officer who initially 
responded to the scene of the accident that the officer 
thought that Mr. Spahr must have been drunk to have 
fallen into such an obvious hazard. The Spahrs' attorney 
was thus justified in arguing that Ferber Resorts was 
trying to portray Mr. Spahr as a "stumbling drunk," even 
if Ferber Resorts' attorney subjectively believes 
otherwise. Moreover, as to the several examples of the 
Spahrs' attorney arguing that Mr. Spahr would have 
lifelong pain, there was evidence that allowed the jury to 
infer [*28] that he would have such pain. 
Ferber Resorts also points to a few instances when 
the Spahrs' attorney argued that Ferber Resorts had viable 
alternatives to leaving the ditch and its surroundings in 
the condition they were in at the time of the accident and 
that blaming guests appeared to be a cheaper idea for 
Ferber Resorts. Ferber Resorts argues that the Spahrs 
should not have made such an argument because Ferber 
Resorts did not argue that it had no feasible alternatives. 
But Ferber Resorts cites no case law for the proposition 
that the defense must first raise an issue before the 
plaintiff can argue that was a reason for the defendant's 
action. Further, it is quite clear from the closing that it 
was the Spahrs attorney's theory only that Ferber Resorts 
believed blaming guests to be cheaper than fixing 
problems. As such, this contention was not portrayed as a 
fictitious admission by Ferber Resorts, as in the 
Whittenburg case, but rather as an opinion of the Spahrs' 
attorney. The expression of that personal opinion was not 
in good form, but it was a minor point in the overall 
argument and was not emphasized to the point that it 
should be concluded it improperly influenced the jury. 
To [*29] the extent that the Spahrs' attorney did a 
few times refer to matters that were not arguably 
supported by the record, the court finds that they were 
"minor aberrations" unlikely to have prejudiced the jury. 
Id. at 1128. For example, the Spahrs' attorney's references 
to the employer/employee relationship were obviously an 
analogy intended to explain the concept of compensatory 
damages. Those references were thus not likely to have 
confused the jury or to have made the jury believe that 
Ferber Resorts employed Mr. Spahr. 
For all these reasons, the court finds that the 
arguments made in closing argument that Ferber Resorts 
characterized as references to matters not on the record 
were unlikely to have improperly influenced the jury. 
The next category of purportedly improper 
arguments are what Ferber Resorts characterizes as 
personal opinions of counsel, of which Ferber Resorts 
cites eight. First, the court acknowledges that some of the 
instances where Spahrs' counsel used the phrases "I 
think" and "it seems to me" were not in good form and 
counsel would be better advised to be more careful in his 
use of language. Nevertheless, in the context of the 
closing as a whole, it was clear that counsel [*30] was 
speaking in a colloquial sense and was not attempting to 
offer a personal assessment. Moreover, the court is 
baffled by Ferber Resorts' apparent contention that it is 
improper for counsel to make arguments about witness' 
credibility. That is exactly a purpose of closing. Calling 
his clients decent and honest, saying his expert is honest, 
and asserting that an opposing witness' testimony is not 
worth a hill of beans are precisely what the Spahrs' 
counsel was expected to do at closing. In zealously 
representing his clients, counsel could properly make 
those arguments. What would have been improper is for 
the Spahrs' counsel to purposely give the impression that 
he had formed a personal opinion based on information 
known to him but outside of the record. See, e.g., 
Whittenburg, 561 F.3d at 1130. But at no point during the 
closing did the court believe that counsel acted so outside 
of the leeway properly allowed to him to require a 
conclusion that he was trying to press his personal 
opinion on the jurors instead of his passionate arguments 
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on the case, nor is there any reason to believe that the 
jurors so understood the arguments. 
The third category of improper argument that Ferber 
[*31] Resorts identifies is allegations of intentional 
malevolence by Ferber Resorts. As Ferber Resorts points 
out, a suggestion by plaintiffs counsel that the defendant 
"acted with a degree of calculated intentional 
malevolence" is one that "has no foundation in [a] trial on 
negligence." Id. at 1129. In reviewing the nine instances 
of such conduct specified by Ferber Resorts, the thrust of 
most of the arguments is that Ferber Resorts is trying to 
escape responsibility for the safety of guests and the 
injury to Mr. Spahr. 8 The court accepts that these 
arguments may have implied some level of malevolence 
by Ferber Resorts, which was improper in this negligence 
trial. But the prejudice that might have been caused by 
this line of argument did not rise to the level at which the 
court needs to start seriously considering a new trial. For 
example, in Whittenburg, not only did the plaintiff invent 
an admission by the defendant that the defendant was 
going to act recklessly and then relentlessly and cruelly 
attack the plaintiff to try to get out of it, but the jury was 
asked to put itself in the plaintiffs children's shoes in 
considering this admission. See id. 9 
8 There are also instances of appearing [*32] to 
disparage Ferber Resorts for defending this 
action, which are addressed below. 
9 Moreover, the court observes that during 
Ferber Resorts' closing, its counsel did not always 
treat the Spahrs with a gentle touch either. For 
example, as the court recalls (though without 
referring to the transcript), Ferber Resorts' counsel 
argued that Mr. Spahr's decisions on the morning 
of the injury were alternatively idiotic, stupid and 
boneheaded. And none of these adjectives are 
needed to show simple negligence, which is 
simply failing to use reasonable care. 
Accordingly, Ferber Resorts's closing was not 
without some level of impropriety that was fair 
game for the Spahrs to "cancel out." Id. at 1130. 
The final type of argument Ferber Resorts identifies 
is the Spahrs' counsel appearing to disparage Ferber 
Resorts for defending this action, suggesting that Ferber 
Resorts' actions in defending the litigation are 
appropriately considered in the liability and damages 
analysis, and making other similar references to Ferber 
Resorts' actions in defending this action. This ground is 
Ferber Resorts' strongest, and is "especially concerning" 
to courts considering this type of motion. See id. at 1129. 
A defendant [*33] has a right to deny the plaintiffs 
allegations and to vigorously defend against the claims. 
Plaintiffs counsel cannot properly argue to the jury that a 
defendant acted improperly or that the jury should punish 
a defendant for doing so. But for the reasons discussed 
below, the court is convinced that to the extent the 
Spahrs' counsel engaged in these types of improper 
arguments, the level of impropriety was not significant 
enough to vacate the award here. 
First and most importantly, the court sustained 
Ferber Resorts' objection to the Spahrs' line of argument 
near the end of their closing that Ferber Resorts' actions 
in defending this suit harmed the Spahrs. These 
arguments were the most flagrantly improper and 
potentially influential ones that the Spahrs made. When 
Ferber Resorts' counsel objected to them, he gave as 
grounds that "this is going into conflated litigation 
difficulty with any sort of damages that are recoverable 
under tort law." (Trial Transcript, Dkt. No. 92-2 at Pages 
30-31 of 36). The court sustained this objection, without 
any hesitation, without allowing argument by the Spahrs' 
counsel, and without qualifying counsel's description of 
the impropriety. Ferber Resorts [*34] did not request any 
corrective instruction. After the objection was sustained, 
the Spahrs' counsel again argued that a verdict in the 
Spahr's favor would restore their good name. But Ferber 
Resorts failed to object or request any curative instruction 
to clarify what was wrong with the argument, nor did it 
move for a mistrial. 
If this particular line of argument had played out 
differently, Ferber Resorts might have a stronger case for 
a new trial. But unlike in Whittenburg, the court 
intervened to decisively stop improper argument 
immediately in response to Ferber Resorts' sole 
contemporaneous objection. Ferber Resorts sought no 
remedy to the potential prejudice beyond the granting of 
its objection, and the grounds stated for the sustained 
objection made clear that litigation difficulties are 
separate from tort damages. While the Spahrs' counsel 
again made reference to restoring the Spahrs' good name 
by granting judgment in their favor, the jury was put on 
notice by the objection that damage to one's reputation is 
not properly considered in deliberating on a negligence 
case. 
The other arguments of this type identified by Ferber 
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Resorts were improper, but were not significant enough 
for [*35] the court to believe they had a likely influence 
on the jury. For example, when the Spahrs' counsel stated 
that he was irritated because it seemed that Ferber 
Resorts was exceeding the bounds of propriety, it was 
clear in the context of the trial that he was referring to his 
own agitated behavior on cross examining a defense 
witness. The suggestion that Ferber Resorts was behaving 
improperly was obviously attorney argument that the jury 
was instructed not to treat as fact. The Spahrs counsel's 
references to the number and costs of Ferber Resorts' 
experts were made in passing and may well have been 
evidence the jury was allowed to consider in considering 
what weight to give to their opinions. These references 
were therefore unlikely to have the effect of suggesting 
Ferber Resorts' wealth or reprehensibility in defending 
the action. Id. at 1129-31. The court has reviewed the 
other instances identified by Ferber Resorts and is 
satisfied that they were unlikely to have influenced the 
jury. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For all of these reasons, Ferber Resorts' motion for 
judgment as a matter of law and for remittitur or a new 
trial is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this 4th day of February, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ [*36] Clark Waddoups 
Clark Waddoups 
United States District Judge 
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